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ABSTRACT

An

Inquiry into Organizational

Learning

September 1981

William Thomas Ratliff, III
M.Ed., Ed.D., University of Massachusetts

Conceived as one part of the effort to determine the distinguishing characteristics of long-term effective organizations, this disserta-

tion presents a model

of organizational

learning and reports on

a

case

study of a company designed to test the usefulness of the model.
izational

of

a

Organ-

learning is defined as the conscious and deliberate extension

consensual ly shared knowledge base by members of the dominant

coalition.
zational

is differentiated

The model

learning

in

from other theories of organi-

that it is not primarily concerned with individual

learning; political theories of decision making serve as the rationale
for focusing on the dominant coalition of the organization and on the

consensual ly accepted, publicly communicated, and integrated knowledge

base it develops.
nological

These ideas are also related to the current phenome-

ideas of organizational

Using this model

as

a

paradigms.

guiding framework, an exploratory case study

was conducted in a life insurance company.

The report of this study

describes the specific behaviors and patterns that satisfied the
definitions of the organizational learning model.
Insurance Company was found to have

vi

a

i i

Berkshire Life

very clear dominant coalition

which has developed and consciously refined
edge base.

a

consensually shared knowl-

There is some evidence to indicate that this pattern of

organizational

learning did lead to superior economic performance, but

attempting to establish this causal

link was beyond the parameters of

the study.
The important conclusion of the study is that the organizational

learning model, when combined with other, more operationally specific

theories, can yield very useful insights into organizational life.

most promising result is that this model could potentially provide

The
a

foundation for integration of presently disparate theories of organizational

behavior.

Other refinements of the model

are also proposed which

would make it easier to conduct more rigorous, equally comprehensive

research in the future.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Context for the Study

The overarching goal

izational

of all

organizational theory, all organ-

research, is ultimately to provide those who live in, work in,

and guide organi zations--all

of us--with concepts and theories which can

be used to make organizations more effective.
riding purpose is advanced in small

Of course, this over-

steps directed toward more limited

goals, such as training more effective administrators or developing more

comprehensive and useful

Each of these subordinate

information systems.

immensely complex and interdependent with the

fields of work is still

pursuit of useful knowledge in other areas, some specifically related to

organizations and others pertaining to either more general or more
specific areas, such as individual
political

science.

psychology, computer science, or

Furthermore, just as the study of individual

be-

havior has lacked the unifying scientific premises that Kuhn has termed
a

"paradigm" (Ratliff,

has been termed

a

1

979), so organizational

theory and management

"jungle" without universally accepted principles

(Koontz, 1980), such as the laws of thermodynamics

in

physics and

chemi stry.

Even so basic an idea as "effectiveness" has proven extremely dif-

limitations (Conficult to define or use without resort to arbitrary
nolly, Conlon, and Deutsch, 1980; Pennings,

1

1

972; Pennings and Goodman,

2

1977).

Since effectiveness implies instrumental

action which is goal

directed, questions inevitably arise over whose goals are
being
achi eved- -members

goals, or the goals of consumers, government regu-

lators, or suppliers.

If the

members, individually or

in

concern is with members'

goals, which

groups, should be considered?

effectiveness implies standards.

Similarly,

What standards should be applied to an

organization--the economic model of profit maximization, levels of members' satisfaction or consumer satisfaction, achievement of publicly

stated organizational

goals?

Assuming the standards, how can organiza-

tions with different histories, different environments, different mem-

berships be meaningfully compared?
•These are all

troubling questions at

does accept certain admittedly arbitrary

trary may still be eminently practical

theory may still advance
are primary here.

in

a

theoretical level.

— because

one

theoretically arbi-

— assumptions,

very useful ways.

If

then

knowledge and

Such practical

concerns

The context for the purpose of this dissertation is

this quest for ideas that will enable organizations to function more

effectively.

Given the ambiguity and lack of definitive, causal

"proof"

that surrounds this core idea of effectiveness, the writer limited the
focus by making an assumption well

supported in the literature on

organizations, namely that those organizations which are most effective
over the long term are those which adapt or learn well.
Much of the current literature cites the crucial

organizational

"fit" or "match"

importance of

(Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch,

3

1969) to the specific nature of its environment.

At

the same time,

writers in numerous fields are concerned with the
accelerating rates of
environmental

change (Toffler. 1970).

"happen upon"

a

successful

Presumably, an organization may

strategy or ride

a

uct for some time, but to remain successful

single successful

prod-

for long periods during

which resources must be deliberately allocated and choices concerning

"future domain" (Thompson, 1967) must be made, an organization must have
the capacity for successful

adaptation to environmental

shifts.

process of long-term, deliberate and conscious decision-making
lation to adaptation or "organizational

cern of this study.

This
in

re-

learning" was the principal con-

To the extent that one could

identify aspects of

organization life that are central to this process of organizational
learning and develop ways to test for and subsequently strengthen these

aspects, then

a

practical

and

a

theoretical

advance in the development

of our knowledge of organizations would be established.
This study began with the assumption that organizational effec-

tiveness will be enhanced by
a

model

an

organizational

to describe organizational

learning.

learning process and with
The problem was that no

field research using this model had been conducted, and therefore

important questions concerning its utility remained unanswered.
a

report of such

a

This is

field study and of the answers it offers as to the

utility of the organizational learning model.
Certain definitions and limitations of focus are important to es-

tablish before proceeding.

Obviously, much of the review of the

4

conceptual

and

research literature is

a

more detailed description of the

origins and significance of these definitions.

A brief presentation of

these "destination points," however, should lend

sense of direction

a

and reasonableness to what is of necessity a complicated journey.

The

limitations tell where the study will not go and the assumptions
illustrate the starting point.

Definitions .
Dl.

Organization:

A group of individuals who act

ordinated ways

in

in

patterned and co-

order to achieve some collective purpose (Argyris

and Schon, 1978; Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Thompson, 1967).
This study was concerned with large and complex organizations which operate in

of

a

a

variety of domains and within the context

complicated set of interdependencies.

A family or a one-to-

one therapeutic relationship may be considered an organization, but

are not sufficiently similar to organizations considered here to

assume research results would be meaningful
D2.

Organizational

knowledge:

in

relation to them.

Knowledge about organizational

action-

outcome relationships and the conditions, both within the organization and in the external
ships hold;

in order

environment, under which these relation-

for this knowledge to be organizational

rather than simply individual, it must be accessible and communicable to all members of the dominant coalition, integrated with

knowledge of the interdependence of various organizational

actions,

(Duncan
and consensual ly held by members of the dominant coalition

and Weiss, 1979).

5

D3.

Dominant coalition:

"That group of interdependent individuals who

collectively have sufficient control of organizational resources to
commit them

in

certain directions and to withhold them from others"

(Thompson, 1967, p. 128).
04.

Organizational

learning:

of organizational

The conscious and deliberate development

knowledge, which may be

a

formal

or informal

process, by the dominant coalition.
D5.

Organizational

adaptation:

through organizational

The adjustment to environmental

action, which may be but

is

change

not necessarily

based on organization knowledge.
D6.

Organizational

paradigm:

tions, and perceptual

A set of beliefs, assumptions, expecta-

frames of reference which are instilled in

organization members through the process of socialization and which
may be either conscious or unconscious.

Those elements of the

paradigm which are consciously held and shared by members of the
dominant coalition are

a

subset of organizational

knowledge.

Limitations .
LI.

Concerned only with knowledge which is consciously and deliberately held and applied in the processes of problem-solving,

decision making, and planning within the dominant coalition.
L2.

Concerned only with the development of knowledge, not with its im-

plementation.
a

Knowledge pertaining to implementation is certainly

vitally important subset of organizational

knowledge, and the

6

implementation step

is

one part of the learning cycle

in

that it

generates new information pertaining to errors or performance gaps.
The success, failure, or even the actuality of implementation is
not of concern here, however, only the development of knowledge.
L3.

Although this project

is

certainly one small step

in

defining the

characteristics that distinguish effective organizations from ineffective ones and an assumed link between organizational

learning

processes and effectiveness is an important aspect of the rationale
for the project, this project is not concerned with qualitative issues or evaluation of organizational

learning, only with identify-

ing the component processes of organizational

learning.

Before

a

process can be assessed, it must be identified, understood, and de-

scribed.

Assumptions .
Al.

A cognitive-phenomenological

view of individual

learning, which

includes goal -di rected behavior, accepts only limited rationality,
and weights perceptions and beliefs as opposed to realities

(Argyris and Schon, 1974; Epstein, 1973; Thompson, 1967).
A2.

A systems view of organizations which stresses the interdependence

of all organizational

subsystems, incorporates feedback loops and

tendency to maintain homeostasis, but is not deterministic

in

that

there is limited discretion and choice available to organization
constraints.
members within the range allowed by environmental

a

7

The dominant coalition
exercises discretion

is that

in

group within the organization which

organizational action, as opposed to the

discretion available to any organization member for individual
action.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this stuciy was to assess the utility of

theoretical model

of organizational

a

certain

learning.

The core constructs have been well developed, at least up to

certain point, by various authors

in the

field.

development will be the basis of Chapter II.

a

Reviewing this

The model

described herein

had never previously been the basis of a field study, however, so that

the constructs and propositions which make up the model required testing
and refinement.

A brief introduction to the model

is needed

before this

purpose can be elaborated upon.
There are two central
framework.

and

reciprocal

elements in this conceptual

The first is the "dominant coalition"

and the second is "organizational

in

the organization

knowledge."

Much of the literature concerning organizational decision making

has focused on either predicting decisions assuming rationality or

presenting new, more rational ways to make decisions.

This literature

has been roundly critiqued from various points of view (Pfeffer,

1

977)

affect
and it is widely understood now that major decisions, those that

the life and functioning and direction of the whole organization, are

arrived at through

a

process more properly described as political than

8

rational

(Cyert and March,

1

963; Gabarro,

1

979; March and Olsen,

Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Thompson, 1967).

1

It

976;
is one

in which coalitions among the members of the highest echelons of the

organization, as well as powerful outsiders, play
This conception of organizational

a

central

role.

decision-making has been one

contributing theme to the conflict over use of organizational goals as
an element in considering organizational
is not synonymous with any coalition,

effectiveness:

an organization

particularly over time, and yet

cannot be anthropomorphized as an entity separate from its constituent

coalitions. The "dominant coalition" as presented by Thompson (1967),
and as it is used in this paper, presents

of multiple organizational

redefining goals in

a

a

solution to these questions

goals and conflicting subgroup goals by

uniquely organizational

perspective.

Gtoals

can be

viewed as "intended future domains," and anyone can intend that the

organization move in certain directions, but only the dominant coalition
has "collectively

.

.

.

sufficient control of organizational

resources

to commit them in certain directions and withhold them from others" (p.
128).

Thompson and many others (March and Olsen, 1976; Pfeffer and

Salancik, 1974) have shown how this political

process of resource allo-

cation can lead to "side payments" and other activities that have little
to do with long-term fulfillment of formal

organizational

purpose.

There has been much writing and some research on the various determining

factors and internal

processes of

a

dominant coalition.

It

is generally

assumed that the dominant coalition is responsible for organizational

decision making and overall performance as well as the subtler role of

9

establishing behavioral norms for an organization.

Evidence of this

is

found in the literature that refers to the necessity of "top
management"

involvement in change processes (Allen and Pilnick,
1969;

Peters, 1980) as well

planning literature.

as in most general

1

973; Beckhard,

management and strategic

MacMillan (1978) is one of the few writers to both

note the centrality of political behavior in organizations and also an-

alyze systematically the appropriate responses of organizational
ship to political

phenomena.

inclusion of political

leader-

His primary concern, however, is with the

conceptualizations

in

the strategic formulations

of the firm in relation to its environment.
This leaves

a

troubling gap

of effective organizational

in

the literature, and

leadership.

a

our theories

Little has been published which

specifically addresses the underlying issue
characterizes

in

this paper--namely

in

,

what

dominant coalition which consistently leads an organi-

zation through effective adaptation.

coalition learn?

Stated more succinctly, how does

Using the literature for guidelines, this study was an

attempt to identify the dominant coalition

in

a

single organization and

describe its present learning processes; this was simply

necessary step in

a

a

a

first, but

series of research steps.

Use of "intended future domain" as a crucial

element in the

shared thinking of the dominant coalition sets the stage as well

concept of "organizational knowledge."

for the

This concept has been most fully

developed previously by Duncan and Weiss (1979) who emphasize the crucial

distinction between individual and organizational learning.

As the

10

dominant coalition goes about making the strategic decisions of resource
allocation and future direction, each individual member has knowledge of
the results a given organizational

conditions.

action will

precipitate under certain

These consequences are both external

and internal

affected by interdependencies with other organizational
as by environmental

conditions.

and are

actions as well

Organizational knowledge exists to the

extent that these individual assumptions and knowledge are consensual ly
shared by members of the dominant coalition, to the extent that individual
in a

knowledge is accessible to all members, and to the extent that
form that all members of the coalition can understand.

tional

knowledge exists

in

all

it

is

Organiza-

organizations to some degree, if only be-

cause certain causal assumptions and knowledge bases are generally
shared throughout the culture.
Organizational

of organizational

learning, as previously defined, is the development
Even

knowledge.

a

fleeting consideration of this view

of learning shows that it is dependent on two distinct aspects of func-

tioning within the dominant coalition.
of organizational

First, the quality and progress

knowledge is directly dependent on the quality of in-

formation on various aspects of organizational
any single member of the dominant coalition.

performance available to
There are numerous

sysexamples of innovative organizations developing unique information
of organizatems to support their special approach to the development

tional
is

knowledge (Chandler,

1

962; Dowling,

1

978). Once this information

organizational
available to any coalition member, the generation of

^

abilr
knowledge is then dependent on the willingness and

of dominant

11

coalition members to share
tions

it

useful ways.

in

can be taken for granted; for example, Pfeffer (1977) has
pointed

out that secrecy and privileged control
and effective means

power

Neither of these condi-

in

of information is a very common

for the maintenance and enhancement of individual

organizations.

Various authors (Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Sheldon, 1980) have noted

the similarity between the requirements for organizational
Kuhn's description of a scientific paradigm.

term because

it

knowledge within

tion and to distinguish that sense of "speci

knowledge that is generally available.

effect of organizational
a

"Paradigm" is

a

useful

lends a sense of the uniqueness that comes to character-

ize highly developed organizational

and

knowledge and

It

al

a

single organiza-

ness" from cause-effect

introduces the important

socialization, the creation of

a

perspective

set of expectations that can be either destructive or facilitative

knowledge.

to the generation of organizational

Since organizational

learning is dependent on the norms of sharing information as well as the

procedures of gathering it, this added emphasis to the overall "paraThere is at least extensive anecdotal confirmation of

digm" is helpful.
the link between

a

strong paradigm and organizational

(Chandler, 1962; Dowling, 1978; McKinsey & Co., 1980).

may be viewed as

a

effectiveness
Thus,

a

paradigm

certain type of extension, or perhaps an outgrowth,

of the development of organizational

This brief statement is
oretical basis of this study.
rate new theoretical

knowledge.

summary of the central

a

ideas in the the-

This project was not an effort to gene-

constructs.

The overlapping fields of management.

12

administration, and organizational
(Koontz, 1980).

The

behavior are inundated with theories

ideas summarized to this point represent

tion of the contributing elements in

a

defini-

a

process of organizational

learn-

ing which appears to be both accurate in its representation of
the reality of organizational

learning and also testable, observable, identi-

fiable in the terms proposed.

ter, it represents

a

Developed more fully in the next chap-

synthesis of the ideas about organizational

ing published to date.

This model

holds great promise as

learn-

conceptual

a

framework for integrating many different aspects of management and
organizational theory.

For example, if the model

for analyzing individual

provides

a

sound basis

organizations, its component concepts might

enable decision-making theorists to develop better hypotheses about what
kinds of decision making processes are most likely to lead to implementation of decisions at different levels of the organization.

At the

macro-theory level, it might lead to political typogies of organizations
which could be linked to predictions of effectiveness.
In

order for such advances to be realized, numerous studies of

various types must be carried out.

The first type of study--of which

the one described here is an exampl e--must be exploratory in nature.

By

attempting to apply the general model to the rich, often overwhelming

specificity of particular organizations, the model can be at once assessed and improved.

Knowledge about specific member behaviors which

lead to the extension of organizational
for instance.

After such general

knowledge may be established,

studies have refined the concepts and

demonstrated their overall usefulness, if that

is the

outcome, then

13

later studies can develop systematic methodologies for studying large
numbers of organizations in

a

comparative approach; and eventually cor-

relations between organizational

learning and some objective measures of

effectiveness can be sought.
The purpose of this study then was to make
fort at analyzing an organization in detail

organizational

learning model

a

first exploratory ef-

using the concepts of the

as the theoretical

foundation.

serves to evaluate the usefulness of the model and to aid

refinement.

Its usefulness has been assessed both as tool

and as a heuristic model

integrated way.

Chapter

for describing organizational

A by-product of the study, described

its

for analysis

behavior
in

in

an

more detail

in

is its contribution to the systematic methodologies mentioned

V,

above as

in

This

goal

a

of future research.

Methodology

The basic methodology utilized was an exploratory field study
focusing on

a

single organization.

As a

first effort to determine the

value of the model and possibly to improve it, this approach was merited
for several

reasons.

First, there are aspects of the model

and

its historical

de-

approach.
velopment that lent themselves to an intensive case study

model

is a relatively new one, never before used

project.

the

to

guide

a

research

propositions of
This means that both the constructs and the

model, as well

as the model's

relation to more general

theories.

The

14

are very much

in

the process of refinement.

the component parts of the model are

a

Operational

definitions of

particular priority.

The model

is also a relatively abstract one, not dependent on any single set or

sequence of behaviors.

Finally, it is

a

model

of both its realism and its significance as
for presently disparate theoretrical

cases (See Appendix

of great promise in terms

possible unifying model

a

themes.

Analysis of published

reaffirmed this promise.

B)

Given these attributes of the model which served as the guide for

this project, there was

a

near perfect match between the strengths of

the methodology proposed and the anticipated research problems.

Kerlinger writes, "Field studies are strong

in

realism, significance,

strength of variables, theory orientation, and heuristic quality (1973,
pg. 406)."

He goes on to point out that one of the principal

field study approaches is to lay

a

uses of

groundwork or foundation for later

research which can be more rigorous in the testing of hypotheses.

This

was particularly important to the purpose of this study where both model

and research techniques were being tested and refined more or less

simultaneously.
No
In

all

methodology had previously been used

of behavioral

to

research this model.

science, there is little assistance for matching

specific methodologies to specific research problems.

Therefore, more

open ended and exploratory approaches were deemed most desirable.

Interviews especially offered the opportunity, within the structure of

a

make conschedule calling for focus on broad areas, for subjects to

nections which seemed most important to them.

This expedited the search
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for areas of consensual ly held, accessible,
and valid knowledge and also
permitted more subtle aspects of the paradigm--such
as similarity in

phrasings or emphasis--to emerge.
promising ones to use

in

Thus, these techniques were the most

an effort to

uncover specific processes which

would fit into the more abstract concepts of the
organizational
model.

learning

Only after some period of time, at the point when
the model of-

fers discreet hypotheses about operational

and

controllable variables,

can the methodology become more specific and concrete.

Faced with this inherent ambiguity
well

in

results,

a

researcher does

to limit the complexity of a given project and simply be as open

and direct about the strengths and limitations of the project as pos-

sible.

Such is the case here.
An exploratory field study with a single subject offered the op-

portunity to engage

in

a

discovery process, one

in

which rich data and

researcher flexibility allowed for progressive strengthening of both the
methods and the guiding model.

The development of each illuminated the

other.
There were at the same time obvious limitations to this research

design.

These limitations are well established

behavioral

research.

in

the literature of

Kerlinger (1973) points out that the lack of dis-

creet hypotheses makes field research difficult to assess.

Furthermore,

no variables can be controlled, even if they can be sufficiently well

identified, and therefore relations between variables are difficult to

establish beyond appeals to logical

inference.
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A more important limitation still

general

is

i

zabi

1

ity

.

Without

more than academic comparisons to other organizations, there is the risk

that the results of this study are simply

osyncratic phenomenon rather than

a

a

report on

a

single, idi-

first step toward insight into the

learning process in all complex organizations.

Even supposing, as this

researcher believes, that the results are not simply reflective of an
isolated process, how far the findings can be usefully generalized
very difficult matter.

At the very least, there is

a

understandable

reason to doubt that the same processes would be found
in

is

in

the same form

organizations with very different purposes, of different size, or of

very different formal

structure.

Clearly, similar projects will be

needed to demonstrate the usefulness of the model

types of organizations functioning

in

in

varied environments.

important to keep in mind that the project herein was
an essential

varying sizes and

step if that process is to proceed.

a

It

is

first step and

So, with all

the pro-

blems and potential limitations of the project, it seemed clearly to offer a significant contribution.
As has been stated,

the theoretical model
to

in

this project there was an interplay between

and the research

uncover more specific situational

than the model

is designed

to

itself.

elements in the single organization

assess and also insured against signific-

ant gaps or blind spots in the research.

pectation that the model

and

This interchange helped

Thus, there was an ex-

the research method had to be "bendable

accommodate the enormous complexity of the variables involved.

This

to
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flexibility of approach has been defended by Mintzberg, who calls for
"inductive, creative, intensive field research" (1977, p.
94) when the

functioning of managers and policy makers is the subject.

He

sees this

as a result of the unstructured and varying nature of management work as

well

as of the current developmental

state of theory in this area of

organizational behavior.
At the same time, there were also checks and balances or cross

referencing built into the methodology.

Otherwise, lack of quantitative

or controlled data could have served to remove requirements for rigor
the linkage between research results and the theoretical model.

help was to be found

in

in

Little

quantitative models or formulas; almost none has

been effectively applied to complex organizational

phenomena (Koontz,

1980) and even when there was such research, as in laboratory investiga-

tions of coalition behavior (Wahba, 1977),
practical

it

was so divorced

situations as to be only peripherally related.

was developed, however, that met the needs

the relevant.

from

A methodology

for rigor without absenting

The overall technique here was to investigate important

phenomena using at least two independent sources of information to check

against each other.

For example, relationships between the President

and other members of the dominant coalition were assessed through self-

reports and through reports of

third parties.

This approach of pursu-

ing different perspectives on the same event/object is

verification technique (Bateson,
solving as well as in science.

1

a

fundamental

979) in daily living and problem-

When confronted with divergent phenomena
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that have no "correct" or logical

end-point and where replication in

a

precise sense is impossible, this type of model verification presents
the only alternative to simple anecdotal

reports.

Writers primarily

focused on research methods have made the same appeal

verification

(Campbell

and Fiske,

1

for cross-

959; Webb, 1966).

The goals of a methodology for diagnosing organizational

within this model were threefold.
be

identified.

learning

First, the dominant coalition had to

Second, the various elements of organizational

knowl-

edge, both the specific action-outcome relations and more importantly,
the paradigmatic beliefs or philosophical

established or verified.

guidelines, had to be clearly

Third, the processes whereby this knowledge is

developed and altered by the dominant coalition had to be identified,
with attention to both the specific behaviors involved and also to the
contextual

factors, internal norms, and "intelligence functions" that

shaped the organizational

learning process.

The organizational

constructs had to be operationalized into observable phenomena.

learning
The

methods applied permitted this activitity to proceed within the research
project itself because no prior research had developed these operational

definitions.
A review of the methods used in similar investigations shows con-

sistent overlap.

Furthermore, their effectiveness has been verified at

least informally by both general

many settings to various ends.
many researchers has been

a

use and by successful

application in

The first and most obvious approach for

combination of direct observation and
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interviews (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Beckhard, 1969; Gabarro,

1

979;

March and Olsen, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Schon, 1978).
the number of people included
in

in

a

Since

dominant coalition is not great, even

very large and complex organizations, this approach is both practical

and also productive because it can yield

a

great deal

of

information.

Although it presents many problems, such as censoring, bias, and possible misinformation, it has the added advantage of possibly revealing

other sources of information that can be used to substantiate or dis-

confirm the interview results, and which may well be peculiar to the
specific organization or type of organization.
One crucial

aspect of the focus of this investigation to keep in

mind was its limitation to conscious and deliberate organizational

learning efforts by members of the dominant coalition.

This focus, in

and of itself, made the study more amenable to research based on self

report and less susceptible to abusive attributions of internal

processes.

Pfeffer and Salancik (1974), investigating the impact of intrauniversity politics on budget resource allocation, set out first to find
out which departments were most powerful.

departmental chairmen and historical

They combined interviews with

studies of key faculty committee

memberships and found significant corroboration between the two
sources.

Many researchers primarily concerned with only
have been even more reliant on interviews.

a

few top managers

Gabarro (1979) interviewed

three newly installed company presidents and their principal
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subordinates at regular intervals over three years
of the development of relationships within
Mi

ntzberg

,

in

his investigation

top management team.

a

who has attempted to offer detailed and concrete descrip-

tions of actual management roles, has simply spent days observing

a

single manager.
As this review shows, there is a great deal

general

approach.

of variation within

a

Researchers have largely accepted the type of "induc-

tive, creative, intensive field study" research for which Mintzberg

calls and have shown considerable willingness to adapt reserach interventions to their own needs.

Unfortunately, in the work of some re-

searchers the weakness of this flexible approach is quite apparent,
where grand

prescriptions or generalizations are made on the basis of

quite limited information.
is obviously the

essential
by

model

One guard against the misuse of "soft" data

investigation of numerous organizations using the same
or approach.

Notably, this approach has been used both

Argyris and Schon (1978) and by March and Olsen (1973); in re-

searching

a

concept as complicated and mul tidetermined as organizational

learning, such comparative data is particularly useful.

approach was not

a

Although that

possibility within the scope of this project, pre-

viously reported "cases" were analyzed with this model as "test cases."
A nunber of these analyses are reported

in

Appendix B.

Generally, researchers (Kerlinger, 1973; Pelto and Pelto, 1978)
and others concerned with data collection (Nadler,

the same strengths of interviewing--adaptabi

1

ity

,

1

977) have stressed

opportunity to build
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rapport and to empathize, and the potential

richness of the data. These

strengths matched precisely the needs of this study.

At this

ex-

ploratory level, interviewing provided the greatest hope of building the
kind of interchange between the theoretical model

that is needed

develop the model.

to

and the direct data

The often cited problems of

expense and of difficulty coding data were not sufficiently problematic
in this project to be of concern.

The only major concern that is also

mentioned in the literature is that of interviewer bias affecting
results; this was potentially

a

problem, but one which simply had to be

addressed through self-awareness on the part of the researcher and

through the use of on-going criticism of the research project by people
not directly involved.

Several

researchers have made additions or extensions to the

interview process

a

vital

aspect of

Schon (1978) have developed

a

a

larger methodology.

Argyris and

very specific, and innovative, tool. As a

follow-up to interviews these authors have asked organization members to
fill out a form which details both inquiring behaviors and unacted on

thoughts, feelings, or considerations.
ports, then they construct

a

Accumulating

a

body of such re-

"map" or "information flow chart" which

shows graphically the blockages within each crucial

learning loop. Some

reviewers have cited this addition to the methodology of organizational

intervention and research as one of the major contributions of the
authors' work (Coleman, 1978).

Similarly, research on the effectiveness

feedback has been one
of various OD approaches has shown that survey
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technique which seems to be effective fairly consistently (Porras and
Berg, 1978).

Although organizational change is not the goal of the

methodology under consideration here, such research does indicate that
review of organizational learning "maps" or feedback of preliminary data
are methods of generating valuable and valid information.
These general

techniques were designed to yield data

in

all

three

areas of concern in the research, the who, what, and how of organizational

learning.

Within just these approaches, there was also ample

opportunity for the cross verification mentioned earlier; certain
aspects of self-reports were compared to verbal assessments of the same
point by other members or checked by related observations.

These ap-

proaches were the core of the methodology.

There are other, more limited methods that were added to yield

valuable insight as well, particularly as ways to confirm or disconfirm

information gained from "softer" sources.

One such technique, and one

of the very most promising insofar as determining the membership of the

dominant coalition was concerned, was network analysis.
As Tichy,

Tushman, and Fombrum describe it (1979), network analy-

sis can be adapted to yield information about many aspects of who com-

municates with whom, the content and importance of the exchange, and the
"clustering" or "density" of different groups or subgroups.

They men-

would
tion self-reports as one source of this information, but generally

provide

a

structure to the response by asking for specific data.

Ex-

talk to most
amples would be, "List the names of the ten persons you
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often

order to accomplish your job," or "List the persons
whom you

in

view as most essential

to you

tions could also be used,

in

the performance of your job."

Observa-

A variation of these questions was used in

the interviews.
A final

approach, and one which was easily combined with ones men-

tioned already, was that of historical analysis.

investigation was into

a

One central

line of

revealing event in the history of the organiza-

tion; there are certainly similar techniques employed

in

all

ence, from psychohistory at the individual level, to the

social

sci-

"critical

incident" approach to group analysis, to the rigorous art of writing

history itself.
In

fact, historical

analysis has several

advantages.

It

may well

be less threatening to organization members than investigating the present and because it can be "bounded" in time and space to some degree,

relationships between variables can be more carefully pursued. Although
speculating about qualitative links, opening up

the "effectiveness" can

of worms, was not to the point of this project, historical

incidents are

also more amenable to that type of assessment because "the returns are
in," at least presumably; objective performance data can be reviewed and

attempts at correlation can be made.
cal

Finally, within the phenomenologi-

frame of reference, the ways and feeling with which the past is de-

scribed by present organization members may yield valuable insight into

the present state of organizational
tional

learning, particularly at the emo-

or meaning attribution levels of

a

paradigm.
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Pettigrew (1973) addressed many of the same issues which
are relevant to the methodology of this project, and his research
was suffi-

ciently similar to this effort to merit careful attention.
expressed concern about the excessive dependence of social
research projects on

a

He, too,

science

single method- -whether it be observation, inter-

views, or questionnaires.

Again and again he stressed the need for com-

bining various approaches and, within approaches, the use of various
sources.
Thus, Pettigrew's comprehensive and multifaceted approach appears
to be at once a validation and a model

ject.

In

the process of studying

a

for the methodology of this

pro-

single decision in great depth, he

used direct observation over time, interviewing, content analysis of

documents, diary-keeping, questionnaries

,

and unobtrusive measures.

These methods were further enriched and cross validated through
use of multiple sources of documentary data and multiple observers.

These approaches may not be uniformly available in every organization
and, as Pettigrew points out, the methodology evolves to some degree

with the research, due to both increasing familiarity with the site and

increasing sophistication of perception on the part of the researcher.
Still, his methodology provided for both depth and breadth of data.

Finally, Pettigrew makes

a

strong proposal

for historical

investigation

he stresses the importance of being able to place the present in an

historical

events.

context and the fuller perspective available on historical
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Pettigrew has been

a

tigation proposed herein.

particularly compelling model
His methodological

for the

inves-

scheme, though more

involved and requiring more time and resources than the project under

consideration, was

in essential

principles and goals very similar.

Jelinek's study of the planning processes at Texas Instruments
(1979) is an even more important parallel

attempting to verify through
learning.

In

a

to this

field study

a

study.

model

She was also

of organizational

this effort, she used interviews and document analysis to

trace the evolution of the Texas Instruments' planning system.
her view of organizational

While

learning is significantly different from the

one proposed herein, she settled upon roughly the same methodology as
was developed for this project.

model

of organizational

This is not accidental, insofar as her

learning, and the concept of organizational

learning itself, were--and still are--in the process of formulation.
Given this stage of development in the theory base, field studies of an

exploratory nature are almost the only reasonable research approach.

Significance and Limitations

The significance and limitations of the study have been referred

to in passing throughout this chapter.

They also provide

a

useful

point

for summing up the most important themes.

The study is significant because it contributed

tive test of

a

very promising theoretical model.

In

a

concrete and ac-

theory, the model

ideas
provides an integrative framework into which many of the disparate
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in organizational

vides
el

a

theory can be meaningfully placed.

This study pro-

preliminary, and very substantive, test of the value of the mod-

as a guide

in

the detailed analysis of

not only does the study represent

a

analysis of organizations

general.

case analysis of

a

a

single

guiding framework for the

At the very least, it points what

could be a very productive direction for future research.
known now about the internal

Thus,

also demonstrates the useful-

it

learning model as
in

single organization.

successful

organization's learning processes but
ness of the organizational

a

Too little is

determinants of long-term organizational

effectiveness, and further use of this model--as encouraged by the
study

—may

greatly enhance our knowledge

in this

field.

Within this

broad contribution, of course, this study illuminates particular com-

ponent concepts of the model, such as the relationship between individual managerial

styles and the organizational

paradigm.

There are severe limitations to the study, however, many of them
inherent in field studies in general and case studies even more especially.

llie

pany is not

first is general izabil ity.
a

Berkshire Life Insurance Com-

large organization by most standards, employing only about

three hundred and fifty people.

Its product lines are fairly limited

and most of its operations are housed in

business, as

a

mutual

a

single location.

Although

a

life insurance company--one in which the policy

somewhat
owners are also technically the owners of the company--it is

insulated from particular environmental
face.

Every organization is unique, and

pressures which many businesses
a

case study can never be
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guaranteed to separate the unique from the general.
the organizational

In

short, although

learning model was extraordinarily useful

in

an analysis of Berkshire Life, there can be no certainty as to

guiding
its ap-

plicability to other organizations; and the more different an organiza-

tion is from Berkshire Life

terms of size, mission, or almost any

in

other criterion, the less it can be assumed--solely on the basis of this

study--that the organizational

learning model would offer the same bene-

fits.

Similarly, field studies are prone to researcher bias and that

certainly

a

danger in the present study.

is

The nature of that bias is

such that the author-researcher cannot identify it beyond recognition of

the risk.

In

this project, the risk was perhaps unusually high, since

the researcher worked alone and was constantly placed

in

the position of

identifying with the company and its managers, the subjects of the research

.

Finally, there are limitations inherent

study was not designed to establish

learning and effectiveness.

It

a

causal

in

the study itself.

This

link between organizational

was not designed to establish the con-

nection between top manager perception and belief and that of lower
level

subordinates.

The study was designed only to establish the use-

fulness of looking at organizational
political

learning, at the interaction

of

processes within an organization and the generation of

knowledge which serves as the basis for organizational
limited goal was accomplished.

Its

action, and this

relevance to other past and future
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research conclusions can only be estimated, not clearly established as
result of this study.

a

CHAPTER

II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Section

1

-

The Dominant Coalition

Often in the literature on organizational
tional

behavior and organiza-

performance, "the organization" or "senior management" or "top

decision-makers" are referred to

ways that imply an almost mechanis-

in

tic degree of rationality, as if once all

ganization and all the internal

external

influences on the or-

technology are known, an observer could
This style of writing recognizes the

predict organizational behavior.

reality of concerted organizational

action and, since the stated purpose

of many organizations is in fact to rationally achieve organizational

goals, it is certainly understandable and useful.

Furthermore, the

reduction of uncertainty--incl uding uncertainty associated with the

variability of human actors--is

a

driving force seemingly inherent in

the very nature of organizing (Thompson, 1967).

Tushman (1977), in concert with many others, has assailed this

tendency to "treat the organization as

a

decision-making, as well as the deterministic theme
al

Rational models of

black box."
in

the organization-

design literature, have been critiqued from many perspectives.

ited individual

Lim-

information processing ability (March and Simon, 1958),

knowledge on which
the prevalence of ambiguity regarding cause-effect
of indidecisions are based (March and Olsen, 1973), and the variance

vidual

and subunit goals (Pfeffer, 1977;

Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974;

question any perspective
Tushman, 1977) have all been used as reasons to
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which assumes predictability and unanimity
course, the greatest critique rests

in

in

organizational

empirical

evidence,

a

action.

Of

recognition

of the fact that there may be no rationally comprehensible reason why
U.

S.

chooses 1980 to begin instituting tighter cost controls and

Steel

higher standards of profitability for its plants rather than 1978 or
1970 (Salpukas, 1980).
This reality has been recognized
two ways.

in

organizational

literature in

First "choice" or "discretion" has been postulated

in

the

literature as an important element of roles at the higher levels of organizational

hierarchies (Thompson, 1967).

Mintzberg (1977) and others

who have directly studied managerial work have likewise stressed its

unstructured nature and the individual and idiosyncratic ways

information is gathered or decisions are made.

in

which

The second and most con-

sistent response to the unpredictability of organizational behavior has
been descriptive studies of the ways
made.

in

which decisions are actually

This approach has led to the recognition of and increasing empha-

sis on political

phenomena in organizations, on the acquisition and use

of power to achieve person or subunit goals.

Cyert and March (1963) are generally credited with the introduction of political

realism into organizational theory.

Their work drew

attention to coalition phenomena but has been found severely wanting
its lack of analysis of these phenomena (Pettigrew, 1973).
ing new research, Thompson (1967) did a great deal

to

that would affect their composition and development.-

Without add-

systematize

theory of coalitions and the environmental and technological

in

a

factors

Many researchers
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have continued

to

investigate decision processes with particular at-

tention to the role of coalitions.

In

a

typical

study, Pfeffer and

Salancik (1974) studied the relationship between departmental
resource allocation in

a

university budget process; they found that bud-

get increases reflected more closely the differential
ual

power and

power of individ-

departments than it did any other criteria such as size, student

class enrollment, or national

prestige.

Pettigrew (1973) performed

a

longitudinal

specialization had on coalition formation
of the specific individual

in

a

study of effects that
single organization and

and group behaviors employed over time to ac-

quire and maintain the power to shape allocations, policies, and future
direction of the organization.

coalition perspective
level

in

His work verifies the usefulness of a

analysis of behavior at every hierarchical

within an organization and also emphasizes the importance of

unique circumstantial

and

historical

factors

in

the evolution of

coalitions.
The combined result of this work has been

a

focus on and accept-

ance of the "dominant coalition" as that group in the organization, and

possibly including outsiders,- who

at

a

given point in time "collectively

have sufficient control of organizational

resources to commit them in

certain directions and to withhold them from others" (Thompson, 1967, p.
128).

Although numerous authors contend that power-based phenomena in

organizations are insufficiently studied (Pettigrew,
Tushman, 1977), the general

1

973; Schein,

1

977;

idea and definition of a dominant coalition

as the group which defines organizational

goals and directs concerted
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organizational

action soems to be generally accepted and frequently used

as a starting point for explanations of and investigations into organi-

zational
in

behavior (Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Nolan and Finch, 1980; Finch,

process).
A final

in

verification of the centrality of the dominant coalition

considering organizational learning comes from the literature on or-

ganizational

development and planned change.

is an accepted

It

"truism"

that the support and participation of top management are essential if

change efforts are to be successful

(Allen and Pilnick,

Callahan, 1971; Ivancevich, et

1978).

al

. ,

1

973; Lake and

Some writers have even gone

so far as to include top management initiation as an element in the very
Peters

definition of "organization development" (Beckhard, 1969).

(1978, 1980) has made detailed studies of the means by which top

managers do in fact alter patterns of organizational action.
The explanations given for the necessity of dominant coalition

sanction are hardly sophisticated
this important understanding.

in

their approach to reasons behind

There is usually

reference to either

a

"power," since top management has the ability to compensate for and

institutionalize change processes, or "commitment," based
tion that subordinates will

"higher ups" do not feel

the assump-

not commit themselves to efforts which

are important enough to merit participation.

These ideas are not usually presented as part of

or model that explains the crucial
model

on

a

comprehensive system

role of the dominant coalition.

The

this pheproposed in this thesis offers such an explanation for

in the literanomena which is widely observed but poorly conceptualized

ture.
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A detailed

review of coalition theory is not to the point of this

paper, but certain important themes should be noted.

concerns the source of organizational

power.

One such theme

Kruglanski

and Raven

(1975) have theorized various power bases, but these can be considered
general

rather than unique to organizations.

Within organizations, man-

agement of significant uncertainty has been postulated as

source of both individual
1967; Tushman, 1977).

and

subunit power (Kotter, 1978b; Thompson,

This has been verified in part by

companies and the management specialties which tend

management positions within each type.

typology of

dominate top

in

self-reinforcing ways

Thus, in a specific dominant coalition,

(Miles, et al

. ,

expertise

areas defined by organizational

in

to

a

The dominant specializations in

turn shape the future direction of the company
1978).

primary

a

members as sources of

uncertainty may determine power balances or the degree to which
subsystems are over- or under-represented

in

the coalition.

Similarly, various degrees of interdependence and dependence

characterize the relations between subsystems of
(1978b) and Pettigrew (1973) show how crucial

a

Kotter

system.

an aspect of the

power-

oriented behavior in organizations the management of these inter-

dependencies is.
of information has often been recognized as

Control

organizational

power.

information.

source of

Since accurate and current information is one

foundation of the organizational
haviors will

a

shape organizational

learning process, one way political

learning is through the control of

Pfeffer (1977) views secrecy as one of the principal

be
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techniques in the acquisition and maintenance of individual and subunit
power.
A final

theme of the decision-making and coalition literature

which sheds light on the organizational

learning process is the dis-

tinction drawn therein between routine and innovative decisions.

The

latter involve considerations which are understood to be new and different from any decisions that are so common in the organization as to
be institutionalized and routine.

cision processes as

a

Pettigrew (1973) views innovative de-

time of heightened political

activity within the

organization, in large part due to the uncertainty involved.

Involve-

ment in these different types of decisions may vary and hence shape the

constitution of the dominant coalition.
deal

This fact may explain

a

great

of the usefulness of institutionalized planning and evaluation pro-

cesses in that these processes make the process of considering newness
and the uncertain future

a

routine organizational

process, subject to

greater control and direction by the dominant coalition.

Jelinek (1979)

contends that only processes which have been administratively insti-

tutionalized can be considered truly organizational.
a

study of organizational

employed in

a

Hence her focus in

learning is upon administrative systems

single organization to make innovation and learning

routine.

MacMillan (1978) has made one of the few systematic inquiries into
the nature of political
with interorgani zational

activity

in

political

dynamics within organizations, but

organizations.

His concern is more

strategy than with the political
he does

root his theory in an

.
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explanation for individual
lation of coalitions.

organizational

He views

behavior and the resultant formu-

coalitions as an inevitable element of

life and describes policy formulation by the leaders of

the organization as
ous internal

political

and

a

political

external

process of balancing demands of vari-

coalitions.

Interestingly, he veiws this

group at the top of the organizational hierarchy primarily as "fidu-

ciaries," as representatives of interest groups, rather than as
potential

coalition.

a

This group generally is invested with legitimate

authority within the organization as well, which puts
position politically vis

a

discusses these leaders as

it

vis other interest groups.
a

in a unique

MacMillan never

coalition, or coalitions, in their own

right and hence fails to bridge his discussion of political effective-

ness within the organization to any external

ness other than in the realm of political activity.

very illuminating ideas on intraorganiztional
perhaps most usefully, begins by defining
cal

action, power, influence, political

a

effective-

organizational

Still, he offers

political

activity, and

number of terms:

politi-

capability and authority.

definitions bear repeating here because they can serve as

a

His

set of link-

ing concepts in the process of matching specific behaviors and percep-

tions to the more abstract concepts

in

the organizational

learning

model

action takes place when an actor, recognizing that the
achievement of its goal is influenced by the behavior of other
actors in the situation, undertakes action against the others to ensure that its own goals are achieved (p. 8).
Political

Power of an actor over an opponent in a situation is the capaci ty of
as
the actor to restructure the situation, so that the opponent acts
the actor wishes.
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Power in a situation is regarded as the capacity of an actor in that
situation to , . , restructure the situation in such a way as to get
others to act as the actor desires . . . power is situationally determined.
Influence of an actor % . . is the capacity ... to restructure the
perceptions of the opponent so as to get the opponent to act as desired [emphasis in original, p. 15].

Political capability is used to denote the sum of power and influence of an actor.

Authority is defined as legitimized political capability ; that is,
legitimized power and influence
The actual authority of a
person in a situation is really his informal authority in the situation.
This informal authority can be greater or smaller than the
formal authority conferred on the person by the organization
there are limits to authority, and these limits are broadly
set by the organization in a formal sense, yet they are speci fical ly
set by each individual in a situation in an informal sense
what may constitute a legitimate action by some may not be regarded
[emphasis in orginal, pp. 16-17].
as legitimate by others

....

....

....

....

With these definitions as starting points, MacMillan structures

coherent model of political
tional.

a

very

behavior, both intra- and interorganiza-

Since the concern here is not primarily with political

but with the effect of such activity on organizational

thrust is tangential to the principal topic here.

provide the basis for the analysis of political

learning, his

His definitions do

action and structures,

however, and he reemphasizes many of the points made

ture concerning organizational

activity

in

earlier litera-

power and influence bases.

He

reduces

them
these bases to very manageable and operational terms, which makes

more useful

for analysis as well.

gic power resources, control

Power bases are possession of strate-

of alternatives, influence, and authority.

influencing
Influence bases are, similarly, possession of strategic

influencing
resources--such as audience or information, control of

37

alternatives, power, and authority.

He

also points out, as several

authors have previously, how specialization within the organization may

serve as the basis for competing interest groups, and offers some
insight into what constitutes effective political

leadership.

systematizing prior conceptualizations, MacMillan makes
contribution to the literature on political

a

Thus, by

major

processes in organizations;

and though he is not primarily concerned with the phenomena surrounding
a

dominant

coalition--in fact, he never uses the term--he provides this

study with concepts which are very useful.
Insight into these political

enriches the theoretical

and

processes in organizations greatly

practical

guidelines of this study. There

are two critical contributions that this literature makes to the study

First, the site

of organizational

learning that must be reemphasized.

of organizational

learning is clearly established; we know where and for

whom to look--the dominant coalition.

The group which directs the con-

certed action of the organization must also be the group that learns if

organizational
way.

A central

organizational

adaptation is to take place

in

a

conscious and deliberate

premise of this model of organizational learning is that
learning must be understood, and can only be understood,

as a function of the interactions in the dominant coalition.

Important

information may exist outside the collective awareness of the dominant
coalition, but organizational learning cannot take place until this

information is shared and integrated into the knowledge base of the
coalition.
•

Organizational

and affect organizational

learning may take place at

a

subsystem level

behavior within that subsystem, but this
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simply illustrates the model working

at

a

lower hierarchical

level, not

an aberration to the model.

Once the dominant coalition becomes the focal

tion, the task of describing organizational

cantly simpler.
a

point of investiga-

learning becomes signifi-

First of all, we have narrowed the field of inquiry to

single group of people.

Although not much of the literature on groups

addresses anything like the complexity of factors affecting
at the pinnacle of

a

a

coalition

large organization, there are certainly valuable

contributions to be gained from the literature on groups.

Some of the

literature specifically directed toward top management relationships
(Gabarro, 1979) has produced results quite similar to analysis of group

development in laboratory settings, with

an

emphasis on sequential

stages of introduction, testing, and finally trust and accommodation.
There is no reason not to believe that

a

dominant coalition is governed

by much the same behavior patterns as other groups.

This is not an

appropriate place for an extensive review of group literature, but
group functioning within the dominant coalition obviously greatly
affects the development of organizational knowledge.

Numerous authors

have already drawn this link between group functioning and the capacity
for system learning;

Janis (1972) comes immediately to mind, with his
crises resulting from the exclusion or

reconstruction of governmental

repression of divergent viewpoints.
The second vitally important contribution of the literature on

decision-making and political

process in organizations to an overall

understanding of organizational

learning

is

to

place that organizational
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learning process in its socio-political

organizational

To the extent that

knowledge exists and is developed and refined, it is

product of political

a

processes and negotiations, of the use of power

within the organization.
rational

context.

point of view.

It

cannot therefore be analyzed from

The organization may fail

to

a

simple,

learn in times of

apparent need or learn without apparent environmental stimulus.

Indivi-

duals may learn and even publicly share their new knowledge with no
impact on systematic organizational action.

Only with an appreciation

for the role of the dominant coalition and for the power relationships
and structures, formal
tional

and informal, which support it, can organiza-

learning be understood.

increasingly popular concept

An

organizational
Schendel

,

functioning

is

efforts to improve overall

in

that of strategic planning

1978; Andrews, 1980).

(Hofer and

This work is similar to the literature

on decision-making in that it is primarily prescriptive in nature and

assumes rationality in decision processes.

Here again, a thorough

examination of this literature would be only tangential to the purpose
of this paper.

Two points are crucial, however, and are consistently

reemphasized

writing on the subject of planning.

in

management is clearly assumed

in

First, top

this literature to be responsible for

the long-term performance of the organization through the process of

developing and implementing strategies
Secondly, the planning process itself

in a

is

changing environment.

often discussed

in

same terms as learning processes are in the organizational

literature.

much the

learning

Planning is clearly one avenue, and perhaps the most common
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one, through which organizational
the dominant coalition.

knowledge is developed and extended by

What is characteristically and unfortunately

missing from most of the planning literature is

a

recognition of the

political, coalitional aspects of organizational decision making.

Without detailed review, voluminous bodies of literature in four
principal

areas have been alluded to in this section: organizational

decision-making, group behavior, organization development and strategic
planning.

A brief example may be helpful

in

illustrating how these

disparate approaches converge to verify this model of organizational
learning. Tushman (1977), in his overview of political

affect organizational

processes that

action, notes that "superordinate goals" have been

frequently proposed as one organizational

influence which can limit

subunit conflict and promote concerted action.

Allen and

describing their efforts to combat "negative norms"

Pi

1

nick,

organizations

in

factors that are key in this change process.

(1973), list several

Top

management commitment, modeling behavior, and sanctioning behavior in
support of the new norms are the first factors listed.

And in Dyer's

(1977) review of factors that promote group performance, "unifying

purpose" is

a

central

focus.

Andrews (1980) considers definition of

business purpose as the first priority of top management.

different terms from different perspectives, writers
pointed to the crucial

promoting

a shared

nature of such

a

in

Thus, in

each area have

impact that the dominant coalition can have by

view of the organization and its purposes.

view is the subject of the next section.

The
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Section

2

-

Organizational Knowledge

Given the importance of the dominant coalition in the process of

organizational learning, the next critical concept is "organizational

knowledge."

By developing the idea of

a

dominant coa*lition, the

"learner" in organizational learning has become much more focused and

manageable.

In

ing process.

the same way, we must clarify the "object" in the learn-

The definition of "organizational

been provided.

knowledge" has already

Much of this definition focuses not on the knowledge or

information itself, but on the social or interpersonal context

in

which

"Consensual," "communicable," "integrated," "accessible"--

it is held.

these words describe not knowledge, not content, but the conditions under which any knowledge can be considered
As has already been stated, organizational

gree in all organizations, but
of the informational

a

"organizational

knowledge."

knowledge exists to some de-

fuller understanding of its nature, and

aspect of it, is neccessary.

More specifically,

since information and knowledge are the bases for organizational

action

and decision-making, we must understand how and what kind of informa-

tion is involved.
A central

assumption of this paper is

view of human learning (see Al, Chapter I).
view of individual

learning is the emphasis

(Epstein, 1973) or "theory-of-action"

cognitive-phenomenological

a

An
it

important aspect of this
places on

(Argyris-Schon

,

1

a

"world view"

978); this con-

a

hierarchically organized system of values, beliefs, and

assumptions.

Experiences and sensory data are filtered through this

cept is of
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system internally and analyzed and given meaning according
structs" held by the learner.

to

the

"con-

Hence, the behavior of an individual

is

a

function as much of this "theory of action" as of the stimulus situation.

It

is

tempting when seeking to explain organizational learning to

focus on the accuracy or substance of information upon which decisions
are made, and in fact organizational

errors are often the product of

poor information. Over the long-term, however,

a

dominant coalition can

develop an information system that reflects its unique needs and goals.
The historical

examples of innovative companies suggest such

a

pattern

(Chandler, 1962; Dowling, 1979).

There is

a

tremendous literature as well specifically concerned

with management information systems, so-called MIS, and with the infor-

mation processing capability of various organizational
(Tushman and Nadler, 1978).

(Wilensky, 1967) is
tional

a

structures

Although the "intelligence function"

vitally important aspect of the overall organizaOnce again, the

configuration, it is not the concern here.

presumption here is that

a

dominant coal ition capable of organizational

learning, as defined by the model, will develop increasingly effective

information systems, whether formal

and structural

or informal.

Simi-

larly, the extensive literature on information processing within various

organizational

structures is only tangential

to

the argument developed

here.

Theories which stress information content over the processes
point.
whereby information is assimilated and applied miss the

history of organizations--governmental

,

The

military, business, educational.
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etc. --is full of cases of "intelligence failure," where decision
makers

ignored vitally important data, even falsified it, in order to maintain
a

belief system.

In

discussing just this phenomenon, Wilensky (1967)

emphasizes repeatedly that the quality of information will always
reflect the quality of questions asked by top management.

Automation

serves not to alter this principle, but simply to make errors apparent

faster and with greater reverberation through the system.
Clearly, the quality of questions asked is

a

product of the exper-

ience, education, and frame of reference of the manager.
to emphasize these individual

Wilensky tends

factors and other research corroborates

this assumption, indicating that "cosmopoli tans"--those with more education and a wider range of experience--tend to be more innovative in or-

ganizations than "locals" (Pierce,

1

977).

There is clearly no substi-

tute for technical expertise and analytic skills.

or organizational

There are also social

factors that have been shown to be important, such

factors as job satisfaction and involvement, performance discrepancies,
and, most importantly to this thesis, "values of strategic decision

makers" (Pierce, p. 33).

This theme is repeated again and again in the

literature; the attitudes and values and priorities

.of top

management

are reflected in the information and innovative ideas that are generated
in the rest of the organization.

Even in such an apparently scientific

endeavor as geological exploration, Peters (1980) found

a

close

correlation between corporate success in mineral exploration and the
amount of time spent discussing exploration

in

top management meetings.
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Wilensky says that the greatest impact an information specialist
can have is not in regard to content or quantity of information, but in

"the capacity to affect the general
174).

tone of policy discourse"

(1967,

p.

Thus, even though there is little we can say on the specific

nature of information involved, organizational

learning requires

a

certain attitude or value toward information within the dominant
coal ition.

There are many sources of blockage, just as there is the ever-

present danger of wrong or insufficient information.

Beyond individual

characteristics of managers that promote information flow, innovation,
and the development of new knowledge, there are also characteristics

that become organizational or systemic and which come to frame the efforts, initiatives, and expectations of organization members.
in a model

Clearly,

which defines learning as the development of consensual, ac-

cessible, communicable, and integrated understandings of action-outcome
relationships, the focus is first and foremost on these organizationwide, or at least dominant coalition-wide, characteristics.
One team of theorists and OD practitioners that have clearly

grasped these issues from
(1973).

a

different perspective is Allen and Pilnick

They stress the "normative systems" operating within any organ-

ization that shape individual

expectations and experience far beyond any

single set of role defined behaviors, systems of ideas or beliefs having
to do with organizational

and

personal

pride, performance standards,

customer and colleague relations, or innovation and change.
ing the organizational

In

address-

factors that shape and maintain this system

.
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of belief and expectations. Allen and
top management commitment to norms;

Pi

1

nick list among other factors:

modeling behavior, especially by

leadership; management sanctioning behavior; evaluation and reward

systems; and, information, communication, and feedback systems.

these factors are

a

All

of

direct res-ult of dominant coalition policy, though

they will certainly evolve independent of dominant coalition attention.

Beckhard (1969), also concerned with purposeful

change efforts in

organizations, cites many of the same attitudinal elements of organizational

life under the anthropological

term of "culture."

He, like Allen

and Pilnick, sees the top management of an organization, the dominant

coalition in the terms of this paper, as responsible for the creation
and maintenance of a culture that promotes attainment of organizational
goal

s

From yet another perspective, an unpublished McKinsey & Co. report
(1980) indicates that some of the characteristics that consistently ef-

fective and innovative corporations share are similarly based.

similarities include

a

"guiding philosophy,"

a

These

strong emphasis on cus-

tomer satisfaction and attention, and an internal system that stresses

accountability.

The present concern of this paper is not so much on ef-

fectiveness, but quite simply on the existence of this organization
"ideology" that has previously been alluded to, and cited
tional

literature, as the "organizational

paradigm."

ganization must have some degree of organizational

and

organiza-

Just as every or-

knowledge in order to

function, every social organization also develops norms.
interacting elements of individual

in

organizational

Both are

theories of
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action."
zational

A crucial

distinction, however, is that by definition organi-

knowledge is consciously and deliberately developed.

A

paradigm may operate, and often does operate, out of the awareness of
organization members.

To the extent,

sciously recognized and ‘cultivated

,

however, that

paradigm is con-

a

to the extent that IBM is aware of

socializing and cultivating "IBM men," the paradigm is an arena for
organizational
may be.

learning

the same sense that any organizational

in

And to that degree, the paradigm is

important subset of organizational

a

special

In

an

and uniquely

knowledge.

Pfeffer (1980) has stressed the maintenance of

management function.

action

paradigm as

a

a

key

illuminating summary, he points to the two

major thrusts in the organi zai tonal

literature; one approach emphasizes

the macroview of economic necessity and environmental

determinism and

the other stresses cognitive, proactive activities and behavior on the
part of managers.

Pfeffer notes that both are critical

in

analyzing

organizations and then focusses on the indications that creation and

maintenance of

an

effective paradigm are critical

aspects of the beha-

vior of effective menagement; in this set of behaviors he stresses

"symbolic action" by management which legitimates economic necessities
and constructs an organizational

identity which organizational

pants can then use to guide their own behavior.

behaviors are symbolic

in

partici-

Clearly, although these

nature, the contributions which Pfeffer indi-

cates they make to organizational

effectiveness are profound.

This understanding of organizational

knowledge is

a

recent development in the literature on organizations than

much more
is

the
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dominant coalition.

Yet, in a view of organizational

incorporates the social and political
of knowledge is

a

necessity.

In

processes, such

behavior that
a

specialzied view

describing this view of organizational

knowledge, Duncan and Weiss stress this distinction between individual

knowledge and knowledge "required for systematic organizational
.

.

.

The overall

organizational

knowledge base emerges out of this

process of exchange, evaluation, and integration of knowledge.
organizational
social

action.

process, the only actors are individuals.

process, one that is extraindividual.

It

Like any

But it is a

is comprised of the

interaction of individuals and not their isolated behavior" (emphasis in
original)

(1979,

pp. 88-89).

Even though a paradign may operate out of awareness in many ways,

to the extent members of the dominant coalition are aware of sharing
certain values and beliefs, it is
ledge.

a

vital

part of organizational

know-

"Around here we work at it until we are the very best in the

field," is obviously

a

much more important consensual, communicable, and

integrated action-outcome assumption than

"advertising for product
even though the latter

is

X is

a

more concrete one such as

most cost-effective during summer months,"

easier to verify.

A crucial

standing organizational learning processes lies

paradigmatic organizational

in

aspect of under-

grasping the way that

knowledge, as exemplified by the first

quote, shapes the development of understandings such as the second
quote.
Thus, in seeking organizational

learning, the focus is on social,

interactive processes that develop organizational

knowledge that fits
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these relatively clear requirements.

Unless these requirements are met,

investigation gets hopelessly bogged down

in a

Individuals develop knowledge or bring

into the organization through

it

focus on individuals.

individual learning, whether factual, causal, or paradigmatic; unless
%

this knowledge is shared with and accepted by other individuals, specifically those in the dominant coalition, learning is not yet organizational

learning.

This is the primary difficulty with most models of

•

organizational learning, which leads to the next section.

Section

3 -

Organizational Learning

Each component of this organizational

tensive support

in

learning model thus has ex-

various parts of the literature.

have also specifically used the term "organizational
own writing as a central

construct.

Certain authors

learning"

in

their

Three pairs of authors-- Argyris

and Schon (1978), March and Olsen (1976), and Duncan and Weiss (1979)--

attention since they have focused on the same core issue

deserve special

as does this thesis.

The Duncan and Weiss position is clearly the most

thorough and comprehensive view, although not nearly as detailed

development as that of the other two teams.

First, this model

in

will

its

be

summarized and additions to and minor differences with it will be discussed.

Then

I

will

show how the other models are sufficiently

accounted for within this comprehensive theory.
organizational

knowledge and organizational

The definitions for

learning already presented

are taken directly from Duncan and Weiss; hence, their influence

clear and necessary, if not so exclusive,

in

is

also

the views of organization.
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dominant coalition, and

in

the underlying theoretical

concerning individual learning.

addressed organizational
and also merits special

A final

assumptions

author, Jelinek (1979), has

learning from a somewhat different perspective

attention.

Each of these theories is an attempt to specify some of the critical

processes that have been neglected within what Tushman has called

the "black box" perspective of top management behavior (1978).

organizational learning approach
ternal

structure nor external

tic effect on organizational

An

recognizes the fact that neither in-

environment has
action.

is

It

a

predictably determinis-

utterly apparent that even

organizations that share essentially the same internal

structure and

external envi ronment--two schools within the same urban conditions in

the same district for ex ampl e- -often function with marked differences

in

This readily observable

success at meeting organizational goals.

reality has made obvious the need for theoretical models that account
for the difference between organizations'

to environmental

rationale for

a

or internal

elements.

abilities to adapt and respond

This is the universally accepted

theory of organizational learning.

A major theoretical

problem involved in building such

a

theory,

however, has been dealing with the fact that even though organizations

may have different degrees of success over time, regardless of the presence of any single member or group of members, only individual members
act or learn for the organization.

solution to this central theoretical
can and Weiss model

It

is

precisely due to the different

problem that distinguishes the Dun-

from the other three, both theoretically and
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quantitatively.

Whereas Duncan and Weiss begin their analysis by

placing learning, and all organization action,

known concerning political

power

in

in

the context of what is

organizations and the central

role

of the dominant coalition in determining organizational direction,

Argyris and Schon, and March and Olsen take individual

learning as their

starting point and never effectively make the bridge to concerted,

systematic organizational

processes,

Jelinek limits her focus to the

development of systematic methods of "institutionalizing innovation" and
hence

is

primarily concerned with administrative systems.

Given the starting point, Duncan and Weiss have the core of

a

truly organizational model--one that meets requirements for theortical

consistency both within larger, macro theories and internally, for

descriptive accuracy, and for predictive ability.

Focusing on the

dominant coalition narrows and concretizes the study of organizational
learning; all

individual

learning need not be explained or addressed and

attention only to individual learning is insufficient,
.

The second question Duncan and Weiss address, which leads to the

development of their understanding of organizational knowledge, regards
the nature of what must be learned by members of the dominant coalition.

Presuming that knowledge, cognition, is the basis of action, then the

knowledge base of the dominant coalition is "action-outcome relationships" which also "specify the conditions under which
will

lead to a given outcome"

a

given action

(Duncan and Weiss, 1979, p, 82),

This

the
includes knowledge of the external environment, the internal system,

interdependence of subsystems, etc.

As has been developed

previously.
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this knowledge has

a

paradigmatic quality that the authors also des-

cribe; although these more abstract beliefs may be stated
tional

terms, as

a

sort of embracing

less opera-

in

"this is who we are," they are

%

clearly understandable as action-outcome relationships.

still

That this knowledge exists within the organization is necessary
but not sufficient; referring back to the dominant coalition as the

group which directs organizational
knowledge must be placed

in

action,

a

phenomenon,

socio-political

this socio-political context.

In

order for

knowledge to be the basis of systematic, concerted organizational

action

directed by the dominant coalition, this knowledge must be shared knowledge, it must be understandable to all who act on it, and

integrated into

a

not informational
social

system of knowledge.
ones or conceptual

These are social

ones.

it

must be

requirements,

Having clarified these

requirements that distinguish organizational knowledge from

individual knowledge, the rest of the model
this crucial

flows easily. Understanding

point, Duncan and Weiss emphasize it repeatedly:

Organizational learning is limited to public knowledge, but is socially defined as valid, relevant, and available to other members of
the organization (p. 88).
This knowledge produced by individuals is organizational only when
Thus, the exchange is
it becomes exchanged and accepted by others.
learning. It
organizational
necessary, although not sufficient, for
to integrate
individuals
is this exchange that makes it possible for
knowlorganizational
the fragments of specialized knowledge into an
by
validation
edge base. . . . This requires that [it] be subject to
own
their
some criteria and that others identify it as relevant to
This is necessary for organizational knowledge to be conneeds.
sensual and integrated (p. 89).
actionRegardless of the method by which an individual finds a new
this
relationship,
existing
an
outcome relationship or modifies
and be acchange in knowledge must be made public, communicated to
a change
considered
be
can
cepted or legitimated by others before it
the
that
mean
This does not
in organizational knowledge.
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individual has not yet learned, or that this new knowledge
cannot
be the basis for individual activities.
It does mean that this
knowledge cannot be used for organizational activities beyond the
individual.
In other words, at this point, no organizational
learning has occurred, (emphasis in original, p. §4).

With the -central ity of the dominant coalition and the social
ture of organizational
tional

na-

knowledge established, the processes of organiza-

learning are easily inferred.

Since these shared action-outcome

relationships are the basis of organizational action, they will be
changed and developed when expected or intended outcomes are not
achieved.
Duncan and Weiss emphasize the importance of these "performance
gaps"

(pp. 91-92) in describing the actual

organizational

learning.

They also accept any other process whereby new

knowledge might change the consensual
ships.

circumstances that lead to

understanding of these relation-

Examples they give are knowledge provided by outside consultants

or other organizations, such as universities, insights gained through

rethinking organizational

problems, or results from altering communica-

tion channels within the organization so that individuals are exposed to

new information about organizational

actions. While all these processes

begin with new knowledge acquisition by individuals, the learning must

always be accepted by other members of the dominant coalition and incorporated into their shared system of integrated concepts

considered organizational.

in

order to be

New knowledge is only relevant and inte-

grated once it has been incorporated into the shared view of action-

outcome relationships.
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Duncan and Weiss also stress the important role of the organizational

paradigm.

A view of organizational learning as systematic requires some mechanism to 'simplify' the complexity of the world about which organization members create new knowledge
.
.
such a mechanism would be
some form of framework comprised of concepts which group phenomena
into classes or categories and make abstract thinking possible.
There must exist within the organization some consensus about this
framework in order to make communication among organization members
possible (p. 90).
.

These are provided to organization members in their socialization
.
.
paradigms are necessary for organizational learning. They
.
provide a basis for abstracting general action-outcome relationships
from specific events.
They provide a way of determining the relevance or importance of questions within the organizational learning
They provide a common language, which makes possible the
process.
sharing of experience and insights among organization members (p.
91).

This is one of the few points in the development of the Duncan-Weiss

model that needs clarification for the purposes of this proposal.

It

is

not clear when they write about a paradigm whether they are discussing

more abstract, general, and philosophical

tenets which are still

to conscious and deliberate scrutiny, as all

organizational knowledge

must be, or whether they consider the paradigm
logical

frame of reference which provides

of organizational

knowledge.

In

a

subject

a

more unconscious, ideo-

context for the development

considering methodological

issues of

how to identify, indeed how to operationalize, organizational

this distinction between conscious and contextual

is

not

learning,

insignificant,

be readily
even though in observable practice the difference may not

apparent.
When Duncan and Weiss describe the paradigm as,

in

effect, cri-

importance of questions
teria, "a way of determining the relevance or
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within the organizational

learning’ process,"

it seems they are speaking

of consciously shared understandings which, while abstracted from any

specific events, are still available to dominant coalition members
within the 'exchange that constitutes organizational

learning.

When the

authors allude to "a way of seeing or organizing the principles governing perception" or "frameworks
in their socialization,"

.

.

.

provided to organization members

it seems they are referring

less conscious factors in the organizational

factors.

textual

to more profound,

learning process, to con-

Kuhn's (1970) concept of paradigm would include both

the conscious and the unconscious, but within the limitations placed on

organizational

knowledge, it could include only the former.

other writers have used the concept "paradigm"
"culture"

the creation and maintenance of

vitally important aspect of management

a
a

paradigm is.

Inquiry into the organizational
of,

organizational

paradigm is

a

vitally important

learning, described as "double loop" and

"deutero-1 earni ng" by Argyris and Schon (1978).
zational

much the same way as

(Sheldon, 1980) is used when referring to organizations.

Pfeffer (1980) emphasizes what

aspect

in

Similarly,

"Paradigm" and "organi-

knowledge" are not usefully considered synonymous, however, and

Duncan and Weiss do not make this distinction sufficiently clear.

Having constructod this model
via the evolutionary and incremental

tional

of the dominant coalition learning

process of developing organiza-

knowledge, and having postulated the way

in

which they theorize

considering the
learning might take place, Duncan and Weiss conclude by
by the dominant
factors that might limit the acceptance of new knowledge
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coalition, regardless of validity.

Many such factors can be easily in-

ferred and have already been mentioned in Section 1.

Besides the limi-

tations imposed by the necessity for consistency within the paradigm,
the authors mention political

cation channels.
tional

As will

factors

in

the organizational

and communi-

be pointed out, the other models of organiza-

learning, for all their limitations, have more to offer on this

topic.
Argyris and Schon began their collaboration with development of

individual learning and behavior models within their "theory of action"

approach (1974).
individual

Although it relabels some of the terms, their model of

psychology is very similar to mainstream cognitive personal-

ity theory (Epstein, 1973; Kelly, 1955); their concepts essential ly mi rror the underlying assumptions in this proposal

action and learning.
it is crucial

concerning individual

That perspective need not be developed here, but

to the Argyr is-Schon approach which repeatedly stresses

that people act according to "images," "maps," and "theories of action."

The failure of the Argyris-Schon model
model

duals.

of organizational

they never develop

is that

a

action, except to say it is taken by indivi-

What is missing is

a

useful

or meaningful

address of the central

importance of power relationships, the fact that only

a

limited group of

individuals determine the direction and domain of the organization and
hence shape the meaning of organizational

learning.

To the extent that

Argyris and Schon directly discuss power, it is primarily as

an

obstruc-

tive factor in their chapter on "limited learning systems" (1978).

another work, however, Argyris (1976) demonstrates at least implicit

In
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sophistication about the centrality of top management

in

organizational

learning.
When the Argyris-Schon model

model, however, it makes

a

standing of organizational

and

learning.

interpersonal

learning process.

combined with the Duncan-Weiss

significant contribution to

tribution is especially valuable
individual

is

a

deeper under-

As might be expected, this con-

describing just what the specific

in

behaviors might be in the organizational

They also offer

a

typology of organizational learning

which draws useful distinctions as far as the focus or content of organizational

inquiry.

The two models mesh so nicely because they both accept action-

outcome relationships as the organizational knowledge base.
Schon call this system of propositions the "organizational

Argyris and

theory-in-

use," thus, they share the assumptions of desired rationality and goal

orientation of the Duncan-Weiss team, and describe organizational learning as a process of "error correction":

Just as individuals are the agents of organizational action, so they
Organizational learning
are the agents for organizational learning.
occurs when individuals, acting from their images and maps, detect a
match or mismatch of outcome to expectation which confirms or disIrPthe case of disconfirmaconfirms organizational theory-in-use.
tion, individuals move from error detection to error correction (emphasi s mine, p. 19).
This is almost identical

Duncan and Weiss.

Argyris and Schon even distinguish between organiza-

and individual

tional

to the idea of "performance gaps" preferred by

learning, writing:

for organizational learning to occur, learning agents' discoveries, inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organization
They must be encoded in the individual images and the
memory.
shared maps of organizational theory-in-use from which individual
19).
members will subsequently act (emphasis in original, p.
.

.

.
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Unfortunately, these ideas of "organization
memory" and "organization

theory-in-use" are never clarified as to the
question of who holds and
develops them.

This gap is filled by the dominant coalition.

The specific contributions of Argyris and Schon
to the model

developed here are

in

two areas.

First, through detailed cases and

elaboration of the "images" and "maps" ideas, they give
of how organizational

inquiry can take.

a

detailed view

learning can be impeded and of the form productive

Calling impediments to learning "conditions for

error" and "inadequacies in organizational theory of action"
(p. 56),

Argyris and Schon describe specific incidents wherein "mistaken assumptions, incongruities between espoused theory and theory-in-use, and

incompatible norms" block communication.

The product of successful

inquiry fits the Duncan-Weiss requirements of communicable, accessible,

consensual, integrated knowledge.
either undetected error or

in

Conditions for error may result in

uncorrected error, but these cannot be

systematically addressed without inquiry into and correction of the
conditions themselves.

The table below matches specific conditions to

specific "corrective responses"

TABLE

^ V U ^w

acciimn^inn
^U
w w

vl

1 1

1 1

1

^

1

1

1

Incongruity
X

win|^u c

1

V

1

1

1

wi

ri(jiiii.j

Vagueness
Ambiguity
Excess/Sparseness
un tcbudL;

1

1

1

59):

CONDITIONS FOR ERROR AND CORRECTIVE RESPONSES

1:

Conditions for Error in
Organizational Theory of
Action
ill

(p.

ty

Scattered
Information withheld

Corrective Responses, which may or
may not be permissible within the
behavioral world
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Argyris and Schon spend considerable time detailing dysfunctional
behaviors and patterns, showing how these patterns can be mapped
graphically,
and describing possible solutions or alternative patterns.

city

helpful

is

in

The specifi-

generating possible avenues of investigation within

an organization.

A second contribution from this model

lies in the distinctions

Argyris and Schon draw between different types or levels of learning:

-single loop learning:

members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and
external environments of the organization by detecting errors which
they then corect so as to maintain the central features of the organizational theory-in-use.
These are learning episodes which function to preserve a certain kind of constancy . . . strategies and
assumptions are . . . modified so as to keep organizational performance within the range set by organizational norms. The norms themselves . . . remain unchanged (pp. 18-19).
-double loop learning:

...

a double feedback loop which connects the detection of error
not only to strategies and assumptions for effective performance but
to the very norms that define effective performance . . . incompatible requirements in organizational theory-in-use are characteristically expressed through a conflict among members and groups within
the organization. . . . Double loop learning, if it occurs, will
consist of the process of inquiry by which these groups of managers

confront and resolve their conflict ... by setting new priorities
and weightings of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves
together with associated strategies and assumptions (pp. 22-24).
-deutero-learni ng:

members learn about organizational learning and encode their
results in images and maps (p. 29).
.

.

.

These three different types or levels of learning are not necessarily

discontinuous, but they are qualitatively different.

Duncan and Weiss
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do not make these distinctions explicit, though

in

their consideration

of paradigms in organizations they are alluding to just these different

levels of the learning process.

Each type of learning

refers to

revision of shared understandings of action-outcome relationships, but
the spheres and time frames are likely to be different.

short-term questions probably dominate
whereas long-range planning demands

in the

Technical

and

single-loop process,

more normative perspective.

a

Although March and Olsen (1976) refer to "organizational
ing," their work lacks any reference to

comprehensive than individual learning.

learn-

process distinct from or more

a

Their focus is on the many fac-

tors that complicate traditional, rational

models of individual

learning

within the organizational context.

They allude to the same theoretical

tradition which produced

political

and in fact March is

but they

in

no way

a

a

and

coalition phenomena,

frequently cited author within that tradition,

relate this understanding of the social

within organizations to

cern is

a focus on

a

model

of organizational

processes
Their con-

learning.

further elaboration on the severe restraints placed on tradi-

tional decision making models by conditions of ambiguity and it is
useful

to

the model

developed here only to the degree that

it

illuminates important limitations.
Most "models of choice" imply

a

cycle shown below (p. 57):
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Indi vidual

Individual
Bel ief

Action

Organizational
Action

Figure

1

-

V

/

Response

March and Olsen's Individual Choice Cycle

March and Olsen detail

the cycle.

Envi ronmental

how various factors can break each link in

Tradition and obligation often compel

individuals to act

differently than their beliefs might otherwise lead them to.

Individ-

uals often are quite unsure about what if any effect their action may
have on organizational action.

Environments change and shift constantly

and it is often not clear which shifts are caused by organizational

action and which are the result of other, unrelated or chance factors.

Nonetheless, March and Olsen conclude that, "despite ambiguity and un-

certainty, organization participants interpret and try to make sense out
of their lives (p. 63)."
ten a product of social

integrated

in

In

the context of ambiguity, this sense is of-

and interpersonal

the organization, s/he will

ences in the organization.

contact, s/he will tend

to

If

factors.

If a

member

is

well

tend to like what s/he experi-

s/he trusts the people with whom s/he has

share their perspective and evaluations.

Taken together these propositions suggest a view of reality forming
that emphasizes the impact of interpersonal connections within the
organization and the affective connection between the organization
and the participant on the development of belief . . . (p. 66).
how
March and Olsen are primarily concerned with models of choice, with

decisions get made.

They never draw specific connections between their
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different macro critiques and their individual

learning model

except

insofar as choice situations affect the interpersonal and affective

connections to which they allude.
into the individual

ambiguity,

a

Still, they offer some useful

experience within organizations and the ways that

prevalent perceptual and emotional

condition, affects or-

ganizational action and decisions, including the organizational
model

insight

propsoed herein,

action-outcome links.

learning

Duncan and Weiss focus on shared knowledge of

March and Olsen show how often, and more impor-

tantly how, organizations muddle through without such knowledge, particularly how public organizations do this.
None of what March and Olsen contend disqualifies the model developed here even if accepted as valid.

Their perspective does cast

a

sha-

dow on the neat coherence of the interrelated aspects of the model.
More importantly, it provides some insight into the peculiar power and

importance of paradigms, of those systems of assumption and belief which
are shared by organization members and which assist them

the world prior to analysis of specific causal

links.

in

simplifying

The paradigm pro-

vides direction and coherence in an uncertain and confusing world.

the extent that

a

To

paradigm does unify and strengthen the affective con-

nections within an organization without doing violence to inquiry into

error and conditions for error, then
which organizational
An

it

provides

a

basis and context

learning can proceed.

important addition to the literature on organizational

has been made by Jelinek (1979).

of organizational

in

In

an

learning

attempt to limit her definition

learning to those events which meet the most rigorous
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requirements, she focuses on the development of administrative systems
designed to insure continued change and innovation

in

an organization.

She views this as the clearest example of Bateson's idea of deutero-

learning in organizations, wherein an organi zation--Texas Instruments in
the case of her study--institutional izes
simply idiosyncratic or individual

process of learning that was

a

prior to that time.

This definition

is unnecessarily limited, largely because it does not focus on the

dominant coalition or any set of actors as the learner.

Still, her

focus on the process of institutionalizing the learning process lends

a

concreteness and specificity which can only further the development of
Furthermore, her study, while using different models and

the concepts.

definitions as starting points, points to some of the specific behaviors
involved

in

organizational

learning, just as do Argyris and Schon.

step beyond any of the authors mentioned to this point, she and, in

similar study, Murray (1976) have charted the process whereby
piece of organizational

routine patterns of

a

a

new

large organization.

A brief summary of the model

-

Summary

as developed to this point may be

There are two central constructs.

organizational

a

knowledge becomes "institutionalized" into the

Section 4

useful.

a

In

learning

is

First, the "who" of

the dominant coalition, that group within an

organization which determines the allocation of organizational
resources.

The "what" of organizational

learning

is

organizational

the conditions
knowledge, knowledge of action-outcome relationships and
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which affect them.

In

order to be organizational

,

these relationships

must be consensual ly held by, accessible and communicable to, and

integrated into an overall knowledge base by members of the dominant

coalition.

Further attention has been paid to the organizational

para-

digm as that set of unifying beliefs and assumptions which serves as the
basis and guiding principles for organizational learning.

Thus, an

organization learns as the dominant coalition refines and develops its
shared knowledge within the context of
the paradigm itself may also be
ing.

This is

a

a

a

guiding philosophy or paradigm;

subject of inquiry and hence of learn-

learning cycle as well, because

a

clearer, more exten-

sive knowledge base encourages the development and unified action of

dominant coalition

(see diagram below).

Clearer roles,
responsibilities.
More unified
membership and
shared vision of
future.

All

organizational process
shaped by Paradigm

V
Organizational

Figure

2

-

There are two central
cribed above.

a

Knowledge

Organizational
theoretical

Examination of
performance gaps,
use of new knowledge, monitoring
of progress toward goals and
objectives, etc.

4

J

Learning Cycle

foundations for the model des-

characterizes
First, there is the ample literature which
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decision-making within organizations as
process.

The second theoretical

an

essentially political

basis of the model

is the less exten-

sive literature regarding the nature of knowledge used

in

organizational

decision-making and of its social construction through such activities
as planning, information gathering, environmental

solving.

analysis, and problem

Drawing on this literature, it is clear that an investigation

of organizational

learning in any organization must attempt to answer

three questions:

—who

is the

dominant coalition?

--What is the nature of the present base of organizational
knowl edge?

— how
coalition?
in

I

is new organizational

knowledge developed by the dominant

These are the questions to which the methodology described

the next chapter was addressed.

CHAPTER

III

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

Section

I

-

Preparation

Based upon the nature of the model

and

a

review of various pos-

sible methodologies, an exploratory case study of
was chosen as the best way to proceed.

single organization

a

(For the rationale

for this

overall methodology and for the specific data gathering approaches, see

Methodology section of Chapter I.)

Unstructured interviews were to be

the primary instrument of the research, and two different interview
formats were designed.

The first interviews, limited primarily to

possible members of the dominant coalition, were structured around

an

open-ended interview protocol which would generate information relevant
to the model

as

organization.

it

pertained to the present functioning of the

The second round of interviews was to provide the first

interviews,

cross validation of the information gathered

in

the initial

and was to include more organization members

in

addition to the dominant

coalition.

These interviews were to focus on some important historical

incident but, being open ended in nature, were expected to generate data

either congruent with or
round.

in

conflict with that gathered

in

the first

Other supporting methodologies were an analysis of various

public and internal

documents and an analysis of the response within the

organization to the feedback of information gathered to that point.
This four step procedure was
ideal

research approach exemplified

a

product of
in
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a

compromise between the

this case by

a

project such as

66

Pettigrew's (1973), and some important constraints.

Whereas Pettigrew

was able to use multiple investigator/observers and to conduct his
study

longitudinally as well as intensively, financial
limited the scope and length of this project.

and time restraints

The investigation of an

historical 'incident was an attempt to compensate for the lack of

longitudinal component.

a

truly

The only balance to a lack of additional

researchers was to present the research procedures as candidly and

thoroughly as possible and to invite questions from reviewers of the
study.

In

addition, the members of the author's doctoral

committee

could and sometimes did raise questions and issues from their perspectives as the project proceeded.
Another constraint on the scope of the project was the willingness
of prospective organizations to commit significant resources and time to
a

project with limited internal

pay-off, so the project was structured

to be minimally disruptive and maximally useful

tion.

to the host organiza-

This limitation revealed itself primarily in the relatively small

number of interviewees, the lack of other than incidental direct observations of company processes, and the structure of the feedback meetings
and

report.

(A copy of the final

report to Berkshire Life

is

included

as Appendix D.)

Having decided that an exploratory case study using interviews as
the primary data gathering tool was the most appropriate research

approach, the next step was to develop an interview format and pre-test
it.

Drawing on various methodological

and theoretical

sources,

a

questionnaire was designed to elicit information answering the three

,

67

bdsic questions inherent in the model.
the basis for all

The questions were essentially

inquiry into the organizational

Insurance Company,

life of Berkshire Life

They were:

Who is the dominant coalition?

What is the present organizational

knowledge base?

How, if at all, does organizational learning, as defined
model, take place?

in

the

Each of these abstract ideas first had to be matched to specific be-

haviors and knowledge areas
geted for inquiry.

As

in

the organization which could then be tar-

explained earlier, the goal was not so much to

explore any specific aspect of the organization

in

great detail, but to

obtain a broad enough picture of the dynamics at the highest levels of
the organizational hierarchy to be able to characterize the development
of new organizational

knowledge by the dominant coalition.

This infor-

mation and analysis would then serve to answer the ultimate question of
the project:

Does inquiry guided by the organizational

learning model

provide insight into the factors that ultimately shape organizational

performance?

This chapter describes the development and application of

the procedures used to answer the three key questions posed by the

model.

An

analysis of published cases provided significant indications

that the model would be useful and some insight into how best to pursue
data relevant to the model,
served almost as

a

(See Appendix

type of pilot study.

concerning the usefulness of the model

B

for this analysis,)

The answer to the question

itself is one that can only be

provided by analysis of the data produced by pursuing the three

questions

This
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The specific questions relating

to

the composition of the

dominant coalition grew out of two basic sources.

The most obvious

source was the definition of "dominant coalition" provided by Thompson
"That group of interdependent individuals who collectively have

(1967):

sufficient control of organizational

resources to commit them

directions and to withhold them from others."

certain

in

Given the mention of

resource allocation, this was the easiest of the three key definitions
to operationalize.

Interdependence, as well as some basic information

concerning communication and influence patterns, was the subject of
several

questions drawn from network analysis (Tickey, Tushman, and

Fombrun, 1979).
To assess the present status of organizational

underlying issues were involved.

knowledge, two

The first was to identify aspects of

organizational life which might be the subject of organizational learning.

Drawing on various sources

in

the literature (Allen and Pilnick,

1973; Dowling, 1978; Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Jelinek, 1979; Kotter,

1978a; Kotter, 1978b; McKinsey & Co., 1980; and Pettigrew, 1973), the

rather inclusive headings of Planning, Management Philosophy, Communi-

cation, Financial

Orientation, Customer Orientation, and the Orientation

of Individuals to the Organization were chosen.

It

was recognized in

that
advance that these were essentially arbitrary distinctions and

inquiry into any one area would automatically overlap into others.

importance of these topics lies not

in

comprehensiveness of the overall list.

their separateness but
The goal

the

was to include enough

patterns
areas of management action to illuminate consistent

coalition thought and behavior.

in

The

in

dominant
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The second underlying concern
zational
social

in

the effort to surface the organi-

knowledge base was the identification of those topics where the

criteria of organizational

knowledge--accessibil ity

bility, integration, and consensus--were satisfied.

To

,

communica-

serve this goal,

respondents were consistently asked if other top managers would agree
with their own individual

lationships.

understanding of particular action-outcome re-

Overlap in responses alone would not have been suffi-

cient, since organizational

knowledge is by definition consciously held

and deliberately developed.
The final

learning.

It

phase of the questionnaire concerned organizational

was pursued through only one central

sible follow-up prompts.

question with pos-

Where interviewees indicated the existence of

consensus on certain topics, they were asked to describe how

— that

— if

at all

agreement among top managers was consciously and deliberately

promoted.

Certain of the topics listed

in

the Organizational

Knowledge

phase of the questionnaire were "processes," notably Planning and Com-

Questions on these topics, particularly those pertaining to

munication.

planning, were expected to preempt the final
naire.

Several

phase of the question-

authors (Dowling, 1978; Jelinek, 1979; and Andrews,

1980) have indicated the centrality of planning--at least

potentially

— as

an organizational

"strategic planning" is

a

learning tool.

"hot ticket"

in

Furthermore, since

business literature and

consulting these days, it was hoped that inclusion of planning as
central

point of inquiry would facilitate entry into

organization.

a

host

a
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Given this
the proposal

first cut" et 3 questionnaire, which was included

for this project, the next step in the procedure was

series of interviews to test and refine it as
These interviews were conducted over

nately, it was possible to hold
single organization.

a

a

a

in

a

research instrument.

several month period.

Fortu-

number of these interviews within one

The researcher was able to conduct test inter-

views using the "Initial

Interview Schedule"

(See Appendix A for final

interview schedule.) with the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor for Student
Affairs,

a

dean,

former dean, and an associate dean, all

a

versity of Massachusetts, Amherst.

interviews in

a

at the Uni-

This concentration of pre-test

single organization permitted

a

more thorough analysis

of the questionnaire's utility in generating answers to the three core

questions proposed by the model.
ducted with
poration.
final

a

divisional vice president

This additional

pre-test interview was con-

A final
in

a

major manufacturing cor-

interview was used to make sure that the

questionnaire would be in language appropriate to

setting, as opposed to

a

As a result of this

public service or educational

business

setting.

pre-test procedure, the original

schedule was significantly altered.

interview

Planning was emphasized to

greater degree; Performance was added as
topics were pared down.

a

a

a

separate topic; and other

These changes were indicated by the fact that

whereas specific content areas, such as Financial Orientation, often
revealed some of

a

manager's thoughts, inquiry into planning and per-

the
formance usually elicited ideas related to all three aspects of
model

and to the dynamic interaction between them.

For example,

a

dean.

.
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when asked if there was an "official" philosophy of management at the
university, said that he first began to see such

a

philosophy emerge in

the meetings the deans held to discuss what would be the most important

qualities required of
went on to say that

it

a

new chancellor.

When asked to elaborate, he

was at that time that he heard people at the

highest levels of the University say, for the first time
ings, that the University was at a critical

between either emphasizing excellence
and trying to
In

in

in

public meet-

juncture and had to choose

selected areas or legitimating

respond to every demand for new services and offerings.

the course of those discussions, the deans decided as

press the emphasis on quality.

group to

This answer, which addressed

process, touched on the emergence of

development of consensus around

a

a

a

a

planning

coalition and linked it to the

critical

action-outcome relationship.

When similarly revealing answers were forthcoming almost every

time planning was the focus of the interview, it made sense to revamp
the protocol

to closely examine planning processes.

the historical

incident eventually chosen as

was the initiation of a formal

a

As

it

turned out,

point of investigation

planning system at Berkshire Life.

With

an interview schedule that would surface the information relevant to the

model, the next step was to find an organization willing to host the

project

Entry

Probably no stage of this project

so

illustrates the problems

locating and
inherent in exploratory field research as that of
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negotiating entry into Berkshire Life Insurance Company.

After several

months of contacting companies in vain, the researcher
was referred by
relative to

a

business associate and professional

insurance industry, J. Kenneth Wiley.

Mr.

consultant

a

the life

in

Wiley was willing to write

a

"letter of introduction" for the researcher to Albert Cornel io. Execu-

tive Vice President for Marketing at Berkshire Life.

Several

weeks

later the researcher met with Mr. Cornel io at Berkshire Life and

in

the

course of forty-five minutes laid out the nature of the project, some of
the theory behind it, and his request for
Mr.

a

supporting stipend.

Cornel io responded that he was at least willing to consider the mat-

ter with the other senior officers and that he would have Richard Whitehead, Sr. Vice President, call

exploring

in

if the matter was deemed to be worth

more detail.

Early the next week,

a

meeting was held with Mr. Whitehead in

which the project, its possible benefits to Berkshire Life, the researcher's academic and professional background, and the appropriateness
of Berkshire Life as site were all explored

in

detail.

Throughout this

time, the primary "selling point" for the project was its possible benefits to the corporate planning process; a copy of the final

academic of the project proposals is attached as Appendix

C.

been read by Mr. Whitehead, along with the author's resume.

conclusion of this interview, Mr. Whitehead asked to see

interview schedule which would be used
search.

in

and

a

least

This had
At the

copy of the

the first stage of the re-

This document, included in Appendix A, was provided by mail,

and the following week Mr. Whitehead agreed on behalf of Berkshire Life
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to host and fund the project.

Another appointment was scheduled to make

arrangements for the project.
In

this second meeting with Mr. Whitehead, the principal

on further elaborating the actual

focus was

research steps and the best way to

proceed with them at Berkshire Life.

The researcher proposed that

a

liaison within the company be appointed to facilitate scheduling and

orientation to the history, present structure, and operating procedures
of the company.

This would reduce demands on top management time and

might also provide some valuable experience to

below the top management level.

Mr.

an

organization member

Whitehead decided to consider this

with the other senior officers.

Another researcher proposal concerned the best way to introduce
the project to the rest of the top management group.
a

meeting be held where the underlying theory and

a

He

suggested that

description of the

research steps could be presented to everyone involved and then clarified through discussion and questions.

This was agreed upon and possi-

ble dates for the meeting were discussed.
The final

point of discussion in this meeting was the schedule of

payment of the research grant.

Mr. Whitehead

offered to arrange this

in

any way desired by the researcher and it was agreed that the grant would

be paid

in

four equal

installments with the final

one due upon comple-

tion of the project as it related to Berkshire Life.
initial

This involved the

meeting, an orientation to the company, the first round of

interviews to last one and

a

half to two hours with the four senior

officers and the head actuary,

a

second

round of interviews designed
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to investigate some historical

incident of significance to the company,

and then a feedback of this data to the company for
its internal

The design of the feedback was by agreement postponed
until

use.

its nature

and usefulness to the company could be assessed.
On

the day of the introductory meeting, the researcher met briefly

with Mr. Whitehead and was informed that William Furey, Vice President

for Field Planning and Manpower Development, would be liaison for the
project and would be in the meeting.

Attending the presentation of the

project, in addition to Messrs. Whitehead and Furey, were:

Larry

Strattner , President, Albert Cornelio, Executive Vice President--

Marketing, and Gene Amber, Senior Vice President--Investments.
The presentation was in three stages.

theory was described.

First, the underlying

"Dominant Coalition" was not used, however, and

the importance of political

phenomena was not emphasized; "Planning

team" or "top management" was substituted for "dominant coalition."
This change was made in an effort to not shape

which might be given

in

the interviews.

in

advance responses

The second

stage of the presen-

tation focused on what benefits might accrue to Berkshire Life as

result of the project.

The principal

a

points here were that planning

might be improved and that’ the investigation of the organizational

knowledge base might reveal

aspects of the company's activity or per-

formance which were receiving too little top management attention.

In

the third phase of the presentation the specific steps in the project
were described.
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The principal questions focused on the meaning
of "paradigm,"
which was answered by examples from the literature,
and on the appro-

priateness of Berkshire Life

as

a

research site.

was based on Berkshire's comparatively small

examples

The latter question

size, particularly since

the presentation were giants like Texas Instruments,

in

and ATT, and on the fact that it has

a

IBM,

fairly limited product line. The

researcher attempted to allay these concerns by expressing his satisfaction with Berkshire as

available

in

a

site and by pointing out that the examples

organizational

literature are primarily of giant companies.

Otherwise, there was limited discussion of the presentation, though it

seemed

to

be

positively received, and

it

was agreed that the project

should proceed.

Orientation to Berkshire Life

Both as

a

way of reducing the demands on top management time and

way of facilitating researcher understanding and acceptance,

also as

a

several

steps were taken to introduce him to the life insurance industry

in general
a

and to Berkshire Life

in

particular.

The first such step was

two hour meeting with Dr. Grant Osborne, Professor of Insurance at the

University of Massachusetts, School of Business.

He

provided an over-

view of the current state of the life insurance industry, explained

technical

terms pertaining to life insurance products and the very

complex accounting procedures used by life insurance companies, and explained the most common weays of evaluating life insurance company performance.

Then, in the context of this earlier discussion, he assisted

I
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the researcher in understanding and evaluating the Berkshire
Life Annual
Report and comparing Berkshire Life's performance to that of other
com-

panies in the industry.
The balance of the orientation took place in extensive conversa-

tions with Bill Furey, the liaison' for the project and an employee of

Berkshire Life his entire professional life, and
many documents provided by him.

in

reviewing

a

great

(A complete list of the documents

reviewed and analyzed at this and other points

in

the research is

provided at the end of this chapter, page 83.)
The last of these conversations, prior to the first round of

interviews, took the form of

a

sample interview so that aspects of Berk-

shire's functioning that might require detailed explanation could be

uncovered.

At this point, specific policies and procedures, such as the

performance appraisal system, the roles of committees and task forces,
and the educational

refund policy, were explained.

this orientation phase that

a

It

was also during

fairly detailed history of the past two

decades was compiled so that references to past events and people no
longer with the company could be readily integrated into the interview

format without additional

explanation.

This sample interview with Bill

Furey was included for purposes of analysis in the first found of

interviews, which followed the same general

schedule of questions.

The Interviews

Following the orientation and initial

review of relevant

documents, five interviews were conducted with the four senior officers

\
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and A1

Easton, Vice President and Actuary.

These ranged

in

length from

two to two and one-half hours and roughly followed the "Initial

view Schedule"

(see Appendix A).

Inter-

At the outset, however, interview sub-

jects were encouraged to "wander" and to elaborate points or draw con-

nections between events

in

whatever way seemed most useful to them.

This ihtoduction, and to some degree the first question--"What has been

your most important contribution to this organization?"--were included
to put respondents at ease in hopes of eliciting candor and their own

individual judgements and perspectives.
This initial

round of interviews, and further document analysis,

led the researcher to choose the first formal, long-range planning

process in 1972-73 as the historical

incident for investigation. The

rationale for this choice will be discussed
IV, but in essence, this process was

to by interviewees as

a

a

year

in

duration,

more detail

in

Chapter

frequently and repeatedly referred

turning point in the management, and hence

the performance, of the company.

over

in

a

in

Being eight years past, however, and

detailed inquiry which might be the usual

approach to an "incident" did not seem

appropriate. Therefore, the

interview format for the second round of interviews was kept fairly
general

and evaluative in approach.

The subjects

for this round of

interviews were the ten of the eleven members of the original

Long-Range

Planning Task Force who were still employed at Berkshire Life.

group included Bill Furey, the five men interviewed

in

This

the first set of

interviews and four additional subjects: Tom Franco, Director of

Advertising and Sales Promotion; Dick Levy, Vice President-Computer
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Services; Colin MacFadyen, Vice President-Securities; and Bob Plageman,
Real

Estate Officer, who at the time of the task force was Director of

Planning and Office Services,
This interview format was shorter in length.

who had participated

in

the initial

For those subjects

interiews, it included both ques-

tions from the first interview that had been neglected or which needed

more elaboration and also whatever questions concerning the original
planning process they had not answered spontaneously
view,

the first inter-

in

For the four new subjects, the format included

introduction to

an

the project, an encouragement to "wander" or to draw connections which

seemed most important to them, and the complete set of questions
"Historical

tirety

in

Incident Interview Schedule," which can be found

in

in

the

its en-

Appendix A.

After all the interviews were transcribed and analyzed, separate

meetings were held with Bill Furey and Dick Whitehead

to

discuss the re-

sults of the interviews and to design the feedback mechanisms for the

management team at Berkshire Life,
in

this process should be an oral

four senior officers as

a

group.

It

was agreed that the first stage

presentation of the results to the
Bill

and Dick independently arrived at

the conclusion that it would be inappropriate for Bill

to attend this

clearly
meeting because some of the results pertained to issues taht
initially, such
were the private domain of senior management, at least

as the approaching retirement of the President.

It

was also agreed to

of the interview
leave the design of the feedback process to the rest
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participants, and possibly to other officers as well, until

after the

meeting with the senior officers.

The Feedback Process

At the meeting held with the senior officers, the research

results were presented

in

four areas.

First, feedback was addressed to

the formal document "Corporate Phil osophy--Objecti ves--Strategy--

Policy."
was given.

Then, feedback pertaining to the implementation of that plan
The next area for feedback related to the planning process

as it was presently structured.

The final

focus of feedback were some

important results from the interviews pertaining to management style and
the approaching retirement of the President.

None of these results were

surprising to any of the top managers and discussion generally focused
on clarification of the results and on how to use them.

Subsequently,

a

report was written to be circulated to all

participants in the research project.

This report included

a

summary

description of the theory behind the research, the steps of the research
procedure, and the overall

results of the project.

This document

(included as Appendix D) focused primarily on the long-range planning

process, reflecting the original
project.

interest of the senior officers

This step concluded the actual

in

the

research procedures.

Observations and comments made during the planning and execution of
attained
these feedback steps were used in cross validating the results
at earlier stages.
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Summary

The research was conducted in three sequential

of which was the primary data gathering phase.
entry into and orientation to Berkshire Life.
sisted of two sequential

management personnel.

stages, the second

The first stage involved
The second stage con-

rounds of interviews with

a

total

of ten top

Document analysis was an integrated part of both

these first two stages.
data were assembled and

After the first two stages were completed, the
a

synopsis of the important points were pre-

sented back to the participants in the research.

The responses to this

feedback were observed and analyzed to check the preliminary findings
for accuracy and to gather any new and relevant information.

Following is

a

complete list of the interviewees, their official

titles, and some information on their background
role at Berkshire Life and this project.

documents reviewed

in

as

it

There is also

the course of the project.

relates to their
a

list of the

List #1:

Managers Interviewed

Lawrence W. Strattner, Jr., CLU, President. Began his professional life in education, which was noted by several participants
when the researcher's own professional background was discussed.
Worked in the field for Prudential. Came to Berkshire Life 20+
years ago as the first Director of Training and Development. Held
various other positions, including Senior Vice President-Agency
Operations, from which he was promoted to President in 1967.

Albert C. Cornel io, FLMI, CLU, Executive Vice-PresidentMarketing.
Came to Berkshire Life as an attorney 20+ years ago.
Rose to Senior Vice President-Insurance Services prior to combination of Insurance Services with Agency Operations to form a single
division. Marketing, in 1971.
Eurgene L. Amber, Senior Vice President-Investments.
Came to
Berkshire Life 20+ years ago in Investment Division.
Has been
Senior Vice President since before 1967.
Richard L. Whitehead, Senior Vice President and Secretary.
Responsible for all home office administrative and corporate/
community relations functions. Came from Home Life of New York 20+
Became Senior Vice President in 1965.
years ago in Personnel.
Came
Albert E. Easton, FSA, FLMI, CLU, Vice President and Actuary.
Became chief actuary in
to Berkshire 13 years ago from Equitable.
1971.

Thomas S. Franco, Director of Advertising and Sales Promotion.
to Berkshire 15 years ago in present role.

Came

William M. Furey, CLU, Vice President-Field Planning and Manpower
A third generation employee of Berkshire Life whose
Development.
Has been with Berkshire his
father was President prior to 1967.
entire 20+ year professional life, and is now primarily responsible
for recruiting and developing new General Agents.
Richard C. Levy, Vice President-Computer Services.
Berkshire 16 years ago as a progammer.

Came to

Came to
Colin MacFadyen, FLMI, CFA, Vice President-Securities.
field for
the
in
working
after
ago
years
20+
Berkshire in Personnel
prior
position
investment
for
"Recruited himself"
another company.
to 1970.
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List #1 (continued)

Robert L. Plageman, Real Estate Officer. With Berkshire 20+ years,
up until three years ago in Administrative Services.
Served on task
force in 1972-73 while Director of Planning and Administrative
Se rvices.

83

List #2;

Documents Reviewed and Analyzed During Project

Annual

Reports to Policyowners, 197 9 and 1980.

Annual

Statement to State Insurance Departments, 1980.

Communications with Outside Parties:
Advertisements in industry magazines, recruiting materials, monthly
magazine for agents.
Internal Communications:
Statement of Corporate Philosophy-ObjectivesStrategy-Pol i cy , 197 3.
Statement of Corporate Phil osophy-ObjectivesStrategy-Policy , 1978.
Extensive reports and memoranda filed as part of task force efforts
in preparation for 1973 "Statement of Corporate Philosophy."
Memo detailing the current composition and principal purposes of the
twelve standing committees and the two currently operative task
forces.
Memoranda detailing personnel policies.
Report assessing in detail the results of general agent recruiting and
training over last eight years.
Reports comparing company performance to industry as a whole and to
twenty-eight companies which are viewed as competitors.

CHAPTER

IV

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter reports the findings of the research project and then
the analysis of those findings.

sections.
is

First,

a

The findings are organized into four

brief summary of the recent history of the company

provided; drawn from various sources, this background information is

offered at the outset
later information.

in

order to facilitate reader understanding of

The next three sections of the chapter each sum-

marize the findings in relation to one of the three core questions of
the case study guided by the organizational learning model.

These

questions are, in order of presentation:
Who is the dominant coalition of Berkshire Life?

What is the state of the current organizational
Berkshire Life? and.

What are the organizational

knowledge base at

learning processes at Berkshire Life?

The sources of the answers to these questions are detailed throughout;
generally, interviews have provided the overwhelming bulk of the data.

Documents, observations, and the feedback processes were primarily used
to either confirm or disconfirm interview responses.

After the data is reported, analysis follows.
analysis is structured to answer the question:

Berkshire Life "learn"

in

The first level

To what degree does

the sense defined by the model?

project.
concludes the traditional case study aspect of the
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of

This analysis
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The second level

of analysis addresses the central

question of the

entire project, however, and therefore this discussion has been placed
in the final

chapter.

organizational

This central

learning model

determine organizational

issue is:

How useful

the

is

guiding inquiry into the factors that

in

effectiveness?

As

a

secondary aspect of this

analysis, strengths and weaknesses of the model outlined in Chapter
are considered.

This final

level

of analysis was separated

II

from the

case study portion of the analysis because it is another step removed
from the data.
of the data.

It

represents

a

qualitative assessment of the usefulness

Of course, the actual

conclusions did not proceed

in

sifting of data and drawing of

such a neat sequence; it was

back and forth, interactive process.

In

a

a

messy,

project with so many

interwoven themes, there might be other equally reasonable ways to
present the data and analysis, but this order fit both the process of

the research steps and also the components of the model which guided the
research.

Section 1.

History and Present Structure

Berkshire Life Insurance Company was founded in 1851 as

a

mutual

company, meaning that the policyowners technically own the assets of the
company.

Until

pany, providing

recently, it was almost exclusively an East Coast coma

full

range of life insurance products through its

field force, which was organized in General Agencies.

As

it

was

for

most businesses, and for most life insurance companies especially, the
1930's were a period of terrible financial

strain for Berkshire Life.
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The company came out of that period attempting to grow by being "all
things to all

people" and without

a

clear definition of the type of

market it wanted to serve or the type of agent
result, it entered the 1960's with

a

a

it needed

to

recruit.

As

rather "rag tag" collection of

agents with widely varying competencies and styles of selling. The President

this period was Rankin Furey,

in

a

man of dynamic capability who

ran the company with most significant decision-making centralized to his

personal

attention.

Seven people reported directly to him at one time

and he was involved in initiating and controlling organizational
in

every sphere.

actions

Under his leadership the company grew, but turnover in

upper management positions was high and there is some indication that at
least in the latter years of his tenure, the company was "buying

business"--pricing its products too low or compensating its agents too
liberally, either of which would result eventually in losses on those
policies.
President
In

In

1967, he retired and Larry Strattner, then Senior Vice

— Agency

Operations, was selected as his successor.

order to smooth that transition of leadership, Larry produced

a

statement reflecting his own ideas of what corporate philosophy and

direction should be.

This became a public document.

assuming the presidency, he began to promote

a

Shortly after

long-range planning pro-

cess, but there were pressing immediate problems which led this first

planning effort to be postponed.

The company was employing at that point about three hundred and
they had
fifteen people in the home office and the building into which

moved

in

1958 was filled to capacity.

Bob Plageman was actually charged
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with recommending architects for

a

new addition before it was decided,

at his suggestion, to initiate a work measurement program with
the

assistance of an outside consulting firm.

According to Bob, he had

recommended this step several times to the previous president, but it
had never been investigated beyond that point.

Through this program,

the company reduced the home office work force by twenty per cent over

the next two years, even as the volume of business continued to grow;
this reduction was attained through attrition rather than lay-offs.

This program eased the pressure of growing expenses and allowed

expansion of the building to be postponed as well.

Studies by the chief

actuary, who was terminated not long afterward, indicated that the
financial

situation of the company was still quite serious, however.

This led to decisions in 1971 to cut the dividend scale,

drastic step in

a

mutual

in

Both A1

Easton and Larry

retrospect that these measures may have been

overreactions, but by the early 1970's the company was
better financial

in

considerably

shape.

There was also considerable flux
this time.

comparatively

life insurance company, and also to introduce

new, less competitively priced products.

Strattner feel

a

in

the top managerment group at

The Director of Computer Services left for another job and

Dick Levy assumed that position in 1970.

One actuary retired and his

successor was asked to leave when he was not working out to the

satisfaction of the senior officers.
arrival

at that time,

A1

Easton,

a

relatively new

was promoted to the position of senior actuary.

General Agent was asked to come in as Senior Vice President--Agency

A
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Operations, Larry's old position, with the understanding that he could
later return to his agency, which he did in 1972.

Finally, the Senior

Vice President of the Administrative Division was approaching retirement
as well.
In

1972,

Services,

A1

Cornel io was made Senior Vice President--Marketing

position which combined the old Insurance Services and

a

Agency Operations divisions into

a

single division.

This combination

was apparently Larry's idea, and at this point is still

unorthodox one in the insurance business.

very

a

This innovative arrangement,

and A1 Cornel io's appointment as the head of the new division, brought

questions and criticisms both from inside the company, particularly
among the field force, and also from outside the company.

have been the last event in

a

This seems to

period of considerable turmoil, however;

as one subject put it, "the power structure was finally stable."

With the financial

and

personnel

situations more stable. President

Strattner turned again to long-range planning in 1972.

He convened a

task force, which he chaired, consisting of Dick Whitehead from Personnel, Bob

PI

ageman from Planning and Administrative Services, Colin

MacFadyen from the Securities area of Investment, another investment
officer who left the company soon thereafter, Dick Levy from Computer
Services,

A1

Easton from Actuarial, Bill Furey from Agency Operations,

and Tom Franco from Advertising and Sales Promotion.

department of the company was represented by
three senior vice presidents,

A1

a

Thus, every major

junior officer and the

Cornel io. Gene Amber, and Merle Tabor

from Administration, sat in as ex officio members.
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Meeting throughout the year of 1972, this group produced the first
written long range plan for the company, dated January

1,

1973.

This

plan identified the specific markets the company would strive to serve,

provided broad outlines and philosophical commitments, and established
numerical goals in critical
In

areas for the first time.

the period covered by this first five year plan, there were two

jolting environmental

shifts,

A large increase in Social

ability benefits radically altered the market conditions

Security disin the

"blue

collar" disability market, and the passage of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) made tax qualified pension plans so complex

that literally tens of thousands of small businesses and professional
people, Berkshire's primary customer markets, allowed their pension

plans to lapse.

events affected Berkshire's economic

These two external

performance, but otherwise the years since 1972 have been ones of
steady, and accelerating, growth.

ticularly successful,

in

The two most recent years were par-

which Berkshire stood near or at the top on

every dimension of industry comparison.
Today, Berkshire Life is still a small company in an industry of

about 1800 life insurance companies.
handful

The industry is dominated by

a

of giants, however, such as Prudential, Connecticut General,

Metropolitan, etc., so that Berkshire still ranks among the largest
The company has expanded its operating area by opening

seven per cent.

General Agencies in such distant states as California, Texas, and

Washington, and is now licensed
While it offers

a

in the

forty -eight contiguous states.

complete line of life insurance products, its clear
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emphasis is

in

pension, salary continuation, and disability
products

designed for the affluent and financially
sophisticated professional or
small

business person.

These products require

a

great deal

of continual

service, which is provided primarily by the home office
after the
initial

sale.

Unlike most insurance companies, where the Policyowner Services
and Actuarial

departments are structurally separated from all field

functions, at Berkshire Life

all

market related functions are combined

in a single Marketing Division (see Figure 3).

functions is further promoted by

a

This integration of

system wherein three key committees

bring together diverse specialists for ongoing joint efforts in

Merchandising, Marketing, and Product Development.

The last of these

provides an example of how these committees function.
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Whenever

a

new product or product change is suggested, and there

are many sources for such suggestions, the Product Development Com-

mittee, chaired by

A1

Easton, is convened to consider it.

includes not only

A1

specialists

insurance company, but also

in

an

The committee

Easton and another actuary, the traditional

product

Cornel io, the

A1

department heads from Underwriting, Policyowner Service, and Marketing
Services, and Dick Levy, Vice President--Computer Services.
a

Levy is not

member of the Marketing Division, but his department will have to

design much of the support for any product.
all

Before

a

decision is made,

of these specialists have an opportunity to contribute their unique

perspective not only on the proposed product change itself, but
impact such

a

on the

change might have on their departments and the best ways

to coordinate their efforts in planning and implementing the change.

Similarly, at the corporate level, whereas each division head has
sole responsibility for the functioning of his
final

di vi

sion--and makes the

decisions pertaining thereto--the Management Committee (Strattner,

Cornel io, Pmber, and Whitehead), meets biweekly "to provide for regular
and orderly communications among the senior officers of the major

divisions and for briefing and review of general
personnel

dated January 12, 1981.)

consequence is discussed

on

standing committee assignments,

Almost every matter of corporate wide
in

this committee before action is taken.

There are other committees serving

technical

(Memorandum from President

and company relations matters."

Strattner to all management personnel

administrative,

a

variety of functions, from

planning in the Telecommunications Task Force to conducting
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input from lower levels of the hierarchy to appropriate
decision makers.
On the

Building Addition Advisory Committee numerous employees have had

an opportunity to be party to the design and construction of the
new ad-

dition to be completed this summer.

The Personnel Advisory Committee

provides an ongoing forum for many supervisory personnel to make suggestions concerning personnel

policies.

Thus, there is

a

fairly con-

ventional, functionally specialized corporate structure with an active
and important overlay of committees.

Section

2 -

The Dominant Coalition

There is clear evidence from all

sources concerning the membership

of the dominant coalition at Berkshire Life.

The four senior officers--

Strattner, Cornel io. Amber, and Whitehead--are involved in and respon-

sible for, either singly or as

a

significance for the company.

Every single interview subject attributed

to this group the principal
for the company.

In

group, every decision with long term

influence over present and future directions

addition, there are clear structural components to

their central ity--their positions at the lead of each major corporate

division and the company as
the Management Committee.

a

whole, and their exclusive membership in

Thus, the interview responses have obvious

support in the structure, and hence, also the documents, of the company.
This group also is, and has been, quite stable over time and over types
of decisions.

Berkshi re

It

is

very clear then, who the dominant coalition is at

Li fe.

There was also substantial

agreement in responses concerning other

aspects of the leadership of the company.

Interviewees who mentioned
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other powerful

organization members clearly differentiated these others

from the primary group.

There was significant overlap between the per-

sons mentioned; of five subjects who named people other than senior of-

ficers, four people mentioned Bob Herklotts, and three mentioned
i

A1

f

Easton and Dick Levy.
The basis for differentials in degrees of influence was also

point of agreement.

Every time such

described in terms of functional

a

a

difference was mentioned, it was
The most important example of

role.

these comments concerned the centrality of marketing functions.

Every

senior officer, and several others as well, described Berkshire Life as
a

"marketing organization" or as

fore, Larry and A1

,

a

"marketing driven" company.

There-

as the senior officers involved in marketing, were

viewed as most influential

by almost every respondent.

Similarly, when

Herklotts, Easton, or Levy were described as influential, the importance

of their respective functions was given as the rationale for these

attributions.
No

one described personal

friendships or other factors not

directly related to job functions as
At the same time, several

a

source of organizational

power.

interviewees below the senior officer level

said that Berkshire Life had considerable political maneuvering eight or

ten years ago.

Events which were cited as bringing about the end of
Hank Weiss's departure and the sub-

such covert struggles were three:

sequent installation of

A1

Cornel io as Sr. Vice President of the com-

as
bined Marketing Services division; Larry Strattner's selection

President; and, the initiation of

a

formal

plan which clearly defined
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corporate direction and therefore provided

a

rational

basis for resource

allocation and personnel decisions.
Members of fhe organization place

a

great deal

this stability in the top management group.

thusly:

"Another thing that's helped

mature, stable group.

.

.

.

A1

of importance on

Cornelio expressed it

we've had

a

relatively

It's hard to describe the benefit of an on-going

team which has been at it for

a

while.

Without

a

plan and with high

turnover, we were always susceptible to changes of direction.

Now when

we bring in a new person, we (can) watch them very carefully."

This

theme was echoed as well by those immediately below the senior officers.

Almost the first comment

A1

project on planning, was:

ence are set.

I

Easton made, when told of the focus of the

advantage now is that spheres of influ-

"An

don't sense any power struggles.

ning in terms of what makes

a

I

go way beyond plan-

You need a stable

successful company.

power structure; those are the periods v^en you make progress."
Furey repeated the same idea.

"One of the reasons why we have the prog-

ress we've made is because prior to (the beginning of formal
1972) there was a lot of organizational

or four different people since
Keep in mind that all

Bill

I

change.

I've worked

came to the home office

the people I've talked about

.

.

.

in

planning in
for three
1960.

.

.

.

Henry, Herk-

lotts, Furey, Cornelio, Strattner and to some extent Whitehead, we've

worked together for

a

number of years."

The clarity with which the dominant coalition can be established
base, much
makes the next data, describing the organizational knowledge

easier to present.
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Section 3.

In

Organizational Knowledge

order for knowledge or belief to be organizational, as opposed

to individual, in nature, it must fit
zational

very clear definition.

a

Organi-

knowledge describes action-outcome relationships that are con-

sensual ly agreed to be valid by the dominant coalition, that are ex-

pressed in communicable terms, that are accessible to all coalition

members, and that are integrated into

system of action-outcome knowl-

a

edge so that relationships between different actions can be described
and assessed in terms of their impact on the organization as

a

whole.

The goals of the questions designed to explore the organizational

knowl-

edge base were to establish the existence of that knowledge base and to
discern patterns or significant, consistent characteristics of the
shared ideas.

Every specific aspect would certainly have been impos-

sible and pointless to pursue, since the emphasis in the model of

organizational

learning is on more paradigmatic understandings as op-

posed to specific functional

or technical

ones.

Only those six interviews conducted in the initial

round and

employing the more extensive schedule of questions (see Appendix A) were
structured to uncover organizational

knowledge

in

a

systematic way.

The

later interviews and other data gathering techniques were used primarily
to check the results of these initial

interviews.

Overall, there was

ensubstantial congruence between the two pools of data, and since the

tire dominant coalition was included

in

that first set of interviews,

they provided the basis of any organizational
rence of other members peripheral

to

knowledge.

The concur-

the dominant coalition is
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validating, and is mentioned where pertinent, but

is

not essential.

Although the interviews themselves often did not follow the order or
specific questions of the interview protocol, the general

organizational

life listed in that schedule do provide

a

areas of
useful

way of

organizing the subjects' responses.

Planning and strategy .

Since 1972, Berkshire Life's identified markets

have been
the small businessman or professional person; corporations with business needs for personal insurance products--pension plans, salary
continuation plans, etc.; others whose needs for income replacement
upon death, disability, or retirement exceed benefits provided by
government and employer, and who should have been well qualified
counsel with regard to supplementing such benefits. (Corporate
Phil osophy-Objecti ves-Pol icy-Strategy; Jan. 1, 1973; p. 6.)

Every single respondent credited the definition of this specific market, and the resulting direction of the company, to the Long-range Plan-

ning Task Force which met through 1972.

All

the interview subjects were

members of this task force, but even given that fact, the unanimity with

which respondents described the past and future direction of the company, the specific components of that strategy, and significant environmental

threats and opportunities facing the company was striking.
The consensual

view was that the company should, and most probably

would, maintain essentially the same direction for the next five years
that it has established in the last eight.

straint on company growth, and hence
wel

1

-qualified General Agents

in the

a

The most difficult con-

central

field.

goal, is the lack of

The principal

threats in

insurance
the larger environment come from new, investment-oriented
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products which are being marketed without providing the traditional
level

of compensation to the agent making the sale.

This is

a

dual

threat, since it not only presents the company with stiff competition to
its present products but also undermines the agency system which has

been the primary marketing approach of the life insurance industry for

decades.

Inflation has made these new products attractive and the

changing nature of financial

service institutions, exemplified by the

recent wave of insurance company-brokerage house mergers, has provided

the marketing thrust behind them.
six initial

Without exception, every one of the

interviewees mentioned every one of the factors above.

The "marketing driven" nature of the company was reemphasized by

these responses, insofar as there was comparatively little discussion of
any forces which might have an effect outside of the marketing area.

Demographic shifts, mentioned by three of the six, and technological

advances, mentioned by five of the six and two of the four

in

the second

round as well, were only discussed in light of the impact they might

have on the demand for life insurance products and the company's ability
to market them.

The only respondent who consistently spoke of

opportunities, trends, or threats

in

relation to any area other than

marketing was Gene Amber, who of course focused on investments.

Even

he, however, outlined every aspect of the direction and present

situation of the company in terms of marketing.
The significance of the plan as

a

component of the organizational

to
knowledge base was even more obvious in the ways individuals referred
it.

Larry Strattner described its origin this way:
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Our sales representation was a fairly motley crew,
selling in different kinds of markets with vastly different levels of
sophistication . . . .
This helter-skelter collection of people and agencies
didn t seem to be the ideal thing to build on. We decided
to look
at what we were doing, to identify those things which
seemed to have
a future and to build on those things and achieve
some sense of
direction.
[The plan^ is hardly a Bill of Rights.
It has nevertheless provided
us with a track
It is a simple, basic policy now es-

....

tablished through osmosis.
A1

Cornel io expressed the same basic thought.

That original product--now everybody has that pretty much ingrained
in them.
They know our products.
They know our markets.
We have a
track to run on, and don't spend a lot of time spinning our wheels.
The plan was described in very similar terms, sometimes even the same

phrasings, by all

respondents.

on a specific aspect of the

from an organizational

Several, like

A1

Cornel io, also focused

plan that makes it particularly important

knowledge point of view, namely that

it

yields

very explicit performance goals and therefore performance gaps.

fact will

be discussed

in

more detail

learning, but it is important here

outcome basis of organizational

in

in

This

the section on organizational

that it indicates the action-

knowledge.

The plan was also described as more than simply a group document

that guides decisions and operations.

When subjects were asked who the

"prime mover" behind the plan was, seven of the ten responded that it

was Larry Strattner.

Most, however, never had to be asked that question

because they had already described
and the plan.

A1

a

link between Larry's personal

style

Cornel io summarized it by saying, "His strength is

that he conceptually comes up with things

of guy who does not get involved

in

...

he

is a thoughtful

saying, 'Do this or don't do

kind

,
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that

«

Even more illuminating, however, are the comments of Bob

Plageman and Colin MacFadyen, who viewed the plan as indicative of

organizational
PI

kn owl edge- -and

learning--far beyond its specifics.

Bob

ageman:
Now, I do know, having known Larry for all the time I've been in' the
company . , . this very much fits his personality. He's a very
organized and quite structured guy.
His predecessor ... had a
very different style, had different strengths and different weaknesses than Strattner . . . successful, yes, but still we didn't
have what Larry likes to run by, which is a roadmap.

In

a

similar vein, Colin MacFadyen spoke of the plan as an incorpora-

tion of Larry's style into the company's operating patterns.

... it was a part of Larry's style, precipitated by his perception
of changing conditions in the industry and how we were going to cope
with them.
It developed for all of us a form of discipline, in that
we had to think ahead and set it down in writing and establish
objectives
and that discipline has continued to prevail
This
Larry's a very well-organized type of person.
represented a passing on of his style of organization to those of us
who work with him.

....

....

Thus, the plan embodies implicit action-outcome relationships, and
powerful

paradigmatic ones, as well as explicit ones.

Performance.

Every single respondent found Berkshire Life's performance

in recent years excellent.

this shared view.

There is

a

very clear objective basis for

Berkshire's economic results for the last two years

have shown substantial

increases over both the company's past results

and the industry averages for the same periods.

Quoting the 1980 annual

report
and
for Berkshire Life, 1980 was a truly outstanding year,
The
such progress deserves attention and evaluation
New life
highlight of our year has to be our gains in new business.
over
increase
insurance volume of $587,812,000 represented a 68%
the gain over the prior year was a hefty
1979, a year in which
24%.

...

....

...
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There are other impressive figures, and the good performance
includes
the investment area as well, where policy loans had played
havoc with

the results of many life insurance companies,

money rate" has consistently been

in the

Berkshire Life's "new

top four or five of the

twenty-eight companies which they consider actual competitors, which was
reported not only by Gene Amber, but by other subjects from the marketing and administrative divisions as well.
not important here.

The specific statistics are

The important fact is that everyone knew these

results, and not simply in relation to their own specialty functions.
It

is

important to note

ance industry

is

a

this discussion, that the life insur-

in

tightly regulated one with

a

long

history.

Its

measures of performance, both current and in relation to the past, are

absolutely standardized and publicly available.

Therefore, researcher

questions regarding the type and accuracy of performance measures were
not of great relevance at Berkshire Life,

These questions usually

brought one of two related issues to the surface, however.
to the meaningful ness of the numerical

goals included

in

Both relate

the plan.

These comments touch on one area of disagreement, both within the

dominant coalition and among other members of the upper management.
Dick Whitehead said he feels the plan should include comparative

goals, stating desired industry rank in each area, such as growth
assets or new premium income.

in

Also, he feels the planning process

should include more thorough investigation of forecasts that are missed,

either above or below.

As

he discussed these

--based on past conversations

in

points, he also predicted

the Management Committee--that the

.
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other senior officers would disagree with him.

He was right; the other

three indicated satisfaction with both the goals and measures for performance.
At the same time, his view of the numerical

goals was shared by

some of the junior officers who described them as "arbitrary” and not

particularly useful
departmental

in

setting departmental

performance.

priorities or

in

evaluating

These comments reflected an ongoing, though

very low key, debate within the dominant coalition and other managers.
Part of the basis for this disagreement was revealed

in

a

comment by

Larry, when he said the numbers in the plan were "sort of incidental,"

that the important aspect was having challenging and measurable goals
and that getting too "sophisticated"

in

analyzing the numbers would not

be useful
When subjects were asked what Berkshire Life does particularly
well

and what it does particularly poorly, there was again broad agreev

ment.

For strengths, every interviewee--even those not asked the ques-

tion--stressed the company's services and support to its field force and
to the ultimate customer.

Specific aspects of this service were

stressed repeatedly as well.

Every senior officer other than Gene Amber

spoke of the sophisticated telecommunications system that provides much

quicker backup to agents than that of most companies Berkshire

s

size,

lowest
and he jokingly referred to Investments always receiving the
of other
priority for computer services--a sort of humorous confirmation

people's comments.

servThe fact that top managers consistently stress

ice to the field was also repeatedly mentioned.
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Interestingly, Gene Amber described the commitment in
his division
to responding quickly to mortgage bankers when they
inquire about

specific projects; then he added, "It's sort of like the rest
of the

company, its service--service to the customer."

Other strengths were also frequently mentioned.

The committees

and task forces were described as very effective communication and
oper-

ational

planning structures by eight of ten subjects.

The "open" and

"concerned" style of management was also described as very firmly es-

tablished and as

a

contributor to open communication and to increased

commitment and motivation.
There was less overall agreement about weak areas
performance.
in the

the company's

in

When the interviewer asked this question as it was written

interview schedule, "What does this organization do particularly

poorly?", the response was most often something like, "I can't think of

anything we do poorly," or "We've spent the last ten years making sure
there is nothing we do poorly," or "If there was anything

were doing poorly. I'd be working on it."

I

thought we

Respondents were very will-

ing, usually spontaneously, to turn the question around and discuss

aspects of the company that need improvement.

concerned with the overall

financial

Amber and Easton, both

situation of the company, said they

have been disappointed with the growth of assets.
they acknowledge the plan did not establish that as

At the same time,
a

priority.

All

six

subjects in the first round mentioned the slowness of the upgrading and
expansion of the field management; at the same time they stressed the

unexpected difficulty of finding and retaining general

agents who can
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function in Berkshire Life's sophisticated markets and noted
the innovative and diligent attempts made by the company

in

this area.

Con-

tinuing to address this problem was the single goal mentioned by
every
respondent.

Although there was clear consensus around this and other problem
areas, there was none that this was something that the company does

poorly--only that it is faced with

a

challenging problem.

Other ex-

amples of this are the comments made concerning employee performance
appraisal

and

the communication of "general" information.

In

both these

areas, no one mentioned them when asked the question about what the com-

pany does not do well.

When asked about performance appraisal, however,

two senior officers and three other managers said, in effect, that this

was an area that the company has not done as well in as it should.
was repeated when asked about communication.

pressed concern that although they make

a

This

Three senior officers ex-

tremendous amount of informa-

tion public, it seems not to stimulate curiosity in officers' meetings

or feelings of being included at lower levels
hierarchy.

in

the organization

This was one of the few management concerns where there

seemed to be genuine uncertainty about the nature of action-outcome re-

lationships.

Management philosophy, orientation toward organization members.

The

same words were repeated again and again by subjects describing the

management style or philosophy of the company, words such as "open,"
"concerned,"

"people oriented," "informal," and "flexible,"

of the subjects also drew

a

A majority

close connection between the company's
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"official" style and Larry Strattner's personal

style.

The agreement on

basic management principles among the four members
of the dominant

coalition was even more pronounced.
organizational

Since that group is the seat of

knowledge, that is the starting point for reporting
data

on management style and philosophy.

Larry Strattner described two essential

addressing this question.

ideas on management in

First, it is the responsibility of management

to manage and the responsibility of the Board of Directors
to monitor.

This principle holds at lower levels of the organization as well, where
Larry said he expects each manager to make decisions in his own area and

for his superior to support him unless he is prepared to replace him or
unless the decision has impact beyond the manager's own division or

department.

Balancing this principle of trust and managerial

independence, Larry has worked to establish "an environment
seek as much as possible to manage by consensus."

in

which we

Whereas these two

ideas might appear to be in conflict, Larry explained how that was

a

mi sconception:

....

There are some misconceptions about the role of committees
Any major decision is discussed in the Management Committee.
Consensus is the goal, but I will play referee. The committee
structure affords specialists with input into the overall com'pany,
but the Management Committee doesn't decide anything. ThT
individual officers make decisions about their areas or r~make
decisions where I have to, but we strive to establish consensus
about what the best way to move is. (emphasis added)

Each of the other senior officers repeated these principles, not

only explicitly but implicitly as they described their own managerial

behavior.

A1

Cornel io, when asked who was moving Berkshire Life into

105

future directions, began by saying that the original

long-range plan was

the product of that task force in 1972, then:

Accepting that plan, it is reviewed on an ongoing basis--not very
formally but in an ongoing way . . . basically, through committee
structures.
Neither Larry nor I are going to take product development for our markets on ourselves. There's the Product Development
C^mittee, chaired by A1 Easton--all input goes through that Committee, product research, sugggestions from the field.
In that
committee we ask, "Will it work in the market? Is it competitive?"
(Gives example of how suggestion from the field was handled.)

Anyway, the committee operates in terms of short-term changes in the
basic context of the plan.
If we sense a basic change, so that the
plan has a problem because it's holding us back product-wise, the
committee refers that to Strattner and the Management Committee.

Describing his relationship with

a

subordinate he was about to hire,

A1

said.
He asked, 'How much control am I going to have over how I run the
department?', to which I answered, 'You'll have all the control in
the world, just don't change anything.
If you want to change someWe don't want
thing, then you bring us in . . .we want input.'
change for change sake where it concerns our products or marketing.
Now he's been here a while and knows our strengths and weaknesses,
so he can make a contribution, but where his actions will affect
other areas we want to make sure it fits our direction.
In

a

very different way of expressing it,

two underlying ideas--manageri

al

A1

was pointing out the same

autonomy balanced against the push for

consensus in important decisions.

Dick Whitehead and Gene Amber made

similar points in their responses, emphasizing both the openness to
input and debate and also the finality of their decisions in their areas
of responsibility.

The senior officers also repeatedly emphasized the

aspects of management style mentioned earlier as

strength--management openness and concern

in

a

particular company

relation to employees.

This theme was particularly important in the comments of the other

interviewees; both Bill Furey and

Al

Easton, the only managers not on
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Management Committee to participate

in

the longer interviews, linked’

this "people-oriented" style to Larry's personal

style of being

empathetic, willing to listen, and concerned about how people feel about
what they do.
An aspect of management style that was mentioned by only one

senior officer, but which also seemed to be shared--at least insofar as

how the senior officers are perceived by the other respondents- -was
their willingness to get involved

in

detail.

Bill

Furey,

Easton and

A1

Dick Levy all described specific incidents in which they were impressed
by top management attention to detail, especially on Larry's part.

degree to which Larry's personal
influential

in

concern and attention to detail

The

are

projecting an overall management style was revealed

in

a

lunch conversation with Jim Dunn, Manpower Development Officer reporting
to Bill Furey.

as

a

He described his experience on the day after his arrival
He was sit-

management trainee when he heard his father had died.

ting in his office worrying about the ramifications of taking time off,

when President Strattner, whom he had never. met, came in.

Larry told

him not to worry, to take as much time as he needed with pay, and that
his job would be waiting for him when he got back.

As Jim said, "That

builds loyalty."
It

is

important not to conceive of this management philosophy as

individual, however, because it

is

truly organi zational--shared by and

consciously developed by the dominant coalition.

Dick Levy

s

comments

illustrative.
about his experience working in Computer Services are

involved, not in
The top management of this company has become very
intricacies of how
the bits and bytes of data processing or in the
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you get something done, but

in what they want done . . . senior management has been setting priorities and backing me in a lot of different situations developing products, not in an undue pressure
environment, but in an understanding manner.
Senior management has
made a major contribution to the success of data processing, . .
especially Whitehead and Cornel io.
.

It's a relatively smooth relationship between our area and upper
management . , , , We seem to feed each other information relatively well.
I have no
qualms about going to them and saying, 'Hey,
we did this wrong.
I
think we should regroup and start again.' . .
the feedback is good ... in fifteen years since I've been here.
.
I've become more and more excited about working at Berkshire Life.
They gave me a lot of opportunity.
They gave a lot of people a lot
of opportunity
They don't tell you they're going to do
anything for you but they give you the opportunity to show that you
can do it.

....

Dick Levy's last comment leads to one final aspect of management philo-

sophy which was demonstrated not simply by the comments of senior managers but also by the career paths of individuals in the company.

recognizing that they must sometimes hire technical

While

specialists from the

outside, Berkshire Life maintains what Larry Strattner calls an "almost
fanatical

insistence on promoting from within."

Though less emphati-

cally, this was echoed by Cornel io and Whitehead, the two senior officers with primary human resource development responsibilities.
In

addition to top management commitment and behavior, there are

also systems and policies that support many of the ideas mentioned
the interviews.

Berkshire Life will

in

refund between fifty and one hun-

dred percent of education tuition costs incurred by full-time employees.

There is an official
Personnel

"open door" policy announced by a memo from the

Department that assures any employee access to any manager,

without
including the President, to discuss any company-related concern
fear of retribution.

There is

a

merit salary system wherein each
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department head

is

given salary parameters for every position in the

department and

a

for salaries.

Within those two constraints, department heads are

certain percentage increase

permitted to make annual

the departmental

budget

salary adjustments according to their own

assessment of employee performance.
central

in

Each of these policies supports

a

idea in the management philosophy at Berkshire Life.

The performance appraisal

and overall

compensation systems, as

mentioned earlier, were viewed by most interviewees as areas

Berkshire Life has not performed as well as it should.
top management decision to have Hay Associates,

a

in

which

This led to

a

very prestigious com-

pensation consulting firm, evaluate and systematically redesign the job

description and compensation guidelines at the company.

This massive

intervention, concluding while this study was being conducted, was

described by all six of the initial subjects as providing

designing

a

more effective performance appraisal

Communication and information flow .

a

basis

for

system.

As mentioned in the earlier sub-

section on Performance, certain aspects of communication were viewed

as

being particular strengths of the company while the efforts to com-

municate general
as

problematic.

and information.

information to all officers or all employees were seen
There are really three different types of communication
One type is that information needed to make and imple-

ment the daily operational decisions that constitute the work of the

company.

The second type of information is that which top managers re-

is
ceive through whatever means that lets them know how the organization

performing

in

its various domains.

The third type of information is
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that which is exchanged between top managers and other company employees

concerning the company as
policies, not related

to

a

whole, its purpose, performance, and guiding

specific task accomplishment.

Members of the

dominant coalition discussed these three different types of communication in very different terms, although both their certainties and their

confusions were consensual ly defined.
Everyone agreed that the essential

communications having to do

with the ongoing tasks of the business are

the company.

Several

a

particular strong point in

officers below the top management level mentioned

the stress Larry places on communication.

A1

Cornel io described one of

his major contributions as "getting a number of diverse, 'go your own
way' departments in unison to achieve company goals."

structures in his division serve this function.

The committee

Almost every respondent

alluded to the committees and task forces, which are used extensively in
the Marketing Division, as being extraordinarily effective communication
forums.
In

another example of his attention to communication,

altering application forms so that agents

in

A1

described

the field would know as

soon as an application was approved without having to wait for it to be

processed.

By

focusing on this communication system, persistent prob-

lems were alleviated.

"People complain that I've gotten involved

in

detail, but over the years some people who work for me have learned to
do that."
which he
Tom Franco's comments about the Merchandising Committee,
in
chairs, were illustrative of both the committees' usefulness

no

communication and also of the two principles of management described

in

the earlier section.
[It] really is nothing more than a communication forum, because from
line standpoint A1 makes the decisions . . . but that doesn't
change the fact that I need to know what the decisions are and some
of the philosophy behind them.
I
get a hel 1 of a lot of that in the
Merchandising Committee, which then spills over into subcommittees
and hallway conversations
and the committees are well intermixed.
a

...

He went on to

describe how the overlapping membership of committees in

the marketing area adds to the richness of his perspective and understanding.

Franco's comments also showed how the committee structures

help overcome the fact, which Larry pointed out

in

his interview, that

an insurance company is a collection of specialists.

Bill (Furey) and I have no reporting connection, but we're on the
Merchandising Committee together and we see each other at least once
a month there and talk about a lot of things
which maybe we
.
.
forget otherwise, and then that prompts some other conversations . .
I'll end up on a subcommittee with a guy from the Computer De.
partment or a guy from the Actuarial Department, people I
ordinarily wouldn't talk to for six months.
.

Although Dick Whitehead and Gene Amber do not employ committees quite
so extensively as

much the same.

A1

does in Marketing, the stress on communication is

Gene Amber described his view this way:

Communication could always be better, I don't care what the
organization is . . . We do pretty well in my rather smallish
organization, information within the division, but even there things
We try to keep people apprised of what's taking place.
go astray.
Dick Whitehead focused on the impact of committees and task forces as
well, and on the quality of interaction within them.
the fact we can pull together people from various functions to
attack the problem, put someone in charge of that task force who is
goal
not the senior person, and get them working toward a common
senior
four
the
think
I
.
without defending their own turf . .
way.
officers set the example in that we do not all manage the same
.

.

.

Ill

and we are not reluctant to disagree either among the four
of us or
In front of other people, so that It's no secret In
the company that
the four of us disagree, and It's clear that that hasn't Impaired
the four of us from cooperating or In terms of career.
He

went on to describe how he holds regular staff meetings with his de-

partment heads to discuss goals, problems, etc.
that the four senior officers are

In

essential

def1n1te--and reportedly effect 1ve--approach

to

So,

It's very clear

agreement, and push
operational

a

communica-

tion.
In

the area of gathering

relevant Information from outside the

organization, particularly as It relates to performance and the marketing environment, there was also agreement and a clear emphasis.

In

Marketing, there are various structured ways that general

agents and

agents can communicate to the home office management.

addition,

pricing analysis Is done at least once

the company's position

In

a

In

year for every product so that

the marketplace can be assessed.

This

Information Is then fed Into the committees for discussion.

While this study was being conducted,
by Bill

report was being compiled

Furey's department and the people In Agency Operations on the

performance of the company
general

a

agents.

A1

In

recruiting and successfully supporting new

Cornel 1o described the process of examination that

Information would go through.
discuss It with the people responsible (for the report) . . .
We'll discuss It, and If there's anything we feel we should be doing
differently. Bill, Cy, and I will take It to the Marketing Committee
and we'll discuss It In the Merchandising Committee, and then If we
decide we should be doing something differently. I'll take It to the
So, It'll go through a number of gelling processes.
President.
I'll

Another source of valuable Information for company management Is

the various Industry associations; there

Is

one of these for virtually
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6very technical

specialty

company philosophy this

in

the company,

Dick Whitehead described the

way—

Our participation in industry associations is a way we
perceive
things beginning to happen. Again, it is very important for us as a
company because we sit up here all by ourselves and it's easy to be
satisfied and not realize that the world is passing you by. But
there are a lot of good ideas out there we could use if we just knew
they existed, so we encourage a fair amount of participation and we
try to get our people out and part of these industry associations.

Even though there was no question designed to surface such information,

every subject except one mentioned his participation
association.

So,

in the thought and
a

in

in

some industry

this area as well, a consistent pattern is evident

action of the top management group.

Just as there is

strong emphasis on effective communication within the company

in

the

course of task accomplishment, there are also efforts made to establish
useful

information flow into the company from outside.
The last type of communication is more amorphous; it concerns the

efforts of the dominant coalition to open up channels of communication
to lower levels of the organizational

hierarchy in relation to concerns

and information that do not pertain to daily task performance.

The fact

that an effort has been made here at all demonstrates the centrality of

communication in the value scheme and frame of reference of the top management group, but their only shared action-outcome understanding expressed during the interviews was one of disappointment and confusion at

the apparent lack of success in this area.

The basis of that dis-

appointment was an externally conducted, anonymous Employee Attitude
Survey,

Whereas the company received above average ratings for job

efforts
security, employees at Berkshire Life seemed less satisfied with
of top managers to communicate with them than was the case

in

most life

1

:
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insurance companies of similar size.

As A1

Cornelio put it,

"I

was

amazed, because only six or eight months before that the President of
the company had just completed

which, over the course of

a

a

series of meetings over coffee in

year, every single employee had the op-

portunity to discuss any topic with the President."
This befuddlement was repeated or affirmed by each of the senior

officers, and this concern was the topic of group discussion at the
feedback presentation to the senior officers as well.

It

was clearly

a

matter they had discussed on numerous previous occasions.

Customer Orientation .

This area has already been touched on in the

earlier section on Performance.

Every subject except Colin MacFadyen

and Bob Plageman, the two who have no direct contact with the field,

named servi ce--both to the agent and also to the policyowner, as
tral

value of the company.

a

cen-

There is no reason to quote specific indi-

viduals here, because their comments essentially repeated, with only

minor variations, the commitments explicitly outlined in the original

"Corporate Phil osophy-Ob jectives-Pol i cy-Strategy"
Products and services will be developed within a
What we wi 1 1 sel
that they are inseparabl e--that the sale
which
recognizes
framework
is perforce product.
service
and
implies service
:

Several

subjects emphasized the point that the general agents, although

employees, are in effect the customers of the home office and deserve to
be treated as such.

...

Larry Strattner:

and it is now a part of the company program, that it
preach
the rate
is the job of the home office to serve the person carrying
their
is
policyowner
and
the
customer
The agent is our
book.
customer.

We
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This is the consensually shared idea of customer
service at Berkshire

Life.

Likewise, the agent is generally the conduit for feedback
from

the policyowners on company products and services.

As

was noted in the

preceeding subsection on Communication, there are both structures and
norms operative to emphasize the value of input and feedback from the
field.

These are consciously reinforced by each member of the dominant

coal ition.

Financial Orientation
in

Questions in this area focused on three issues

.

financial management--profitability

control.

,

cost effectiveness, and cost

Most of the discussion in the interviews focused on the last

of these three, for several

reasons.

First, profitability is

different concept at the corporate level
most business firms because

vision for

a

a

mutual

somewhat

company than

in

income beyond cost of business and pro-

all

contingency reserve

form of dividends.

in

a

is

returned to the policyowners in the

Second, profitability of individual

products is ex-

tremely hard to assess, particularly in the short run, because all sales
lose money in the first year or so--due to field compensation and the

costs associated with setting up

a

policy--and also because it is af-

fected by long term events, such as mortality rates.

are usually left to technical

These calculations

specialists, the actuaries.

Finally,

these vagueries make cost effectiveness, which is always very difficult
to assess, almost impossible to determine in any meaningful way

in

the

The accepted measure in the life insurance

life insurance business.

industry is "net cost to policyowner per $1000.00 of coverage," but
again, over the life of

tially by changes

in

a

policy this figure can be altered substan-

the dividend scale.
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Given this background information, there
the basic financial

goal

clearly established

in

is

clear unanimity about

of Berkshire Life--it is growth.

This goal

is

the corporate plan:

Growth contributes to better unit cost; it helps to stabilize earnings from mortality; it provides opportunities for a broader based
investment program; and most important, it helps create a climate
for attracting and retaining outstanding people.
We will,
therefore, continue to pursue aggressively a course of sound growth.
This underlying commitment was implicitly obvious, and often expressed,

throughout the interviews and was well supported

observations as well.

Berkshire Life

is

in

the documents and

aggressively, and successfully,

attempting to expand its business.
This effort was obvious in the marketing thrust of the organization,

A consistent commensurate effort at the home office must be made

to insure that costs of gaining and servicing that new business do not

outstrip the income it generates.

This was why so much discussion

focused on cost control; in addition, it is an area where the company
severe problem in the late 1960's, and one where it ex-

experienced

a

perienced

highly successful

The

a

solution.

importance of that historical

incident, where

a

work measure-

ment program was instituted with outside help and home office costs were

subsequently brought under control, was stressed by five of the six people asked about the company orientation to cost control.

The senior

officers especially spoke of having weathered that crisis as

an

ex-

perience that has shaped their individual and shared attitudes.
There was less agreement about the status of present cost control

efforts.

Significantly, those three senior officers who elaborated on
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t h6

topic not only stdtod thoir own viow but also notod the current

disagreement among them and predicted accurately who would express
current concern and who would not.

Although there was currently

disagreement about the meaning and significance of climbing costs, there
was consensus about the long-term importance of cost control

systems, such as work measurement, were

in

and

the

place to support it.

Orientation of individuals toward the organization

.

The four senior

officers, and everyone else interviewed or spoken to informally,

expressed very positive feelings about Berkshire Life
work.

as a

place to

Most respondents mentioned the positive organizational

climate,

and also noted that the company's outstanding performance in recent

years both has been gratifying in and of itself and also has enabled the

company to do more for its employees
etc.

In

in

the way of bonuses, benefits,

describing their view of company-wide morale, the senior

officers once again noted their surprise at some of the results
surveys of employee attitudes.

in

past

Two of the senior officers mentioned the

fact that the company fared considerably better among employees that had
been with the company

a

while, and

it

was also noted that comments about

unfairness in work loads and compensation had been one impetus to the

comprehensive intervention by Hay Associates.

The members of the

dominant coalition expressed very similar thoughts on this subject,
despite some shared sense of not knowing exactly what the nature of

action-outcome relationships are.

It

was clear from their comments and

levels of morale
past actions, such as taking regular surveys, that the
in both the
and job satisfaction are viewed as important elements

mission and the long term success of the company.

V
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Section 4.

The final

Organizational Learning

set of questions in the principal

interview protocol

concerned the means by which shared knowledge and attitudes are developed and refined.

Although to meet the demands of the model, this

process need only include members of the dominant coalition, the development of organizational

knowledge frequently includes other

organization members as well.

Several

subsections of the section on

Organizational Knowledge have already touched on the ways that top managers described extending their action-outcome knowledge.
One of those subsections

planning and strategy.

focused on responses to questions about

people demonstrate how the

Comments by several

act of planning itself provided for the development of organizational

knowledge.

Colin MacFadyen, quoted at length earlier, described how he

viewed planning as conducive to
group.

Bill

a

shared sense of discipline by the top

Furey also described the development of shared knowledge,

almost expressed in terms of the identify of the company, and how that
led to more effective use of managerial

talent:

had less turnover,
our markets, . .
defined
We
going.
we're
where
known
because we've
tried
to be al 1
We'd
before.
we'd never defined our markets
.
planning
corporate
lot;
the
over
all
things to all people and were
we're
what
are,
we
who
stable--'here's
has been vital in keeping us
the
here's
it;
about
go
to
committed to, here's how we're going
market' --we started with the market and then decided what kind of
agent we needed, then what kind of agency management, then what kind
So you add to that we ve
of support, then what kind of home office.
it's
had the people plugged into the right slots in the plan, and
direction.
Everybody was pulling in the same
worked pretty well.
.

.

.the most important single reason why we've

These comments show how the plan provides
other types of decision,

a

a

direction and

a

basis for

set of action-outcome understandings.

These

.
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original

understandings also yielded performance gaps, which served as

the basis for new inquiry by the dominant coalition.

scribed how this occurred

in

A1

Cornel io de-

the first five years.

ERISA ... is a fine example of how the planning process works very
nicely.
We were going along fin,e and then hit a blip.
Plan sets
out the goals, then you have to look at deviations.
You have good
and bad deviations--and need to look at both.
Last year we had good
deviations. After ERISA, all of a sudden we were falling off.
The same thing happened with disability income.
Social Security
payments jumped way up and took away some of the incentive to work.
We had massive losses.
With the plan, we had something to compare
it to.
In the old days, we might have gone along buiiipity-bumpi ty
We wouldn't have known to take a look because we wouldn't have known
where we were supposed to be.
... Ihe plan caused us to look at
the deviations.
It turns out these deviations were the result of
external events that required new adjustments, not in the basic plan
--which was still sound, but in some of our ways of implementing the
plan.
These essential

themes about the usefulness of the plan and the plan-

ning process were repeated again and again.

Every single interview sub-

ject gave much of the credit for the company's recent performance to the
plan and the planning procedures instituted in 1972.

Another way of developing shared knowledge of the organization
which was mentioned by most interviewees is the extensive use of comThese have been documented already, particu-

mittees and task forces.

larly in the subsections on Communication and Information Flow and on

Management Philosophy.

It

is worth quoting Larry Strattner again.

The committee structure affords special ists wi th input into the
The Management Committee is focal in providing
overall company.
Any major decision is discussed in the Manoverall direction.
agement Committee; consensus is the goal, but I will play referee
when I have to.
This type of exchange almost inevitably leads to

a

shared under-

company, even if
standing at least about how each individual views the
it does not lead to agreement on direction.
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Another top management learning tool has been the fairly regular
use of consultants.

At least three times

since Larry Strattner became

President, major consulting firms have been hired to assist
organizational
nical

performance.

The specific

improving

in

projects have been

in

tech-

areas--work measurement, field compensation systems, and home

office compensation systems.

These experiences have also helped shape

top management attitudes.
The decision to host and fund the project described here is

another example of the use of outside resources.

The dominant coalition

did not initiate the project, but provided the opportunity, they

discussed as
the initial

a

group the possible costs and benefits, met as

a

group for

presentation of the project, contributed significant amounts

of time to the interviews, and then met as

discuss the results.

At that

a

group again to hear and

point, they indicated some of the feedback

might well prove useful to them.
Similarly, they have employed outside people to take employee

attitude surveys.

Then they have discussed those results in depth and

used them, to some degree, to guide future decisions.

They have drawn

on the opportunities provided by industry associations for individual

learning, and there is historical and interview data to suggest they

have used that individual

learning as

a

starting point for group

learning.
The senior officers mentioned other activities as well when asked
gets
how public knowledge of the company's performance and philosophy

developed and extended.

They described officers meetings, held six
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times

a

year, and the company newsletter that goes to all employees.

These seemed to be, as they described them anyway, more attempts by the

dominant coalition to communicate to the employees, as opposed

to

ef-

forts to generate new knowledge among the top four.

One final

source of dominant coalition learning deserves mention.

The other three senior officers each gave

a

great deal

of credit to

Larry Strattner for both promoting certain ideas explicitly and modeling

principles that have become known as corporate values.

He was

frequently mentioned as the exemplor of the company management philosophy and the company approach to communication.

merge the two old divisions into
and that idea of marketing as

point of sale has become

a

a

a

It

was his idea to

single Marketing Services division,

process from product development to

central

concept in the organizational

knowledge base--in the conception of the company as "marketing driven."

Other interviewees, below the senior management level, described Larry
as contributing "discipline,"

"organization," and "concern for people"

to the corporate philosophy.
Several

respondents, including two senior officers, said informal

conversations were

a

source of new thoughts and ideas.

elaborated, it seemed that

in

such instances, these spontaneous dis-

cussions usually lead to examination of such
meeting, such as

a

committee.

As they

a

topic

in

a

more formal
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TABLE

SUMMARY OF

INTERVIEW
SUBJECT

#1

DOMINANT
COALITION

A1

#2

#3

#4

#5

Cornel io

INTERVIEW DATA

FUTURE
CORPORATE
DIRECTION

Senior Officers

2

Basical ly
the
same

KEY

CORPORATE
GOALS

Recruiting
GA's

Larry Strattner basical ly
Cornel io
the
Senior Officers
same
Planning Group
Senior Officers Basical ly
the
Easton, Herksame
lotts. Levy
Senior Officers Basical ly
Co rnel io
the
same
Easton
Larry Strattner Basically
A1 Cornel io
the
Senior Officers
same

Recruiting

Larry Strattner Basical ly
A1 Cornel io
the
same
Dick Whitehead
Gene Amber
A1 Cornel io
Basical ly
the
Senior Officers
same
Senior Officers Basical 1y
the
Larry Strattner
same
A1 Cornelio
Senior Officers
NA
Larry Strattner
A1 Cornelio
Dick Whitehead
Larry Strattner
NA
Senior Officers

Recruiting

A1

GA's
Field backup

Recruiting
GA's
Field backup

Recruiting
GA's
Growth

Recruiting
GA's

Insuring GA
qual ity

ENVIRONMENTAL
TRENDS OF
IMPACT
New prods.
New comp.

Demographics
Techno, trends
Inflation
New prods.
New comp.
New comp.
New prods.
Inflation

Tech, trends
Inflation
Economic growth
New prods.

Inflation
New prods.
New comp.
Tax changes

Demographics
#6

#7

#8

#9

?n5

GA's

Recrui ting
GA's

Upgrading
quality of
GA's
NA

NA

New prods.

Demographics

NA
Technol ogical

trends

NA

Inflation

NA = Not asked or addressed spontaneously.
Many of these summarizing words may not be clear without referring to
the text of Chapter IV.

,

,
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TABLE

INTERVIEW
SUBJECT

NUMERICAL
GOALS &
MEASURES

#1

Sati sfied

#2

Sati sfied

Very difficult
to figure
l^lot

#3

satisfied.

Not enough
depth of

understanding

#4

Sati sfied

#5

Satisfied

2

(continued)

mm
STRENGTHS

IMPROVEMENT
Not much,
Overal 1 communication
could be
better,
Perf. appraisal
Not much
Communication
of broader
i ssues

Service to
agent &
customer

Service
Competitive
products
Computer
services
Open comm.
Service
Sales support

Financi al
planning.
Training of
sales org.
Perf. appraisal
Growth in
assets

Service
Quality
people
Service to
field
Communication

Computer backup

Perf. appraisal
Recruiting GA's
Growth in
assets
Perf. appraisal

Service to

#6

Sati sfied

#7

Numbers not
rel evant

fiel d

PLANNING
PROCESS
Track clear
Not too sophi sticated
Integrated

Track clear
Committees

monitor
Per. gaps
show up
Not enough
eval uation
Not enough
partici pat ion

Markets clear
Provided
groundwork
Effective
A blueprint
Direction
markets clear
Consensus
built
Track clear
recti on,
more important than

Di

goal

Numerical
goals
Perf. appraisal

Service
Backup to
field

Service, esp

1

#8

#9

#10

NA

Numbers not
relevant to
departments
NA

fi el d

NA

NA

.

NA

NA

Reviews of
plan

s

Exercise good
Markets clear
Plan vague
Committee
fill gap
Clear markets
Focus on GA
recruiting
Track clear
Goals clear

Provided
di scipl ine

NA = Not asked or addressed spontaneously.
referring to
Many of these summarizing words may not be clear without
the text of Chapter IV.
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TABLE

2

(continued)

INTERVIEW “MANAGEMENT
OTmuNICATION
SUBJECT
PHILOSOPHY
FLOW
Consensus
Field input
#1
Commi ttees
EAS* indiintegrate
problem
Managers manage Lots of
effort here
Upen comm.
Field input
#2
Concern for
Committees
employees
Surprise at
Detail

Open comm.
Committees and
task forces
Managers manage

#3

Cohens ive, open
Theory Y
Managers manage

#4

Open comm.

Consensus
People oriented
Matrix

#5

People oriented
Open Door

#6

Committees
Managers manage
Trust in people
Flexible
Informal , open
Suppo rti ve
Involved
Informal , open
Can be tough
Goal oriented
Participatory

#7

#8

#9

Informal
Well

#10

organized

CUTTUmTR
ORIENTATION
Se rvice
Strong communication

'TINAUCIffC

ORIENTATION
Cost concerns
Hi story

Agent as

customer
jood prods.
Service and
backup to

Controls important
Time lags affect
EAS
field
calculation
Hi story
Task forces and Service
Overviews need
committees
Strong commit- to be improved
Open door
ment
Profitabil i ty
Strong commit- Sales support
needs moniment
toring
Could be better Service is key Cost effective,
Open door
Strong commit- i nstil led
Info for deciHi sto ry
ment
sions good
Committees
Planning beControls effecgins with
tive
Strong commitHi story
ment
customer
Agent as
customer
Field oriented Shared, commitCommi ttees
ment, lax at
Strong comOpen door
moment
ment
Strong commitHistory
ment
Good lateral comm.
NA
Service best
Committees
avail able
are key

Open exchange
Trust evident

Participation
encouraged
Open comm.

I

!

Controls effecService
Strong commit- tive, imporment to field tant, useful
Hi

NA

sto ry

Precedent for
pi anning
Very important

Informal
Info available
if interested

NA

NA

NA = Not asked or addressed spontaneously.
to
Many of these summarizing words may not be clear without referring
the text of Chapter IV.

*EAS

=

Employee Attitude Survey
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Section 5,

The central

Discussion and Analysis

issue remaining, based on the information presented in

the previous three sections, is--does Berkshire Life
function as

learning organization?

More specifically, does the dominant coalition

at Berkshire Life consciously and deliberately develop

more useful

cisions?

a

The answer to both questions is clearly "yes."

in

progressively

and effective knowledge base to guide its actions and de-

ious components of the organizational

resented

a

All

learning model are well

the var-

rep-

the data.

Dominant Coalition .

The dominant coalition is

so

unanimously and con-

sistently verified--by self-report, third party report, organizational
structure, document analysis, and behavior during and

project--as to be established beyond doubt.

in

relation to the

Not only do the four senior

officers collectively control the company's resources, but by all

accounts they have provided stable and influential
as well.

political

leadership

MacMillan (1978) distinguishes between power and influence,

and the dominant coalition at Berkshire Life holds both the legitimate

power to restructure situations and the influence to restructure the

perceptions of organizational members.
a

In

MacMillan's terms, they hold

tremendous amount of "political capability."

Organizational Knowledge .

In

order to be considered organizational

action-outcome relationship reported by

a

,

an

single member must be accepted

consensual ly by all members of the dominant coalition.

It

must also be
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public and accessible to all coalition members, expressed
of them understand, and integrated into

understandings.

a

in

terms all

system of other action-outcome

Many concepts of the functioning and underlying philo-

sophy of the company described by the dominant coalition and other man-

agers at Berkshire Life meet all of these requirements.
In

the areas of future direction of the company, environmental

trends, management style, organizational

communication, attitudes toward

the customer and the agent, financial orientation, the strengths and

weaknesses of the company

— in

gree of agreement in all

of the data.

all

these areas there is

a

remarkable de-

There are areas of disagreement

as well, but the way in which these were reported supports the self-

reports concerning communication and management philosophy.

Open dis-

agreement and debate are apparently encouraged.
The accessibility of knowledge was also reported.

Not a single

respondent reported any area of company performance or functioning that
was taboo for discussion.

This knowledge is

for the most part not only

cultivated within the dominant coalition but also disseminated widely to
other members.
The interviews at Berkshire Life, the quoted passages

in

the ear-

free of techlier sections of this chapter show, were for the most part

nical

jargon or cliqueish phraseology.

present information
is doubtful

in

Even if an effort was made to

this form to an unsophisticated outsider, which

given the spontaneous and relaxed delivery of most par-

the coalition members
ticipants, then it has demonstrated the ability of

to describe shared

ideas in communicable form.

This was further

^
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evidenced by the fact that, even though substantial consensus
existed,
each subject expressed these core ideas in

nections that were uniquely individual.

a

form and by drawing con-

For example, one officer said

that he felt a course in Transactional Analysis given by external

trainers to all managers had been

a

major turning point

barriers to effective work communication.

even mentioned the event, but

in

altering

Not a single other subject

characterized the commitment to open

all

communication as being accepted and firmly supported at the top of the
organization.
Finally, there was considerable evidence of integration among the

various action-outcome understandings.

The process view of marketing

embodied in the company structure, complete with ongoing committees

where technical

specialists jointly define problems and solutions,

demonstrates one aspect of this integration.

The various efforts to

provide job security, design fair compensation systems, open access to
top managers, and develop individuals within the organization showed

both an integrated concern for people and also

an

understanding of the

impact employee morale and satisfaction can have on performance.

The

fact that the Management Committee meets regularly, that every division
is

represented, and that each decision

is

discussed

an

in

effort to

reach consensus demonstrated an appreciation for the importance of all

affected parties understanding and being committed to
same could be said of the broad departmental

long-range planning task force.

a

decision.

The

representation on the

•

There are significant areas where integration is lacking, at least
to the degree it was uncovered in this study.

Although the interviews
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were not designed to uncover issues of corporate social

responsibility,

only a single respondent mentioned any concern, or even thoughts, about

this area except in the context of exhibiting concern for employees.
Likewise, one senior officer expressed the need for more overall

integration of financial management,

concern which was significantly

a

not expressed by anyone else.
Of course there would be areas where organizational

knowledge has

not been extended, and there were areas--like the one concerning com-

munication with employees beyond issues of task performance- -where what
the dominant coalition shares is

a

feeling of mystification.

The

important fact is that there were very important areas of company

functioning where the dominant coalition had developed an integrated,
consensual, accessible, and communicable set of action-outcome understandings.

Organizational Learning .
tion possesses

a

well

Given that

a

well

established dominant coali-

developed organizational knowledge base, there was

also ample evidence that this coalition has been (and

continuous learning process

in

is)

engaged

in

a

which it is consciously and deliberately

extending the parameters of its shared knowledge.
There is some evidence in the literature to suggest that
economic
formalized planning processes alone correlate with improved

performance

in

business organizations (Hofer and Schendel

Planning has certainly made

a key

performance at Berkshire Life;

,

1978).

contribution to the improving economic

in the

comments of the senior officers,

in that improvement.
it has been perhaps the most important element
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Theorists in strategic planning tend
rarely mention the political

to

be

rationalists, however; they

foundation of an effective planning pro-

cess.

This foundation has been evident at Berkshire Life

formal

plan was ever instituted.

since before

a

Still, the plan and the planning
I

process--as the comments quoted earlier indicated--have been
method of defining and making explicit the organizational
and then of refining

it.

Bill

a

critical

knowledge base

Furey's comments about how definition of

the markets led logically to more careful definition of every aspect of
the business show beautifully how integration was

organizational

integration.

a

vital

aspect of that

knowledge base, and also how the plan promoted that
The juxtaposed quote from

A1

Cornel io shows how the per-

formance gaps that grew out of monitoring the plan led to new

organizational

knowledge.

Duncan and Weiss (1979) emphasized the

importance of performance gaps as
1

a

starting point for organizational

earning.
In

fact, the senior management seems to have employed

of learning strategies beyond planning.

a

wide range

They have promoted individual

learning, relying on intra-organi zational communication to capitalize
on ideas that might thus be introduced.

They have made regular use of

external consultants, trainers, and researchers; they have developed

systems of generating information about the environment, and par-

ticularly about their competitors, which assist them

in

product de-

velopment, pricing, etc.
an excellent
The dominant coalition at Berkshire Life provides

emphasis on the quality
example. It would appear, of Wllensky's (1967)
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of top management questions as the basis of quality information.

As A1

Cornel io emphasized repeatedly, the plan was as important because of

what it permitted him to stop doing as
to do.

it

was for what it directed him

He and his staff stopped pursuing every appealing

idea; they

stopped researching the college market or the mortgage insurance market.
As this delineation sank in, he and his staff were able to

focus one

hundred percent of their attention on the questions that might make

difference

— those

that pertained to the professional

a

busi-

and small

nessperson and the other companies out to get the same business.
One organizational

depth.

In

learning strategy deserves analysis

in

some

describing the basis of planning for innovation at Texas

Instruments, Patrick Haggerty repeatedly emphasizes the concept of

"coupling" (Dowling, 1970; Jelinek, 1980).

By this he means the

juxtapositioning of specialists from different fields
a

in the

context of

Jelinek (1980) goes on to de-

common product development problem.

scribe how this approach to innovation was institutionalized, insuring

continuous innovation, in the Objectives, Strategies, Tactics (OST) process.

On

a

much smaller scale, with

a

shorter time frame, Berkshire

Life has built this same "coupling" into its marketing committee

structures.

The product line is limited,

projects unless

a

so they do not organize around

task force is needed to address some specific issue.

The standing committees, however, bring together all

are involved

in

a

into the original

specific function.

In

the specialists who

this way, everyone has input

decision, limiting the likelihood of

significant changes.

a

need later for

Task forces drawing on specialists or affected
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departments are called together from across all three divisions when
some corporate-wide issue needs to be addressed.

This type of ongoing

exchange seems to have promoted both effective problem solving and commitment to impl ementat ion

even as it developed

j

a

shared perspective on

the specific problem, it reinforced in an ongoing way

a

general

company

philosophy about how to solve problems.

Organizational Paradigm .

The paradigmatic nature of many of the con-

sensual ly held ideas was quite obvious.

Amber described

a

When Larry Strattner or Gene

company-wide commitment to service, they were not re-

ferring to some specific approach to handling inquiries from the field.

They were describing

a

philosophical

want to cultivate in all

commitment,

employees to be applied

a

general

in

an agent, a customer, a fellow employee, whomever.

attitude they

every exchange with
The commitments to

consensus building, to concern for employees, to open communication, or
to fair compensation can each be viewed in

a

similar light.

be shown to have quite specific and quite beneficial

Each could

behavioral

cor-

relates, but the dominant coalition was--as it must be--concerned with
the underlying principles.

actions.

Obviously, this did not preclude specific

When A1 Cornel io got involved in details of paper flow or when

Larry Strattner went to Jim Dunn's office to offer his condolences and

personal

reassurance, they were genuinely committed to addressing that

specific issue, but the fact that
the President made it also

a

it

was the Executive Vice President or

symbolic act.

Pfeffer (1980) and Peters

top
(1980) emphasize the significance of just such behavior by

management.

Larry Strattner has so solidly established

a

pattern of

131

such g6stur6s, thdt mor© thdn once people responded to the question
about a company management style by saying,

style."

It

in

effect, "It's Larry's

important to understand that noting the "symbolic" or

is

"political" significance of such actions in no way calls their sincerity
into question, it simply indicates what Allen and Pilnick (1973)

emphasized, that few factors have as much impact on organizational norms
as top management modeling.

In

the case of Berkshire Life, this seems

to be true within the dominant coalition as well

as at lower levels of

the hierarchy.
In

the interviews, Larry Strattner and the other senior officers

were very clear about their conscious efforts to shape the paradigm at
Berkshire Life,
frustrated

in

Although

in

some cases it seems they may have been more

these efforts than

in

their more directly task related

leadership, there can be little doubt that these paradigmatic concerns
have stimulated efforts at organizational

learning in much the same way

that more functional, specific concerns led to organizational

learning

in more limited spheres of action.

Summary .

The entire organizational

learning cycle (See Figure

63) is amply demonstrated at Berkshire Life.

tablished an organizational

2,

pg.

The dominant coalition es-

knowledge base at least as long ago as 1972

and there have been continuous efforts to refine it in varied spheres of

organizational action, from field recruiting to product development to

compensation

in

the home office.

These efforts have led to pro-

gressively clearer role definitions, especially for managers immediately
below the senior officer level.

These changes have permitted more
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systematic efforts still at the extension of valid knowledge about the
effects of organizational actions.
The next level

of analysis concerns the meta-purpose of this

study, the assessment of the usefulness of the model

organizations.

in

the analysis of

That issue is the core of the concluding chapter.

i

CHAPTER

V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

One of the risks of this type of research design

researcher has

a

great deal

to do with what

that the

is

kind of information is

gathered and complete control over what is reported.

This project

generated over two hundred pages of interview transcripts as well as

observation notes, documents, and
except in the researcher's memory.
several

of which lasted all day.

a

wealth of data which went unrecorded
There were eleven trips to the site,

Since the model

guided the search for

information, and presumably shaped the researcher's perceptions as well,

there is the possibility on the face of it that the project simply dis-

covered what the researcher already believed to be true.

Counterbalancing this problem, however, there were thorough checks
built into the design.

There were ample opportunities for the senior

managers at Berkshire Life to offer conflicting points of view or to
question the accuracy of the conclusions; there would have been little
point in their attempting to mislead the researcher, since their investment in the outcome of the project was minimal.

It

is

also unlikely

that so many different sources of information could be made congruent
intentional ly.

Barring informant censoring, the other way that researcher bias
significant
could have affected the project would be through omission of
133

.

.
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findings or neglect of strategies of investigation that might
have uncovered problematic information.

The procedures are reported in full

and the findings are summarized systematically; of course, there is
still

the danger of researcher selectivity, but here again, the evidence

reported converges so consistently that whatever the researcher might
have added or subtracted would be of minor significance compared to what
has been reported.

Alternative explanations can be offered for the re-

markable overlap

subject responses, but the consensual agreement in

in

so many areas is factual, the structure of the company is factual, and

the economic performance of the company is factual

Interpreting and labeling such data is the leap of research, and
in an

exploratory field study, the leap is

taken without faith.
is

a

long one--one not generally

Yet the primary benefit of this type of research

precisely that it provides

perspective that might never be obtained

a

through the orderly additions of more rigorous research designs.
a

Given

description of that destination point, the point from which new ex-

planations or new integrations are possible, subsequent research may
indicate the small, component truths that made the original

leap of

faith successful
The destination point in this project was

a

new, more integrative

explanation for the fact that some organizations are remarkably effective over time while others are not.

was

a

model

of organizational

The starting point for this study

learning that appeared, on the basis of

theory, to offer such an explanation.

The purpose of the study was to

see whether or not that model might usefully provide the basis for
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The conclusion is that it did in this exploratory study, and that
it can

be even more usefully employed

in

the future.

Before examining the

reasons for this in more detail, it may be useful

to retrace the theory

and the research.

The model of organizational learning .

the model

are political

The most important sources of

theories of organizing and decision making.

These theories establish the inevitability of coalitions in

organizational

life and provide a coalitional

for corporate action, the dominant coalition.

or political

explanation

This is the starting

point of the model, the group which collectively determines the long-

term direction of the organization.

This group then becomes the focus

of attempts to explain organizational
model

flows from that point; the dominant coalition which improves

organizational
ing.

effectiveness, and the rest of the

performance over the long-term must be capable of learn-

Since individual

learning is insufficient, the learning must be

extensions--non-accidental
group as

a

whole.

organizational

This is the origin of the social

learning.

An

requirements of

knowl edge--that it be consensual, accessible, com-

municable, and integrated.
organizational

extensions--of the knowledge shared by that

Conscious and deliberate development of

knowledge by the dominant coalition

is

organizational

important subject of inquiry by the dominant coalition is

that set of norms, beliefs, and commonly held principles which give the

organization its unique personal ity--the paradigm.
shapes and is shaped by actions

in

The paradigm both

every sphere of the organization.

.
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It

through the progressive and continuous refinement of this

is

organizational

knowledge base that organizational

significance.

As action-outcome

learning takes on real

relationships are more clearly under-

stood, and related more closely into an integrated system of knowledge,

performance gaps become easier to identify and roles and responsibilities become easier to establish and evaluate.

These processes in turn

lead to the development of new organizational

knowledge.

nature of this model

4.

produces

a

edge base.

is

illustrated in Figure

The dynamic

This learning dynamic

more and more extensive and integrated organizational
Various technical

this knowledge base, but

it

knowledge specialties must be included in

is the paradigm which serves to

the different subsystems and to guide the organizational
in each technical

domain.

knowl-

Figure

5

integrate

actions taken

illustrates the relationship between
Figure

various components of the organizational knowledge base.

how these different aspects of organizational

6

shows

knowledge are both pro-

duced by and productive of organizational action.

The dominant coali-

tion always serves as the "learner" of this knowledge, and unless all

members of the coalition have access to this knowledge,

it

is not truly

organizational

The research results .

In

an

exploratory case study of Berkshire Life

Insurance Company, each element of the model was identified

specific people, ideas, and processes within the company.

in

terms of

The dominant

coalition at Berkshire Life deliberately and consistently attempts to
improve an already extensive and integrated knowledge base.

Hence

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING DYNAMIC

The dominant coalition selectively
monitors organizational outcomes and then feeds new
organizational knowledge into the organization to
shape new actions.

Fig. 4.
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ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

STRATEGIC
PLANNING

Fig. 5.
This shows visually how organizational
knowledge is the combination of technical knowledge in
different domains of organizational action and the paradigm,
which serves to integrate and guide organizational action
within technical specialties.

THE FLOW OF ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
INTO
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION AND VICE VERSA

Fig. 6,
This diagram illustrates how the
various components of organizational knowledge guide
organizational action and are in turn shaped by
those actions and their perceived consequences.

140

Berkshire Life was found to be
1

a

good example of on-going organizational

earning.

What this means

in

more detail

is

important.

First, it was found

that the four senior officers--the President, Executive Vice
President--

Marketing, Senior Vice President--Investment

,

and Senior Vice

Pres ident- -Admi ni strati on- -cons i dered themselves, and were likewise
con-

sidered by everyone else, to be determining the future direction of the

company.

Thus, all

questions of long-term goals, of significant com-

mitments of company resources, and therefore of long-term effectiveness,
are the responsibility and ultimately the product of this group.

Second, this group has systematically developed
that guided its actions.

ticularly

in

The degree of consensual

the essential

direction, was striking.

a

knowledge base

agreement, par-

areas of daily operations and long term

Management philosophy, financial and customer

service orientations, company markets, and the serious trends affecting
those markets were

all

points of detailed agreement expressed

practical, applicable terms.

in

the research, have any questions

or confusions regarding the direction of the company
managerial actions or about their personal

where organizational
marginal

in

very

None of the senior officers, or the of-

ficers below them that participated

moting company performance

in

that context.

in

its economic or

role and priorities

in

pro-

There were certainly areas

knowledge was lacking or so vague as to be of only

usefulness; these areas, such as overall financial management,

have not been subjects of particular problems, however.
This sort of clarity in relation to corporate direction and
individual contribution is

a

substantial

achievement, and one which was
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obtained through
organizational

a

number of processes that meet the definition of

learning.

Planning was mentioned routinely as

a

source

of continued redefinition of company commitments and strategies.
Similarly, committees and task forces which bring together people from

diverse specialities and company roles have promoted

a

shared sense of

corporate endeavor at the same time that they have contributed new,

integrative solutions to organizational

problems.

External

people and

organizations have also been called upon to offer new knowledge which

became part of the organizational
ing proceeded by all

knowledge base.

Organizational

learn-

these routes, and the dominant coal i tion--and other

managers as wel l--credi ted these processes with the company's success.
Obviously, these processes have not been divorced from the personal

leadership qualities of the top managers either, particularly those of
the President.

Conclusions

This final

point in the summary is the key one for the purposes

of the overall study.

Research guided by the model

those processes which the people who have worked

in

focused on precisely
the company--most of

them for more than twenty years--described as central
organizational

effectiveness.

in

determining

Explanations for the importance of these

different processes, and prescriptions of their importance, have been
offered before.

In

fact, the various managers sometimes spoke in terms

of different theories:

"Theory

tion," strategic planning, etc.

Y

management style," "matrix organizaThese and other ideas have been

serve as the
developed piecemeal, however, and no one of them could

,
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integrating theory for the rest.

The model

fills that role, and hence represents

fields of organizational

significant advance

learning
the

in

behavior and organization development. The fact

that it also led to successful

cates, in

a

of organizational

inquiry into

a

single organization indi-

preliminary way, that it is not only broadly integrative but

a

also sufficiently specific as to lend itself to diagnosis and predic-

tion.

Hence, it seems to meet the tests of

good theory--extensivity

a

parsimony, empirical validity, internal consistency, testability, and

usefulness (Epstein, 1973).

Since the overriding purpose of this study

has been to assess the value of

a

particular theory of organizational

learning, it makes sense to address each of these points discreetly as

a

way of presenting the assessment of the model.

Extensi vi ty .
Its

This theory accounts for

a

very wide range of phenomena.

starting point is a political analysis of organizational

life, and

it therefore provides a perspective on and integrates prior contribu-

tions to theories of individual and group behavior

in

organizations.

As

Pettigrew's study (1973) shows, the tensions that arise between technical, functional, or divisional

understood

in

political

specialties within organizations can be
The responses at Berkshire Life which

terms.

described the functional bases of individual

power would at once support

Pettigrew's conclusions and demonstrate how inquiry

in

organizational

learning points up the significant bases of political action.
In

their original

which was fundamental

proposal

to this

of the organizational

learning model

project, Duncan and Weiss (1979) demon-

strate how this model can serve as the "macro" theory for

a

"middle

V
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range" theory of organizational

design.

Similarly, discussion

ter II indicates how the social criteria of organizational

provide

a

Chap-

in

knowledge can

starting point for investigation of information processing

an organization.

in

Here again, the responses at Berkshire Life both ad-

dressed these issues of management and also integrated them into

a

larger explanation of corporate functioning.

Pfeffer (1980) describes how literature on organizational

behavior

can be viewed as falling into one of two school s--the phenomenological
and behavioral

school which is concerned with managerial

issues and the

more quantitative, "macro" school which is concerned with patterns of

organizational

responses to general

con-

Pfeffer cites evidence to indicate that the latter, more

ditions.

termini Stic school
tional

economic and environmental

of thought can explain most influences on organiza-

performance, influences which for the most part are out of the
of managers, especially in the short term.

control

the focus of the organizational

achievement.

This would support

learning model on long term goal

More importantly, the organizational

being clearly of the phenomenological-behavioral

learning model--while

school--bridges the gap

between the two by not being content or form specific.

ciently general, and not at

all

prescriptive

in

It

is

the behavioral

suffi-

sense, as

to emphasize management adjustment to whatever ongoing environmental
illustrates the theoretical

forces affect the organization.

Figure

congruence of the organizational

learning model with other theories, and

7

its significance as an integrative and "linking" theory.
An
at this

addressed
important aspect of extensivity lA^ich cannot be fully
point concerns one of the limitations of the study,
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general izabil ity.

research in

a

Because the theory has never been applied

very large firm,

a

in

large public bureaucracy, or

which faces more strictly technical

concerns--such as

a

actual

a

firm

mining

operation, there can be no certainty that the model would provide
insight into the factors determining effectiveness.

apparent logical or theoretical

Parsimony .

reason why

it

There is no

would not, however.

One of the very great strengths of the organizational

learning model is its simplicity and economy.

It

is not

weighted down

with extraneous concerns and its postulates are both broad enough to
provide for integration of many phenomena and specific enough to provide
some guidance as to the significance of phenomena, or of subtheories

pertaining to certain types of phenomena.

This can be illustrated in

several ways.

Argyris and Schon (1978) spent

a

of time developing the

great deal

idea of two "archetypes" of organizations--Model

I

organizations which

are characterized by rigid policies and procedures, conflicting norms

inability to inquire, and Model

and values, and the general

II

organi-

zations which are characterized by flexibility, inquiry, and resolution

of implicit conflict.

Although the categories are interesting and may

perhaps
be of descriptive value, they appear ultimately superfluous, and

misleading.
Model

Berkshire Life would seem on the face of it to represent

and
II, but there are areas in which inquiry does not take place,

there never seems to have been
Model

II.

a

discontinuous leap from Model

I

to

Although the planning task force of 1972 may have been an

example of dutero-1 earning

,

of learning to learn, there were clear
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HIERARCHY OF THEORIES EXPLAINING ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR

Focus

Broadest

Level of Theory
Soci o-cul t ural and Economic Theories
(i.e.
Sociological and Economic Models)

Organi zation-Envi ronment Theories
(i.e. Open Systems Models)

Organizational Theories
(i.e. Organizational Learning Model
developed herein)

\/

Subsystem Theories
(i.e. Organization Design Models)
Group Behavior Theories
(i.e. Group Development Models)

Most Specific

Individual Behavior Theories
(i.e. Leadership, Management Style,
and Motivation Models)

Figure 7.
Although knowledge of the first and second levels in
this hierarchy can inform management decisions, only the four lower
levels pertain to areas which actually fall under top management
The promise of the organizational learning model is that it
control.
provides a framework for integrating all the theories at the four lower
levels in a way which does not contradict the importance of the first
two levels.
addition, there are very general theories such as information
processing theories or systemic learning theories (Bateson, 1979) that
They lack
can be applied at every level of the hierarchy above.
learning
organizational
specificity, however; while more specific, the
model is still congruent with these theories.
In

.
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that original

process.

Most importantly, however. Model

I

and Model

IS

add nothing to the analysis of those learning phenomena, they are just

theoretical labels requiring explanation.

The model

research, while relying on invented terminology

in

used in this

some degree, is not

laden with the labels and implicit value judgments of the Argyris and

Schon theory, and as
use.

a

result is cleaner and easier to present and to

This heightens both its analytical

Another strength of the model
tance from any specific behavior.

in

is not attached to

terms of parsimony is its dis-

Although planning played

role in the reports of organizational
model

and its heuristic value.

a

prominent

learning at Berkshire Life, the

planning, or matrix structure, or any other

specific behaviors or structures.

At the

same time, its concepts pro-

vide an explanation for the utility of planning, and theories of

strategic planning can be integrated comfortably into the model.

This

combination of being one step removed from the behavior itself and yet

clearly attached to behavioral

processes is

a

peculiar strength of the

model

Empirical validity .

reality?

It

Does the organizational

learning model

reflect

seems clear that it reflects the reality of Berkshire Life;

the theory seems to both indicate what data should be collected and how
it can be viewed.

Although explanations of the data and its signifi-

cance were offered by participants

in

the research, their explanations

were less comprehensive than that offered by the model.
be remembered that the model

is

It

should also

itself an outgrowth of an empirical
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research tradition, as opposed to the more purely theoretical --and less
real

stic--concepts of organizational

i

action and decision making that

have grown out of the more quantitative and rationalistic approaches.
Although this study presents only
its empirical

val idi ty--an(i

in

a

single, very limited test of

fact avoids the most crucial

causal ity--there is reason to trust its empirical
it grow out of empirical

basis.

question,

Not only does

studies of decision making, but it seems to be

broadly appl icabl e--much more so than this single case study can indiAnalysis of published cases provides some additional

cate.

(See Appendix B.)

suppport.

Finally, there is some convergence with the results

of descriptive studies.

In

the broadest analysis to date of long-term

effective companies, McKinsey and Co. (1980) has outlined six basic
similarities between the companies surveyed:
a)

a

clear guiding philosophy, often identified with

a

single,

well-known individual or small directing group;
b)

a

strong orientation to meet customer needs and maintain

customer satisfaction;
c)

an emphasis on smallness and

flexibility

in

internal

organiza-

tion;
d)

strong internal

accountability systems, even as rapid changes

take place;
e)

attention to the development of people within the organization;
and,

f)

careful, thorough integration of various subsystems.

characteristics, some
Berkshire Life appears to share many of these same
of which pertain directly to the model

and

some of which do not.
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Importantly, the McKinsey report stresses the uniqueness of each
com-

'

pany's approach to, and evolution in relations to, these issues; what
it

does not offer is any explanatory theory.

The model

^

basis for explanation, and hence for prediction.

provides such

If the model

a

is

empirically valid, it will provide the basis for predictions; an example
might be:

"long-term effective companies will have

a

clear, stable

dominant coalition over long periods of time."

More emphasis on the

importance of predictive accuracy will be given

in

but suffice it to say that the model

the next subsection,

least congruent with the best

is at

descriptive studies available on long-term effective organizations.
The McKinsey study also points up

a

gap in the model.

As orig-

inally proposed, the model does not distinguish between different areas

of organizational
ficance.

knowledge.

The model

at this

Yet, all

knowledge is not of equal

signi-

point offers only one qualitative distinc-

tion, that being an emphasis on the importance of knowledge relating to

organizational

learning processes; the model

implicitly stresses the

significance of knowledge of those processes..
At the same time, empirical

evidence

research, and the data from Berkshire
of knowledge are similarly vital.

Li

in

the McKinsey data, other

fe--indicates that other types

Marketing knowledge, including the

orientation toward customer needs, would be one example; this includes
an

implicit definition of who the customer is,

importance of knowing the organizational
the McKinsey data, with its stress on

a

a

purpose or mission.

Similarly,

guiding philosophy, and the

Berkshire Life data as well, indicate the central
plicit paradigm.

validation of the

importance of an ex-

The idea of the paradigm is sort of tacked onto the
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original

model, and is not well connected to

needed is

a

theoretically.

What is

comprehensive statement of what the most important areas of

organizational
some powerful

specificity

it

in

inquiry are; the descriptive data gathered to date offers

indications, and even some good conceptualizations.
this aspect of the model would be

a

More

substantive addition

to it.

There are other, less significant ideas which might benefit the
model

as

well, and heighten its empirical

present indications are mostly anecdotal

reliability.
and

Although the

sketchy, an example might

focus on the types of events that characteristically present learning

opportunities and what types of conditions must be
nant coalition to benefit.

control

in

in

place for

At Berkshire Life, the crisis

in

1968-9 might be considered such an event, similar

a

domi-

cost
in

kind to

the inventory crises at General Motors in 1920 or at Texas Instruments
in the early 1960's.

All

three seem to have had

a

precipitating effect.

Attempting to include such relatively "micro" explanations

in

the

overall model, however, represents one of the dangers of attempting too

much empirical

specificity.

Unless clearly separated from the organiz-

ing constructs of the model, such specificity could undermine the ex-

tens ivity and economy of the model.

important that the model

is

By the same token,

however, it is

capable of providing guidance to research

into such limited phenomena and to possibly be congruent with microlevel

theories which explain them.
An

example of

a

specific hypothesis that the model might call

question is drawn from Pettigrew (1973), who
decision theorists.

in

into

turn drew on other

His contention is that "innovative" decisions lead
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to more political

tematized.

His study, conducted in an organization
where little or no

organizational

hypothesis.

activity than "routine" ones, which can be sys-

learning took place at the highest levels, confirms
this

The results from Berkshire Life and those of
Jelinek

(

1979 )

would indicate that learning organizations handle innovative
decisions
in

much the same way they handle routine ones, except that the
innova-

tive ones obviously receive more top management attention.

The model

might suggest then, that the handling of innovative decisions would be

a

point of differentiation between learning and non-learning
organi zations.

Empirical

validity has been

a

stumbling block

in

the behavioral

sciences generally where the object of investigation was too complex for

laboratory replication or even for control of variables.
oretical model, dealing as it does with

a

This the-

very broad range of ex-

ceedingly complex phenomena, is particularly susceptible to criticism

in

terms of its adherence to reality.
Of necessity, it is divorced from the data to a level

of abstrac-

tion where the complexity and richness of the subject can be selectively

screened; and naturally, no firm link of causality can be established

between the presence of organizational
ness.

As was stated

learning and long-term effective-

at the outset, there is no consensus even about the

meaning of "effectiveness."

For the purposes of this study, effective-

ness has been accepted as the capacity to meet long-term objectives as

established by the dominant coalition.

Given that starting point, and

the present impossibility of establishing causal

relationships, this
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study makes

a

first positive step

lationship between organizational
ness.

In

in

establishing

a

correlational

learning and organizational effective-

the current state of behavioral

science, that is

first step in the direction of establishing empirical

Internal Consistency .

The organizational

As various postulates and

this will become more of

The logical

a

significant

is

so

simple

inconsistency would likely

sub-theories are added, however,

problem.

consistency

in

the model

the cyclical nature of organizational
(see Figure 2, pg. 63).

a

validity.

learning model

at this stage of development that any logical

be apparent.

re-

itself is best illustrated by

learning as described by the model

As the dominant coalition investigates per-

formance gaps or generates new knowledge through other means, it is cor-

respondingly able to define clearer roles and responsibilities
organization.

This increased accountability leads to

a

in

the

firmer def-

inition of the dominant coalition and the cycle is reinforced.

The

assumptions on which the model is based, such as the assumption that the
improvement of organizational

knowledge will

formance, are subject to individual

lead to improved per-

scrutiny, but none of them is in

conflict with another.

Testabi 1 ity .

Whereas the other conclusions discussed to this point are

essentially by-products and indications which grew out of the theory
building or the research, the issue of testability represents the heart
of the project.

The purpose of this study was to find out if the ele-

ments of the model could be investigated--and therefore tested--

152

simple methodology and

a

single organization as

a

sample case, each

element of the model--the dominant coalition, the organizational

knowledge base, and the organizational

successfully uncovered.

learning processes--was

This means that the groundwork is there for

future research, research that can be designed to test discreet and
specific hypotheses.

Dominant coalitions can be more fully examined

in

terms of the

importance of stability of membership, of breadth of membership, or

other factors.

Similarly, as has already been suggested, the various

components of an organizational

knowledge base could be identified and

attributed different degrees of importance.

Various different ap-

proaches to organizational learning could also be identified,

categorized, and evaluated.
viewed lightly

— they

These various suggestions should not be

are undertakings of immense complexity; but this

project has shown that the core elements of the organizational
model

learning

are discoverable, and the strong contention has been made that

they are worth investigating.

Furthermore, the testability of the

organizational learning model can be enhanced through the use of operational

definitions for organizational

tions pertaining to political

Usefulness .

phenomena, such as the defini-

activity provided by MacMillan (1978).

The primary reason for undertaking

lying complexity and methodological

ceived usefulness of the theory.

a

study with the under-

problems of this one was the per-

The project has offered

a

preliminary

model
affirmation of that perception, but the ultimate usefulness of the
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remains to be validated.

On

the face of it, the model

offers

very

a

significant theoretical and practical contribution.

Theoretically, as has been pointed out repeatedly, this model provides

a

basis for integration of various important but previously dis-

connected ideas in the literature.

the professional

In

organizational and management academicians, just as
tions, most people are specialists.

in

ranks of

most organiza-

The decision theorists do not

necessarily interact with the planning theorists or with the information
systems specialists.

This model

could potentially provide

a

means of

are easier to see.

The de-

integrating the products of these disparate interests.
The practical

scription of

managers

a

benefits of the model

learning organization provided by the model gives active

picture of

a

a

desirable outcome without necessarily making de-

mands for speci ficchanges of personal

Furthermore, because the propositions of the model are

structure.

testable,

style or of organizational

a

manager can determine whether or not organizational learning

is happening.

Finally, it is performance oriented rather than value

based; it is less concerned with individual behavior than it
basis for informed action at the top of the organization.

is

It

with the

does not

replace other models, except perhaps those that insist that human

behavior be more rational
as a

precursor to it.

It

permits the managers to use approaches that

fit their own styles to answer the central
to

practitioners, "Are we developing

a

question posed by the model

progressively more valid shared

knowledge base to inform our long-term decision making?"
is "no," the model

action but

not as a result of organizational

If

the answer

gives some indications as to why that might be.
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Summary .

As with any new theory, where little supporting

research has

been conducted, there are gaps and unanswered questions about the value
of the model.

The most critical

of these

is, "Does

the internal determinants of organizational

it

really focus on

performance?"

It

is

far too

soon to venture a definitive answer to that question, but there are

indications--theoretical

,

anecdotal, and

1

ogical--that it does.

Given

the relative absence of other convincing models to explain organiza-

effectiveness, this is

tional

a

very hopeful

This study has shown the model

to be:

contribution.
broad enough to account for

wide range of phenomena; simple and direct enough to offer clear ex-

a

planations; rooted enough to the behavioral

reality of organizations to

have both analytic and heuristic value; internally consistent; operational

enough in its conceptualizations to be testable; and promising

enough to be worth further investigation.

There are questions to be an-

swered, refinements and specifications to be made, in each of these
areas, however.

This study was conducted to see whether further re-

search would be productive or worthwhile.

It

is definitely merited

on

the basis of the results.

Recommendations for Further Research

In

the case of

a

model

so

recently developed, there is no end to

the various research efforts which are needed to test, refine, and add
to this bare theoretical

directions

in

base.

In

general there are two general

which the research should proceed.

The first direction

or on
might be loosely modeled on the case study described herein

Jelinek
similar projects, such as those conducted by Gabarro (1979),
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(1979), Murray (1976), or Pettigrew (1973).

These studies would be

efforts to investigate specific elements of the
model

in

more detail.

The second productive avenue for research would
be very different,

modeled more on the Pierce and

Del

berg (1977) study where

a

number of

organizations were surveyed for both outcomes and factors
viewed as
.contributing to those outcomes.

Comparative survey research could go

far in establishing both the general izabil ity of the model

and also the

correlation between organizational learning and certain standard measures of effectiveness, such as return on assets

in

business organiza-

tions.

Detailed analysis of specific factors could be designed to answer
host of relevant questions.

a

Gabarro (1979) charted through interviews

over three years the interpersonal

relationships developed between new

chief executive officers and their immediate subordinates.

Jelinek

(1979) and Murray (1976) traced the process of institutionalization of
an

innovative idea from the point of introduction to the point of

general

,

systematic enactment of that core idea through routine admin-

istrative and control systems.

Similar efforts could be made to test

specific hypotheses concerning the nature of the formation and development processes for

organizational

a

dominant coalition, the patterns and sequences of

learning processes, and the relative importance of

different aspects of organizational

knowledge.

For example, an attempt

could be made to test certain hypotheses related to dominant coalition

characteristics as "necessary but not sufficient' conditions for
organizational

learning.

As Figure 8 indicates, coalitions might be
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DOMINANT COALITION CHARACTERISTICS

other characInquiry into the link between these and
one subject or
as
serve
teristics and organizational learning could
continued, intensive research.
Fig. 8.
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tested for stability, cohesion, communication, and productivity.

Such

research could test and yield subtheories, many of which have
already
been developed with

a

body of research to support them, which could be

now integrated into the organizational

learning model.

schedule developed for this project would provide

a

The interview

methodological

starting point for such inquiry.

The more pressing direction for research of the model, and for

organizational
Once

a

research

in

general, is

the survey, comparative area.

in

model, such as the organizational

learning model, has been

de-

veloped, only this approach to research offers the possibility of truly

establishing the correlation between organizational

effectiveness.

It

also offers, when samples are sufficiently large, the

chance to correlate the existence of organizational
tain industries, certain organizational

educational

learning and

learning with cer-

structures, or certain types of

background for dominant coalition members.

Such research

would provide broad new questions and issues to be the subjects of

intensive, case study style projects.

More importantly, only this type
issues which

of research offers hope of settling any of the theoretical

make management theory the confusing tangle of conflicting theories,

assumptions, and definitions that it is.
Examples of such

a

research design will give an indication of the

substantial benefits that might result.
the domain of fairly few firms,

John Deere, Massey Ferguson,

a

The farm equipment industry is

few giants such as

A1 li

International Harvester, and

much smaller, more specialized companies.

It

is also an

s-Chalmers,
a

range of

industry where
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the performance results are largely
Historical

a

matter of the public record.

information on the companies could be gathered easily--given

the research resources, which would have to be substantial --and then

a

survey could be conducted, necessitating of course the cooperation of
the chief executive officers of each company.

Such

a

survey could probe

the composition of the dominant coalition in each company, the areas of

organizational

knowledge which are defined clearly or vaguely, and the

processes through which performance is monitored and improved.

parative results from

a

number of large organizations facing essentially

the same environment could go

organizational

The com-

learning as

a

a

long way in verifying the usefulness of

contributing element toward organizational

Analysis of corporate histories, such as those provided

effectiveness.

by Chandler (1962), give preliminary substantiation to the link between

organizational

learning and effectiveness, but much more is needed.

Ideas about the importance of specific components of the model, such as
a

clearly defined and consciously promoted paradigm or

lished dominant coalition, could also be tested

in

a

a

well

estab-

more substantive

way.

Similarly,
mentary schools

a

in

survey could be conducted for
the same system.

a

number of urban ele-

A number of performance indices

could be collected at the same time as information about coalitions,
political activity, and organizational

individual

learning processes; anonymity of

schools could be protected to insure cooperation.

answer
extensive body of data, once gathered, could be used to

of questions related to the model, such as:

"Does formal

Such an
a

number

planning or
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any other specific structural
with organizational

factor or combination of factors correlate

performance indices?"; "Does the presence of

a

well

established and stable dominant coalition correlate with decreased
political activity, increased organizational

learning, or increased

performance?"
There is one aspect of research into the model

The model

is a long-term one, and

component is
In

sequel

a

which is vital.

hence, some historical

or longitudinal

necessity of meaningful tests of the model.

summary, there are myriad options for productive research as

to the study described here.

a

The more desirable route, large

scale, comparative designs, also require extensive resources and access.
For this reason alone, intensive methodologies such as this

may be the more likely avenue for gradual

project's,

strengthening of the model.

Regardless of the specific methodology, however, more research is needed
to verify the encouraging

results of this preliminary step.
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APPENDIX A

Interview Schedules

This appendix contains the two interview schedules used as the

primary data gathering tools of the project.
"Initial

The first schedule, the

Interview Schedule," was used for six interviews which required

about two hours to complete.
lowed up with

a

These interviews were subsequently fol-

few specific questions that, after the tapes were

transcribed, needed to be clarified or elaborated.

Initial

Interview Schedule

INTRODUCTION:
This interview format is to be unstructured, free flowing
with a premium placed on getting the information in the language and
points of emphasis of the interviewee. The specific questions are
designed to answer three fundamental questions.
1)

Who is the dominant coalition?

2)

What is the present stat e of organizational knowledge?

3)

How is this knowledge base developed by members of the
dominant coalition?

ORIENTATION:
- What are the most critical things you do

in

your role?

-

With whom do you communicate most often to do your job?

-

What would you say your major contribution to this organization is
or has been?

DOMINANT COALITION:
- Who are the people that determine the future of this company?
-

-

this a clear cut and stable group in the organization or does
it vary?
Is

If

it changes,

how and under what circumstances does it change?
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-

Who are the most powerful members of this group in terms of
shaping future directions? Who are the less powerful members who
nonetheless still have a voice?

-

What is the basis for different degrees of power among the members
of this directing group?

-

Who makes the decisions concerning long-term strategies?
objectives? resource allocation?

-

How are these decisions and plans developed and finalizes?

- Who

interim

participates in monitoring, changing, or developing these
over time?

pi ans

What criteria are applied in this process?

-

ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE:
Questions in each area beyond would follow what Kerlinger (1973)
calls a funnel pattern--begi nning with very general, open-ended quesThe distinction between private
tions and then getting more specific.
perceptions and public knowledge is key here.
Standard prompts:

-

What is the basis for your response?

-

Do you think other managers would agree with your

statement?
-

Has this perception been openly discussed?

actively developed?
di scussions?

A.

Planning and Strategy:
Where is this organization headed

-

-

-

in

such

the next 5-10 years?

How has this set of goals been developed?

Were you included?

What are the major goals and objectives for this year? What
specific strategies are you using or planning to use to accomplish
them?

responsibilities in terms of these long-term
Do you know how your functions fit with those of

Do you have specific

strategies?
others?
-

in

Who participates

the last 3
What major changes have affected this organization in
years? What was their impact?
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B.

C.

D.

-

the next five years, what major changes and trends in
social ,
technological, economic, and political conditions do you expect to
have the most impact on your organization? What will this impact
be?

-

How would you describe the basic purpose of this organization?

-

Evaluating planning process. Changes? specific strengths and
weaknesses of plan produced by this process?

In

Performance:
- How would you describe the performance of this
organization over
the past few years?
-

How does this performance get measured?
measured?

-

What does this organization do particularly well?

-

What does this organization do particularly poorly?

Is

it accurately

Management Philosophy, Orientation toward Organization Members:
- What is the general style of management in this organization?
-

How does individual

-

Is there an "official" management philosophy?
practice?

-

Are there organizational systems designed to support this
philosophy, e.g., training and development programs?

performance get appraised?

Communication and Information Flow:
- How would describe the flow of information

in

rewarded?

Does it function in

this organization?

-

Are there specific subjects you feel must not be discussed?
subjects? What would happen if they were discussed?

-

Do you

-

-

know about problems/projects other people are dealing with?

there an "official" policy or philosophy about communication
this organization? How does it work in practice?
Is

How do you get information on the performance of this

organization?
-

What

How do you get information on your own performance?

in

E,

Customer Orientation:
- What is the general attitude
among managers here toward the
consumers of your products?
-

Do you think customers are satisfied with your product and

services?

F.

6.

-

Is there an official
customers?

-

What kinds of feedback, if any, do you get from customers?
you get it? Is it used?

policy or set of guidelines for dealing with

How do

Financial Orientation:
- What are the general attitudes of top managers in relation
to
profitability? cost effectiveness? cost control?
-

Are these issues openly discussed?

-

Is information on performance
everyone? On every project?

in

these terms available to

Orientation of Individuals toward the Organization:
- How do you feel about this organization as a place to work?
-

Have certain events in the last few years had a major impact on
of this organization?

your view of and understanding
-

Do you think your

-

Are such perceptions openly discussed?

-

What specific aspects of organizational

feelings are typical

or unusual?

life make you feel

this

way?
-

How would you characterize the overall atmosphere or climate
around this organization?

-

How would you assess the general
satisfaction?

level

of morale?

job

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING PRX ESSES
"We've talked about many aspects of life in this organization.
You've mentioned X, Y, and Z statements which you think are generally
Is there anything
agreed upon by members of the top management team.
else you can tell me about how this agreement is built?"
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-

Are specific ideas recognized as crucial

-

How are these central

-

Who participates in this process?

-

When you were new to the organization, how did you learn them?

and publicly promoted?

ideas developed? changed?

How does it happen?

When or if you find a contradiction in some area (e.g., management
reward systems not reinforcing these ideas), what do yo do?

The second interview schedule was used

in

second round of

a

interviews which included four other participants
original

in

addition to the

This round included ten of the eleven original members of

six.

the task force convened by President Strattner in 1972 to develop the

first formal

long-range plan for Berkshire Life.

chosen as the critical historical

This task force was

incident for investigation as part of

the study.

Historical

Incident Interview Schedule:
Long-range Planning

The Initiation of

Background:

What were the significant events leading up to the
institution of a formal planning process?

The Event:

Describe any events or moments you remember in that
process as being particularly important or revealing
to you?
Who were (and have been) the "prime movers" behind
the planning process?

Retrospective
Analysis:

Has anything happened since the beginning of formal
planning process to alter your perception of it?
How, if at all did top management behavior change as
result of the planning process? Their

a

effectiveness?

I
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What have been the most important results of the
formal planning process?
What have been the most important results of the
formal planning process?

How would you evaluate the planning process today?
What significant changes in it would you make? Why?
The general

approach to this format was very similar to that of the

first round of interviews.

Respondents were encouraged to elaborate and

draw connections which were important to them.

APPENDIX

B

ANALYSIS OF PUBLISHED CASES

There are many tests of

a

theory:

consistency, both internal

and

within the broader framework of accepted scientific truth; parsimony or

economy; extensivity; specificity; and empirical

Chapter II concentrated on the first

in the

validity.

Of these,

list above, on demonstrating

that this model of organizational

learning is both internally coherent

and in substantial

harmony with

large body of the prior theorizing on

organizations.

was also shown how this theory brings together

It

diverse themes in the

1 i

a

terature--pol itical behavior within organiza-

tions; organization decision-making and information utilization; organ-

learning; and individual learning--in useful and economical

izational

and relevant ways.

Each component of the model--organizational

edge, paradigm, and the dominant coalition

— has

been independently

addressed as well as integrated into the larger model, each one
sary but insufficient aspect of organizational

isolation, to account for organizational
based on

a

knowl-

a

neces-

life, when considered in

learning.

This Appendix is

body of literature quite separate from the ones reviewed to

this point, the literature of case histories and illustrative examples.
These cases have often been prepared to demonstrate very different

theories than the one proposed here.
a

Yet, the writer has not discovered

many
single case, either in the literature or in direct experience of

organizations, which could not be usefully analyzed in terms of this
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model of organizational
study is

a

learning.

This addition to the main body of the

review of several of such cases drawn from various sources

and analyzed in terms of the organizational
of comprehensive validation, where all

against real

situations, was

Unless the model

a

learning model.

This type

aspects of the theory are tested

meaningful

prelude to field research.

held up when applied in such

a

sample, unless the

abstract concepts brought order to the relatively tame world of written
cases, there was little hope for it in the jarring world of direct

experience.
A first example is the history of Texas Instruments, a corporation

recognized

in

diverse sources as

a

remarkably innovative and adaptive

organization (Dowling, 1979; McClellan, 1978; McKinsey and Co., 1980).
In

an interview (Dowling,

1

979), Patrick Haggerty, the retiring chair-

man, credited the consistent record of organization and product inno-

vation to comprehensive planning.
lar procedure since 1952,

Long-range planning has been

a

regu-

formally institutionalized after the economic

crunch of 1961-62 created unprecedented problems for the company following the exponential

growth of the 1950s.

Today, a five-day "strategic

planning conference" attended by four hundred top managers produces

a

thirty page document with quantifiable and monitorable return on asset
goals as well as an update on company philosophy including:

attitudes

toward customers, suppliers, and employees; ethics; stress on technology
and innovation; and the "three basic functions--create, make, and market," any of which can be the seat of innovation.

Within these broad

outlines specific objectives and strategies are mapped out with

a
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manager assigned

tx)

each (p. 43).

In

a

separate but related planning

process, every "product center" manager must submit

a

ten-year plan with

oach year's budget request, which is the only way proposed innovations
get funded.

It

is

of organizational

hard to imagine

a

clearer example of the generation

knowledge within the context of

promoted organizational

paradigm.

a

consciously held and

Haggerty stresses planning again and

again, saying it is so important that there isjio separate planning

department; every manager participates and performance
crucial

planning is

a

aspect of evaluation and reward systems.

As

for the dominant coalition, it must be intuitively obvious that

this organization is directed by
well

in

a

group that shares an orientation as

as a knowledge base and that they clearly direct the organization

Haggerty describes those men who

toward "intended future domains."

founded TI, two others and himself, of whom he is the last to retire.
stable board of directors which reviews all

There is

a

novation

f unds--"strategic

requests for in-

funding" in the terms of the TI budgeting

system- -and they allocate funding and other resources to

a

balanced

group of projects considering such factors as prospective pay-off time,

integration of the three basic functions, etc.
In

this company, there is

organizational

cently

learning model.

a

crystal

clear example of the whole

guided by the founders of the organization, shared

to technological

innovation and

very re-

A dominant coalition, until

a

philosophy of organizing.

a

commitment
From the

consensual.
outset they concerned themselves with the development of

182

communicable, and integrated understandings of action-outcome relationships in every aspect of the business from employee relations to marketing processes.

To serve the development of this

knowledge, they insti-

tuted planning and budgeting processes which directly involve every

manager.

This learning

erate within

a

truly organizational, conscious and delib-

is

guiding paradigm.

The Levi-Strauss Company, although in
provides

a

similarly clear example.

a

more mundane business,

Here, the dominant coalition is

even more obvious, four members of the Haas family and

a

brother-in-law

who have managed the company continuously since it was an essentially
local

concern in the San Francisco area at the end of World War

Over

I.

that period the company has doubled its output approximately every five

years and grown to multinational

size.

Grether (1978) points to the

principles, both business and organizational, that have guided the company over all those years.

Within these paradigmatic guidelines, such

as an emphasis on quality and maintenance of direct contact with re-

tailers (resulting in independence from chains and control over pricing), the company has flexibly developed new applications of its basic

business and adapted successfully to many environmental

shifts.

A sin-

gle example is the shift from work clothes to leisure-casual wear that

accompanied the cultural

shift first from manufacturing and agricultural

work to greater service employment and then toward greater informality
in clothing.

There is no evidence at hand that Levi-Strauss management

Texas
has been innovative internally in the same sense that

Instruments
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has, creating unique budgeting or planning systems.

They have, however,

consistently responded to new information about trends

in the

environ-

ment culled from close ties with retailers; they have
consistently
emphasized executive recruitment and development as crucial
components
of an overall plan; they have maintained extraordinarily peaceful

labor

relations through employee stock purchase and profit sharing plans and

through careful attention and responsible commitment to relationships
with communities in which the company is located.

and has been a paradigm that has provided

a

In

short, there is

basis for the continual

development of an action-outcome knowledge base that served as the basis
for growth and entry into new domains.
In

a

very different approach to

chard (1977) describe and analyze
ager was introduced into

a

a

a

case. Guest, Hersey, and Blan-

situation in which

a

new plant man-

manufacturing plant that was plagued by prob-

lems and ranked worst along several dimensions relative to
six very similar plants in

a

very large corporation.

the manager with the new man, called Cooley

a

group of

The replacement of

in the case,

was the only

significant shift in personnel within intra-organi zational and extraorganizational environments that remained essentially unchanged.

In

three years, the performance and the culture of the plant were sub-

stantially improved; Cooley's actions and success can be viewed quite
simply as an example of organizational learning according to the model,
even though the authors' emphasis is on Cooley's special

role.

V

184

Cooley's first steps were essentially political
At the dinner he was introduced to all

level

and

paradigmatic.

the managers from the foreman

seating patterns were arranged to disperse established coali-

up,

tions that had sustained an intraplant atmosphere characterized by blaming, suspicion and continual

crisis.

mingling informally with

the managers, not staying close to his su-

all

perior or the top plant personnel.

Cooley himself made

In

series of formal

a

meetings immediately following his arrival
for both

a

a

point of

and

informal

he continued to lay the basis

dominant coalition and for the development of organizational

knowledge within the context of
than that of his predecessor.

a

very different managerial

philosophy

Quoting Cooley:

saw that the organization needed a long range program spelled out
writing and reviewed with the department heads, the staff, and
the superintendents. They needed to be in agreement on something
that was realizable and tangible and practical.
It had to come from
the whole organization and be explained to the whole organization.
Then we had to start moving on it (emphasis added, p. 8^).
.
.
.
I

in

Although less remarkable than the Texas Instruments "strategic planning

conference," it is hard to imagine

a

more direct and simple statement

confirming the commitment to the development of action-outcome relationships ("tangible and practical") which are consensual

("They needed to

be in agreement"), communicable ("explained to the whole organization"),

and

integrated ("it had to come from the whole organization").
There is no need here to detail

all

the changes that Cooley insti-

tuted that slowly reverberated through the behaviors and attitudes of
almost everyone in the system.

staff member to show how

it

It

is, however, worth quoting a single

appears to

a

single individual

to be
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included

in

the organizational

nant coalition.

learning process as

a

member of the domi-

Quoting the comptroller:

.
.
.
Cooley told me right off that he felt that our department
could be a lot more helpful to the operating people and the service
departments.
In fact, , , , Matt would frequently come up and grab
me and tell me we were going to take a walk through the plant, , .
I spent a
lot of time talking not only to the department heads and
the superintendents, but with the general foremen and all other
foremen as wel 1 , , , it became apparent that, although they got to
understand how the information on efficiency and costs and other
things was constructed, they were not necessarily the type of information which would be useful to them in their day-to-day work , , ,
when you really got the foremen to open up, they thought that some
of our figures were lying.
The figures in themselves were not
wrong, but they certainly weren't useful to them, which amounts to
about the same thing , , , some of these factors were beyond [the
foreman's] control.
Yet he was being punished for them,
We
,
,
worked for a long time figuring up a formula which the foremen and
general foremen and superintendent could use to analyze figures
quickly, , , , Next, we got all of supervision in and presented the
idea to them, showing that the idea had basically come from our
talks with them , , ,
.

,

We would observe the operations themselves to see why the changes
Even though I didn't know much about the operaneeded to be made.
tions themselves, I was always asked ny opinion. My job, of course,
was to work up the information to be submitted to the division for
It meant a lot more to us in writing up the request
money outlays.
for appropriations, when we had actual experience of seeing the
In other
problem itself and in having a part in making suggestions.
office
in
an
sitting
of
business
words, we again got away from the
We were cut in on the deal (pp, 1 43-145),
by ourselves.

Such an extensive quote shows first hand how organizational
ing can take place, with the dual

tion and developing organizational

process of building

a

learn-

dominant coali-

knowledge taking place in

a

comple-

mentary way,
Alfred Chandler wrote something of

history

in

a

landmark work in business

which he details the development of the divisional
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organizational

structure in American corporations (1962).

He devotes

lengthy chapter to each of four large corporations--DuPont

,

a

Sears,

Standard Oil of New Jersey, and General Motors--which independently
arrived at

a

divisional

demands they faced.

structure uniquely evolved to the special

Although Chandler's focus is on the relationship

between strategy and structure and on the role of innovative indivi-

duals, it was in reading these four historical cases that this writer
was first struck by how clearly the organizational

learning model

explained differences in the rate and apparent effectiveness of organizational

adaptation,

DuPont, where throughout the period considered there was

a

stable

coalition of five or six individuals who emphasized specific directions
and objectives within

guiding framework, was much quicker to adapt to

a

environmental change and to innovate internally with new budgeting, control, or information systems.

Sears and Standard Oil

had nationally

prominent CEOs, but underneath them in the hierarchy there was less

stability or unity, with conflicting ideas about strategies, organization, and philosophy.

Standard Oil

there was

Chandler details how for more than ten years at
a

conflict between older refinery directors and

newer, more managerial ly oriented men.

The former maintained that

refining was more an art than an exact science and they were politically

entrenched, with the result that during that time Standard

without

a

uniform system of grading or quality control

operations even though the younger men recommended
need for it.

it

in

Oil

went

its refinery

and documented the
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All of the brief descriptions to this point are positive examples

of organizational

model.

It

learning, cases which may be expected to uphold the

is also be worthwhile to examine examples of organizations

that seem not to fit the model

,

but there are some general

themes that

are worth mentioning that do not pertain directly to the model
shed light on organizational
real

world.

learning as it appears to happen

First, as has been mentioned repeatedly, once

a

but which
in

the

dominant

coalition is engaged in the process of developing organizational knowledge, quality of information on which to base decisions

is

not a prob-

At Texas Instruments, General Motors, DuPont, and the Cooley

lem.

plant, information systems were developed as the gaps in information
were made apparent in the learning process.

This did not happen spon-

taneously, however, which is the second key point.
performance gap usually precipitated
ly.

War

At DuPont
I;

it

a

A crisis or serious

large scale innovation internal-

was the major threat of overcapacity following World

at GM and TI and Sears, serious inventory control

problems at

a

time of economic recession made obvious the need for change; in Cooley's
plant, the obvious performance problems were responsible for the change
in leadership.

The whole model

by a general

and these additional

themes are borne out as well

review of large corporate efforts to incorporate data pro-

cessing systems into overall corporate systems (Finch and Nolan, 1980).

The authors detail
numerous settings.

a

developmental

process which they have observed

Data processing is introduced but not fully

in
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understood by the dominant coalition.

This lack of integrative under-

standing on the part of either senior management or users within the

organization leads to the development of political

coalitions.

The

dominant coalition reasserts control over the data processing unit,
often with

a

resulting loss of DP leadership.

As the control

process

takes place, knowledge of DP and its possible contributions to the

organization is integrated after this knowledge is made acccessible and
communicable either by the DP leadership itself or through the use of
outside consultants.

Oftentimes, the initial

conflict resulting

in

the

assertion of control by the dominant coalition is the result of serious

performance gaps, such as DP cost overruns, etc.

As the interdependen-

cies and action-outcome knowledge are clarified through the organizaorganiza-

tional

learning process, DP is integrated

tional

knowledge base and its relationship to long-term goal achievement

i

s

establ

i

into the overall

shed.

A theory which explains why successful

based on the idea of organizational

organizations succeed,

learning, should also provide ex-

planation for organizations that fail

to learn.

Sheldon (1980) provides

an excellent example of just such an organization, although his theory
of organizational

change

He

focused primarily on "paradigm" change.

is

describes an innovative psychiatric hospital which was founded by four
newly developed, long-term treatment for

psychiatrists committed to

a

patients who had failed

other treatment settings.

in

clinically and financially very successful

for several

The hospital

years and

was

I
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developed

"culture" in which administrative functions were very de-

a

centralized.

Traditional managerial

and clinical

roles were often

blurred by multiple functions, informality, and the fact that newcomers
usually required more than

a

year to learn the special therapeutic

approach employed, regardless of prior training.
environmental

Because of the unique

"fit" based on the type of patient, there was little

apparent need for organizational

learning.

form of departing leadership and external

Internal

transition in the

change, due to seriously re-

duced referrals because of insurance reluctance to fund long-term treat-

ment, coincided, however, and it looked as if the hsopital was going to

collapse.

The response of the new leadership, which was not as politi-

cally or philosophically rooted
been, was to bring

in

a

in

the organization as the founders had

managerial ly oriented administrator and

ing director trained in a different therapeutic approach.

a

nurs-

The result

was a new short-term ward, and also high staff turnover, low morale and
serious conflict between coalitions representing different paradigms.
The new medical

director was undercut in his efforts to institute

programmatic change.

Apparently with outside assistance, the members of the organization were helped to see the incompatible norms which lay at the root of

the conflicts which were previously defined as interpersonal

tical.

and

theore-

The solution was to create two separate divisions, one on the

old model with its own orientation, staff, and director, and one organized separately along fairly traditional

lines.

Sheldon glosses over
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this solution and it is difficult to determine its long

run

effect

beyond the immediate positive effects of reduced turnover and higher
moral e.
This single, major change is an excellent example of what Argyri

s

and Schon (1978) would term "double loop learning" based on inquiry into

organizational norms.
ganizational

There is, however, no reason to believe that or-

learning will continue without further outside assistance

although there is really too little information provided on which to
base a prediction.

It

is clear that no organizational

learning was tak-

ing place prior to the change; a widening performance gap was evident to

almost everyone in the organization but no effective adaptation was taking place, only deterioration.

lished.

A new medical

based in

a

The dominant coalition was not estab-

director made decisions which were obviously not

consensual, communicable, integrated knowledge base of

action-outcome relationships.
with the shift of one ward to

The external
a

environment was adjusted to,

different patient population, but the

conditions under which that adjustment might be successful were neither
understood nor clearly sought.

Without this base knowledge, there was

no hope of resolution of the destructive infighting between coalitions.

Olsen (March and Olsen, 1976) offers another, much more carefully

documented case
organizational

in

which an organization acted without learning or an

knowledge base and thus failed to achieve its goal.

innovative professional

school

faced with the need to hire

a

in

an

American public university was

dean when its charismatic founder and

An
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present dean announced his intention to resign.
nounced in September to be effective

in

The resignation was an-

the following August.

Olsen

points out that the dean had been the central

figure in directing the

school

In

ing

both philosophically and practically.

following the announcement, there was general

strong leader from outside the school

the first faculty meet-

agreement that

a

should be sought and that s/he

should be capable of continuing the school's progress toward national
prominence.

A search committee, not including the dean, was formed with

this mission.
The outcome of the process was that through a rather helter-

skelter approach, the position was eventually offered to and refused by
ten outside people of varying reputation.

The latter stage of this de-

bacle was marked by the generation and invitation of candidates

in

a

closed meeting between the dean and the chair of the search committee.
At that point, political
a

accusations began to fly within the school

and

candidate was proposed by one of the three semi -autonomous programs.

The search committee began to fall apart via the departure of the stu-

dent member and the highly charged and well publicized resignation of

one member.

In

the end, the Vice-Chancellor chose the chairman of the

search committee as the new dean with the assumed but covert support of
the resigning dean;

a

from inside the school

majority vote by the faculty for another candidate
was overruled.

Olsen breaks the subsequent events into three phases, "the search

committee-centered phase," "the dean-centered phase," and the
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Vi

C6-Chanc6l 1 or-C6n t6rGd phasG."

Hg analyzGS thGSG with

a

gGPGral

Em-

phasis on thG impact various typos of ambiguity sGomod to havG on tho

dGcision procGSS and ho applios throG modols of docision making--thG
rational, tho bargaining, and tho arti factual whoroin tho docision just

happons, usually duG to

a

doadlino, and

is

rational izod aftor tho fact.

Olson's contontion is that oach of thoso modols is most ofton doscrip-

tivG of dGCision procGSSGS charactorizod by contain dogroos of ambiguity, G.g., sincG tho mombors of tho soarch committoG woro not

cl

oar

about Githor thoir spocific critoria or goals for candidatos and sinco
thoy woro not suro thoir docision would actually bo onactod, this am-

biguity lod to

a

paralysis and ovontual

failuro to mako

a

cloar rGcom-

mondation to tho VicG-Chancol 1 or prior to tho doan's intorvontion.
Olson's analysis is intorosting, but

is

is moro doscriptivG than

Gxpl anatory.

Tho dGcisions did not fail

bo mado

to

offoctivoly bocauso tho

various olomonts of tho situation woro ambiguous.

Glomonts romainod ambiguous bocauso

:

Tho ambiguous

(a) no dominant coalition

was

ablG to cloarly ostablish itsolf indopondont of tho old doan, and his

dominant coalition novor coasod to function but ves not part of tho
docision procoss; (b) no action-outcomo rolationshi ps concorning

formal

any aspoct of tho docision procoss or its intondod outcomo woro ovor
GStabl

i

shod and sharod; thoro was not ovon a hint of

togratod, and consonsual

a

communicabl o,

i

n-

knolwodgo basG--at loast publicly (a quostion-

nairo sont to tho faculty showod that most of

thorn

assumod tho doan

would pick his succossor aftor soliciting whatovor input

ho dosirod);
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and, finally, (c) with the possible exception of
the dean's influence,

which was largely concealed, there was no political base
within the

faculty and no clearly established coalitions, except within the three
loosely knit programs, which could have served as the basis for

a

nant coalition and the subsequent development of organizational

knowl-

domi-

edge; hence, it might have taken some period of time for organizational

learning to begin and the Vice-Chancellor's deadline did not accommodate
that lengthy political

process of waiting for

a

coalition or coalition

of coalitions to emerge.
An alternative

interpretation neither disconfirmed nor substanti-

ated by Olsen's extensive data is that the dominant coalition, repre-

sented by the dean and the chair of the search committee, did

engage

organizational

in

in

fact

learning and at the very least exercised suf-

ficient political clout to have their final decision accepted by the

Vice-Chancellor
candidate.

in

spite of a majority vote by the faculty for another

This interpretation is still

in

line with the conclusion

drawn from the model; namely that organizational
place without the necessary components of

publicly generated organizational
The final, and

in

tail

a

dominant coalition and

knowledge.

many ways the most complex, case is drawn from

Pettigrew's booklength study of
chase of

a

learning did not take

a

major innovative decision, the pur-

new and considerably larger computer system,

firm (1973).

in

a

large re-

Beyond the case itself, this work is of particular

interest because it is the product of

a

research project which, while

more extensive, is very similar to the one described

in

this paper.
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Pettigrew's focus is not on the director level

of

the firm but on

the computer operations and implementation unit, called the
"Management

Services Department."

Still the decision he studied was made

the di-

at

rector level and therefore clearly involved organizational learning

within both the overall dominant coalition and also the single Management Services Department.

He

is also not

concerned with organizational

learning but rather with the patterns of specialization and interdepen-

dence that lead to disparity of goals within an organization and with
the social

processes that are used to acquire and maintain power to

achieve those personal or subgroup goals.

Specifically, Pettigrew describes the rise of specialization
the area of computer operations at Brian Michales.

in

Because of the rel-

atively primitive state of technology, the lack of organized knowledge
about its commercial application, and the great market demand for pro-

grammers in the mid-to-late 1950s, the programmers established

a

subunit

within the organization that defied efforts to control or integrate it

either behavioral ly or philosophically.

Even after this technological

expertise was generally available to the firm, the programmers maintained their power base through secrecy, denial

others--especi

al

ly the newly hired and

analysts, control

of the competence of

particularly threatening systems

over training and recruitment policies, and "protec-

tive myths" such as their alleged inability to predict the time certain

functions would require.
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Th6 special
Kenny,

a

tions.

power of this subunit was eventually overcome by

manager who served as liaison to the board for computer operaHis particular techniques for achieving this control were to:

(a) reorganize the

programming section and separate geographically the

system development and operator functions

so

that knowledge previously

kept secret had to be publicly systematized; (b) to make programming one

equal

subunit of

rected,

a

the formal

a

larger unit called "Management Services" which he di-

move which utilized his power with board members to make him
head of all

duit for all

computer related functions and made him the con-

regular communication between top management and the pro-

grammers; and, (c) he enlisted programming assistance, from the computer

manufacturer, which demonstrated to both management and the programmers
that their technical

expertise was no longer quite so special

as it had

been at an earlier stage in technological development. Following these

changes, Kenny was able to prevail

over the technical

staff in the

choice of manufacturers for the next computer whereas the technicians
had

always swayed the managing board before.

still

maintained

than was typical

a

of

Although the programmers

significantly greater level of organizational power
programming units

in

Britain at that time, Kenny had

cemented his control over the future direction of the computer operations and applications

in

the firm.

This very detailed account is useful because it illustrates both

learning and failure to learn within

a

specific organizational

The limitations are perhaps most apparent.

setting.

The programmers' collective
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effort

to

maintain their independence

in

the firm led them to withhold

information and to retard the integration of their
expertise into overall

organizational

knowledge and resource bases.

Kenny felt he had to assert and maintain control

Similarly, because
over the programmers in

order to maintain influence, he emphasized the importance of

a

working

relationship with the manufacturer of the present computer system--a
source of power for him

in

the past--over technical

have led to the selection of

a

new manufacturer.

factors which might

His control

mation clearly constrained the range of options considered
and the technical

by

of inforthe board

information the programmers might have been able to

contribute to the decision.
At the same time, the example

coal

i

shows very clearly that the dominant

tion--true to the form proposed by Nolan and Finch (1980)- -asserted

control

over the data processing coalition through the imposition and

support of "their man," Kenny.

Furthermore, despite the limitations

that Kenny felt he had to enact

in

order to "win" against the program-

mers, he also clearly assisted the board
organizational
tions.

in

developing

a

more complete

knowledge base as regarded the DP functions and applica-

His requirements within the Management Services Department also

resulted in public exchanges and systematized knowledge that was instrumental

in

freeing the company from unnecessary and unwarranted depen-

dence on the clique among the programmers.
Finally, to the extent that Pettigrew attained information about
the functioning of the managing board, his findings clearly illustrate
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the usefulness of the model.

The programmers were originally so dis-

tinct because they were not sharing an otherwise thoroughly founded

organizational

paradigm.

Part of that paradigm Involved competition

between the furniture and clothing divisions, even to the point of

Intra-company "spies" between divisions, so that Integration of new
knowledge concerning computer applications was slow to be Integrated.
The managing directors were not considered

a

group by either Kenny or

the programming director, so that their Individual

knowledge was often

not shared and tended to be based as much on personal. Individual

con-

tacts with Kenny or the programmers as on clearly formulated Inquiry
Into questions or decisions bearing on the Issue.

This tended to make

them even more dependent on Kenny's decision about what was relevant

Information than they might have been had they been unified and
proactive

In

their search for valid knowledge.

This case Is perhaps the most useful

one in that It demonstrates

both the learning process and the limitations on the learning process

predicted by the model.
sense of the political

Further, It gives through Its richness
and technological

contexts which shape

situation and the learning process within that situation.

a

a

real

given

L
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Introduction

recent years there have been numerous efforts to account for

In

organizational effectiveness, both in research work and

practically oriented literature.

in

more

Theorists have made useful

contri-

butions, such as the evolving emphasis on "fit" between organization

design and the environment, on contingency approaches to management, and
on the interrelatedness of strategy and structure.

Much of the progress

of this search has been blocked, however, by an inability to reach any
meaningful

agreement on what constitutes effectiveness.

Questions arise

as to what criteria should be used to compare results that are in

themselves very difficult to measure or compare.
On

a

more practical

level

,

these theoretical

concerns are not so

Many business leaders and consultants have stressed the

troubling.

characteristics of "healthy" and consistently successful companies.
a

particularly comprehensive project, McKinsey

&

In

Company surveyed those

firms which sustained above-average levels of profitability and innovation over long periods of time.

similarity
1)

in
a

The research showed areas of remarkable

these firms:

clear guiding philosophy, often identified with

a

single,

well-known individual or small, directing group;
2)

a

strong orientation to meet customer needs and maintain cus-

tomer satisfaction;
3)

an

emphasis on smallness and flexibility

tion;
199

in

internal

organiza-

200

4)

strong internal

accountabi i ty systems, even as rapid changes

take place;
5)

careful

attention to the development of people within the

organization; and,
6)

thorough integration of various subsystems and subprocesses.

Similarly, other research has shown that planning

organizational

is a

success over long periods of time.

vital

element in

Thus, there is an

emerging picture of factors which lead to sustained high-level

perform-

ance.
The problem facing top managers, however, is how to combine and

refine these factors to meet the unique needs of

a

given organization.

Strategy theorists have stressed the need for this unique plan but have

offered only rational, flow-chart style formulas for achieving it.
There has been comparatively little attention to the actual processes

through which the leaders of an organization shape its future direcThere is consensus that this is

tions.

there

is

a

top management function, but

little guidance as to how to perform that function.

There is the unmistakable fact, however, that some organiza-

tions--some top management teams--do consistently improve their performance over time; in short, these organizations learn.

proposed herein offers

a

The project

top management team an opportunity to study its

own learning processes and hence to improve its effectiveness.

In

accord with the research to date, the focus is on planning processes, on
the means by which top managers incorporate what they know of the past
and present into

a

direction for the future.
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What is Organizational Learning?

Organizational

learning is the conscious and deliberate effort on

the part of top managers to extend their shared knowledge of
the organization, of its unique environmental demands, and of the future direc-

tions which will

insure its continued prosperity.

Individuals may

extend their private knowledge; learning is only organizational, however, to the degree that those who shape the future of the organization

construct

a

vision of the company and its future that they consensually

accept and that
on

is

expressed in terms that are understandable and based

information that is accessible to the entire planning team.

Preliminary research indicates the forum for such learning
often the strategic planning process, both formal and informal.

is

most

These

efforts to grasp the effects of past organizational actions, to remedy
performance gaps, and to adapt to and benefit from environmental changes
create

a

knowledge base.

This knowledge base includes understanding of

the ways various subsystems within the whole affect each other and of

the distinctive strengths or competitive advantages of the organization.
Finally, this process both shapes and is shaped by the culture or para-

digm of the firm.

This paradigm is that framework of shared values and

assumptions which make every organization
an individual's unique personality.

a

unique entity, almost like

An effective

planning process

includes an awareness of this paradigm and the many ways it can either

reinforce or undermine the implementation of new plans.
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The Learning-Planning Cycle

Effectiveness over long periods of time
executive leadership;

a

single product or

a

is

a

function of

growing market may lead to

spurt of growth or profitability, but over long periods success
result of deliberate choices made by managers.

is

a

the

Uncertainty and risk are

factors in every such decision or strategic choice, and the increasing
pace of technological, economic, and social change only accentuates this

uncertainty.

These shifting circumstances make each day's events more

difficult to manage effectively even as they make long-range planning

more important.

Only

a

top management team capable of learning and

extending its own knowledge base can hope to balance these conflicting
demands.
The beauty of a planning cycle is that the development of the

management team and the refinement of their plans for the firm become
reciprocal

processes.

As the planning team examines performance gaps,

solves problems, considers new projects, sets goals and monitors movement toward them,

a

clearer understanding of the distinctive competen-

cies of the company is slowly built; at the same time, increasingly

specific knowledge of the market demands, threats, and emerging

opportunities is also built.

In

an

interacting way, this more valid and

extensive knowledge base permits clearer role definition and accountability within the management team and, subsequently, at lower organizational

levels.
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Top Management Team

Clearer roles, responsibilities.
More unified membership and
shared vision of the
future.

Examination of performance
gaps, use of new knowledge,
monitoring of progress
toward goals and objectives,
etc.

Organizational Knowledge

Clearer roles, responsibilities, and accountability serve

as a basis

for a more effective and unified group at the top of the organization,

and one more capable in turn of increasing organizational

knowledge and

implementing corporate strategy.

Brief Examples

Texas

Instruments has compiled

and successful

innovation.

the extraordinarily wel
at TI every year.

1

a

remarkable record of consistent

Patrick Haggerty attributes this record to

-developed strategic planning process undertaken

Four hundred managers are called together for four or

five days and produce a thirty-page document outlining the overall

philosophy of the company, long-term goals and intermediate steps to
attain them, specific project groups, assignment of direct manager

responsibility for each objective, etc.

Projects do not get funded

conclusion of
unless they are approved by the top management team at the

this process.

This is perhaps the picture-perfect example of large

scale organizational

learning.

The origins of this process, however.
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are

a

more typical

example.

In

the mid-1950's, Haggerty and the two

founders of TI would regularly set aside time not only to develop goals,
but also to establish
of the internal

a

basis for organizational

and external

environment.

marketing and production as well as

in

action in every aspect

They emphasized innovation in

product development, and as

a

result the entire company has been transformed--and is remarkably suc-

cessful.
dual

As the business grew, and outgrew the capacity of any indivi-

or small

group to manage and direct, Haggerty developed the present

planning process as

a

way to duplicate and extend in an institutional

way the innovative approaches which had been only informally structured

originally;

by meshing this new planning process with the resource

allocation process, he made it not simply desirable, but necessary for
project managers to plan.
Another striking example of the central

planning

is

role of coordinated

the present effort being made to shift A.T.&T. from

service oriented monopoly to
its product areas.

This is

a

a

marketing oriented competitor

in

many of

redirection effort of mind-boggling

proportions, involving many of A.T.T.'s one million employees.
initial

a

In

the

phase of this process, large numbers of managers were simply

retrained in

a

special

program emphasizing marketing and the necessity

of new approaches in the organization; most of these retrained personnel
subunits were
left the company, however, when their efforts to reorient

contradicted by an interlocking network of other factors, such as
and
compensation and incentive systems, organizational traditions,

lack of product flexibility.

a

Now more comprehensively planned attempts
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are being made where new people and new skills are being combined
with

new products, new incentives, and new organizational

roles and

structures; there is also the realization that effecting this massive
shift will

require years, if not decades.

Only as planning cycles are

passed through repeatedly--! i ke the circular tightening of lug nuts on
tire- -does

a

sound knowledge base get developed by an ever more

a

effective planning team.
A final

example is Levi Strauss Co.,

through horizontal

a

clothing manufacturer which

expansion alone has managed to double its volume

about every five years since World War

I.

Across all those years, the

company has had stable leadership built around the members of the Haas
family.

It

has had a guiding strategy built around strong ties to

independent retailers, trademark protection, internal

commitment to the

development of managerial and human resources, and of course,
reputation for product quality.

a

The management team of this company has

consistently adapted to upheavals and rapid environmental change and the
effects of rapid growth internally; their own explanation of that record
is

a

combination of flexibility

in

addressing specific problems

the context of firm commitment to the essential

strategy, and of always working as

a

within

principles of the

team, even over the generations.

Again, all the elements of the organizational

learning model

are here.

Why Host and Fund This Research Project ?

There

a

number of concrete ways in which

a

subject organization

might benefit from hosting and funding this project.

First and most
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obviously, at tho end of the project there will be

a

comprehensive

report describing the organization in terms of the model of

organizational

procedures,

a

learning.

This would include an analysis of planning

description of the organizational

knowledge base, and

a

description of the presently employed means of increasing organizational
knowledge.

Such a report could be a valuable foundation for efforts to

improve organizational learning.

The researcher would be available to

help in the interpretation of the data and in use of the information to
guide action planning for increased effectiveness.

vide

This model can pro-

on-going frame of reference for the top management team in its

an

attempts to deal effectively with rapid technological or environmental
change, and hence to improve the entire cyclical process of strategy
formulation, implementation, evaluation, and reformulation.
tional

Organiza-

learning provides the support and context for effective strategic

planni ng.
A focus on the final

product of the research, however, is

ited view of the possible organizational

rewards.

a

lim-

Before the report is

ever written, the research will have required top executives to reflect
in

rigorous ways on the fundamental aspects of the organization.

process of disciplined inquiry, stimulated by the presence of

an

In

this

out-

sider with fresh perspective, participants will be asked to examine:
1)

the actual

processes, and people, that determine the future of

the organization;
2)

strategic planning, long-term goals, and interim objectives,
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3)

management style;

4)

patterns of innovation within the organization;

5)

communication and information flow; and, of course,

6)

the processes through which organizational

knowledge

in

each

of these areas is developed.

Such a process of in-depth inquiry will

in

valuable ideas to improve organizational

and of itself provide new and

functioning.

Clearly, the re-

search project would be an opportunity to improve the functioning of the

subject organization, an outcome congruent with the research goals.

The

information generatod will be available to the members of the organization for any productive use.

What Will the Research Entail

The initial

?

phase of the research will consist entirely of in-

depth interviews, probably an hour or more in length, with

members of the planning team.
tional

all

the

At least the highest two organiza-

levels would be included here.

In

order to clarify certain

issues, brief follow-up interviews might also be included

in

the initial

stage.

The next stage in the research process would include

a

wider vari-

ety of research activities, generally designed to substantiate and enrich the results of the initial

interviews.

would be observation of meetings.

Oie technique at this stage
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Another approach will be the investigation of one or more
historical

incidents, probably ones that are mentioned spontaneously

course of the interviewing.
in

the

in

This type of investigation is advantageous

that consequences or results of

a

decision or event are already known

and hence a fuller picture can be attained.

The final

technique applied

in this

This will

involve

study will

be documentary analysis.

of company and departmental

reports, agenda from meetings, formal

statements of goals, and evaluation reports of special

mittees.

At this

review

a

projects or com-

point, the organization will obviously have to provide

access to documentary data.

Before the preparation of the final

report, the research data will

also be presented for review to those who have contributed to the data

collection.

The form of this review, either individually or in small

groups, will be determined later.

This feedback procedure will

be an

opportunity to check the accuracy and the validity of the earlier
findings, as well as to begin the effort to use the information to the
firm's benefit.
Every effort will

be made to limit disruptions caused by the re-

search project, but of course it will
the organization.

In

require some flexibility within

order to facilitate the research process and mini-

mize inconveniences and disruptions to both parties,

a

within the organization should be assigned to assist

in

researcher and

in

liaison person

orienting the

scheduling data gathering events.

Interviews will be taped to insure accuracy and to permit im-

provement of the methods through retrospective analysis, but individual
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responses will be held

in

strict confidence unless permission to share

the responses is given by the interviewee.

Naturally, no one outside the organization except the researcher's
doctoral committee will

have access to any information and the organiza-

tion's identity can be withheld entirely from the disseration if so desired.

In

maintained.

general, the highest professional ethical

standards will be

These standards can be explicitly discussed as part of

a

contracting process.
Altogether, the project should require three to four months to

complete from the date of agreement to participate

presentation of the final

findings.

in the

study to the

The specific amount of researcher

or executive time needed, beyond that required for the initial

round of

interviews, is very difficult to predict at this time due to the depen-

dence of later stages on the outcome of the first.

Many of the later

techniques, e.g., observation, documentary analysis, will require no
time at all

from organization executives, however.

Summarizing the last two sections, this research project would:

Offer to the host organization:
a) a
-

-

-

final

report describing

the membership and functioning
of the planning team;
the state of organizational
knowledge and strategic planning; and,
the organizational learning
processes presently in use.

b) a structured process of inquiry
for all top executives into the

fundamental aspects of organizational functioning; and,
c) instruction in a model that the
planning team can use to guide
and improve its own functioning.

Require of the host organization:
a) executive time;

research project liaison
person within the organization;
c) a research grant; and,
b)

a

d) access to documents and

records.
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Introduction

This report is the product of

Berkshire Life Insurance Company.
cal

model

model

of organizational

research project conducted at

a

The project was based on

learning, and

a

full

theoreti-

a

description of the

and of the research findings can be found in "An Inquiry into

Organizational Learning,"

a

doctoral

thesis written for the School

of

Education at the University of Massachusetts.

The organizational

learning model

focuses on the ways in which the

top managers of an organization develop and improve the knowledge which

serves as the basis for their decision making.

For the academic pur-

poses of the dissertation, the research included extensive documenta-

tion of who constitutes the "dominant coalition" at Berkshire Life, the
state of their shared knowledge base on

methods of refining that knowledge base.

a

range of topics, and their
For the more practical

con-

cerns of the company, the study focused primarily on the planning process and the structures which support it.

presented here in four sections

sented

in

— one

The results of the study are

assessing the plan itself as pre-

"Corporate Philosophy-Objectives-Policy-Strategy: Janaury

1,

1978"; one assessing the implementation of that plan; one assessing the

planning process as it has performed since the long-range planning task
force convened in 1972; and, one addressing two larger, "contextual

factors that are important to planning, and the company as
the not too distant future.
211

a

whole, in
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The Plan

A critically important aspect of the long-range plan
is that it is

very clear in its delineation of policies and strategies in the two

"line" functions of the company--marketing and investments.

Not only

are these performance areas spelled out in sufficient detail

to provide

broad guidelines for organizational action but they have also remained

remarkably stable over the eight year life of the plan, except for the
ongoing revisions of numerical goals.

Since marketing and investments

are the two functions which most directly determine the economic per-

formance of the company, it is fitting that they should also be the most

carefully spelled out.
Other performance areas of the company are not presented so

thoroughly.

I

have in mind such broad management concerns as general

management philosophy, goals and strategies for productivity improvement, or explicit commitments in the area of corporate citizenship.

Although there was general

agreement in the interviews about the actual

policies in some of these areas, there were other issues which were

addressed either not at all or only in vague terms.

It

is perhaps

worthwhile stressing again that these areas of management are not likely
to have as direct an impact on company performance, at least

in

the

short run, as do the line functions discussed above.
Several

respondents also noted

a

certain level of abstraction in

the numerical

goals expressed in the plan, calling them "incidental

"arbitrary."

Whereas the market definitions included

in

the plan

or
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provide clear operating priorities, the numbers were
reported to have
only limited meaning or significance to those involved
in departmental

planning.

This lack of relevance was emphasized by the fact that
little

apparent attention is given to forecasts or goals which are missed,

either above or below.

Implementation of the Plan

Overall, the implementation of the original
lent and seems to be steadily improving.

plan has been excel-

The recent economic perform-

ance of the company speaks for itself, and the benefits of this perform-

ance are being spread throughout the company.

One result is that the

management areas described in the preceding section as only vaguely

elaborated are receiving additional attention.
The committee system provides an extremely effective method of

continuously monitoring and revising the specific tactics through which
the plan is implemented.

One very useful

This is especially true in the marketing area.

and important function which the committees and task

forces serve is the integrHion of diverse technical

specialties.

Although the turbulent economic environment has made frequent
adjustments necessary in the investment area, the clarity of the invest-

ment goals has made performance

in

that area easy to monitor.

interviewees outside the investment area spoke

in

Several

considerable detail

about performance in Investments.
Employee relations, productivity improvement, and issues of cor-

porate citizenship have been effectively addressed.

They do not seem
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to be

as

thoroughly integrated, at least conceptually, as is the opera-

tional management of the line divisions.

These are more difficult areas

of management in which to establish integrating ideas, but the search
for some larger integration might be informative and useful.

The Planning Process

The planning process has proven itself effective to this point.
One supportive structural

component of the planning process is, again,

the use of committees which build planning into ongoing operational

decision making.
Since the original
tactical

task force, planning beyond operational

issues has been increasingly centralized as

four senior officers.

decreased involvement
of numerical

a

function of the

Other interview subjects expressed
in

overall

corporate development.

or

a

feeling of

The discussion

goals was related to this issue, where some subjects said

that corporate numbers gave them little sense of what they should be

emphasizing more in their own work.
More importantly, those below the senior officer level

almost

always mentioned contributions of the original task force over and above
the definition of

more of

a

a

corporate direction.

range of individual

They usually described one or

benefits they gained from participating.

Frequently mentioned learnings were:
-a

new awareness of the "big picture" of the company;

-new knowledge about other company functions;

and,
-new knowledge about the views and values of senior officers,

colleagues.
-insight into the considerable capacities of their
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These learnings came largely

as

by-products of the planning process but

as by-products which have had a significant impact on the job perform-

ance of the individuals involved.

Important Larger Issues

First, not

a

single respondent expressed any indication that the

company needs to alter its basic strategy,
nition of environmental

threats.

in

spite of

a

general

recog-

Two competitive threats mentioned by

almost everyone were new types of investment oriented products, which

both offer competition at present and may undermine the distribution

system long-term, and increasing numbers of new types of competitors.
Thus, while no change is viewed as necessary now, continued watchfulness
is necessary.

It

is evident that that watchfulness

is

present.

Second, most people mentioned Larry Strattner's approaching re-

tirement even though this was not
views.

a

subject of questions in the inter-

Any type of leadership change causes uncertainty.

especially true

in

this case because Larry's personal

This could be

stj^le of

leader-

ship was frequently described as the basis for the planning approach and
as the basis for and exemplification of corporate commitments to concern

for people and to communication of important company information.

Conclusions and Recommendations

No

significant need for immediate change is indicated by the

results of this project.

The company is obviously performing very well,

seems very high. The
ongoing improvements are taking place, and morale
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usefulness of planning as
tool

a

communication and management development

has perhaps been underestimated in the past few years, but these

are long-term concerns which can be addressed in
way.

I

a

gradual, evolutionary

would recommend that more people be included in the long-range

planning process in the future.
an opportunity to

officers.

The ne;^t five year review might be such

formally expand discussion beyond the four senior

Other approaches might be to convene task forces, not on the

long-range marketing or investment strategies, which seem to be clearly

understood, well accepted, and regularly reviewed, but on other issues
of corporate-wide concern.

Examples might be some of those topics men-

tioned earl ier--general management philosophy, productivity improvement,
and corporate citizenship.

Unquestionably, Berkshire Life meets my criteria for

organization.

Please let me know if

I

a

learning

can be of further assistance to

you in any way.

4

Ratliff
Doctoral Candidate
University of Massachusetts
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